Microfinance, Household Indebtedness and Gender Inequality by Mannah-Blankson, Theresa
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Doctoral Dissertations Dissertations and Theses 
July 2016 
Microfinance, Household Indebtedness and Gender Inequality 
Theresa Mannah-Blankson 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2 
Recommended Citation 
Mannah-Blankson, Theresa, "Microfinance, Household Indebtedness and Gender Inequality" (2016). 
Doctoral Dissertations. 710. 
https://doi.org/10.7275/8431122.0 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/710 
This Campus-Only Access for Five (5) Years is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and 
Theses at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an 

























Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
MAY 2016 



























© Copyright by Theresa Mannah-Blankson 2016 




















Approved as to style and content by: 
_______________________________________ 
Léonce Ndikumana, Chair 
 
_______________________________________ 
Gerald Epstein, Member 
 
_______________________________________ 
James Heintz, Member 
 
_______________________________________ 
Lynda Pickbourn, Outside Member 
 
____________________________________ 
Michael Ash, Department Head,  
Department of Economics 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate this dissertation to my beloved children, Afia Nshira Dansoa Danso and 







Though this dissertation bears my name, its production has benefitted from the 
dedicated work, generous support and contributions from a great number of people. I am 
grateful to everyone who has helped to make the completion of this dissertation a reality 
and also helped to make my graduate experience at University of Massachusetts Amherst 
one that I will cherish forever.  
First, I owe my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Professor Léonce Ndikumana, for 
his patience, dedication and the knowledge he has imparted to me throughout this project. 
Léonce’s rich experience on African macroeconomic and development issues proved 
invaluable to helping me to finalize this project. At different stages of this project, 
Léonce challenged me to think deeply about my ideas by offering insightful suggestions 
while also providing me with the space to explore my own ideas. I must say that 
Léonce’s selfless time, encouragement and support were sometimes all that kept me 
going. 
I am equally grateful to the other members of my dissertation committee, 
Professors Gerald Epstein, James Heintz and Lynda Pickbourn, for their guidance, 
insightful comments, encouragement, and patience during the planning and the 
development of this project. Over the period of this project, Jerry Epstein provided 
constructive suggestions which contributed immensely to the quality of my research. 
James Heintz also provided insightful and probing comments which were helpful in 
inspiring my confidence in my quantitative analysis. I also received tremendous and 
indispensable input from Lynda Pickbourn throughout this project, which helped to 
enrich my ideas. To my dissertation committee, I say, “Thank you for the contribution 
 
vi 
you have each made towards my scholarly development. I feel highly privileged to have 
had the opportunity to work with you.” 
I am also grateful to the faculty and the administrative staff of the Economics 
Department and the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), at the University of 
Massachusetts Amherst, who have contributed in diverse ways towards my graduate 
experience. In particular, I am grateful to Professors, David Kotz, Jim Crotty, Mwangi wa 
Githingi, Robert Pollin, Michael Ash, and Gerald Friedman, who inspired in me a great 
interest in economic issues during my graduate study. I am also grateful to Joseph Pickul, 
Eileen Atallah, and Judy Fogg for their kindness and support, which they showed to me 
in diverse ways during the different stages of my graduate study.  
I gratefully acknowledge the support and generosity of the West African Research 
Center (WARC), the African Economic Research Consortium and the Bank of Ghana, 
without whom this study could not have been completed. I am also thankful for a 
dissertation fellowship from PERI and other dissertation grants from the Graduate School 
and the Economics Department, all at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, which 
were instrumental in helping me to finalize this dissertation. My thanks also go to the 
American Association of University Women and the PEO Sisterhood for providing 
funding at different stages of my graduate study. I am deeply grateful to my field research 
assistants, Joyce Appiah, Frank Owusu, Kekeli Adonu, and Ebenezer Blankson, and all 
my respondents. Without them, this dissertation would have been far from reality. My 
thanks also go to the data entry staff at the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research (ISSER) at the University of Ghana, Legon. I am deeply grateful to my brother, 
Gilbert, for helping to sort out the logistics for the survey and to my sister, Margaret 
 
vii 
Mary, and my mother for carrying the burden of taking care of my children while I went 
on my field trips. I would also like to thank Dr. Ernest Appiah of ISSER, at the 
University of Ghana, Legon, for helping to recruit and train my field research assistants 
and also assisting with the organization of the field research. Finally, my thanks go to 
Florianne Jimenez for her excellent proofreading and editing of this manuscript. 
The abiding kindness and support of many friends also helped me to remain 
focused during the period of my graduate study and research. Although I cannot mention 
everyone, I am particularly grateful to Evelyn Kwakye, Patricia Anafi, Yetunde Ajao, 
Rommel and Diana Fiori, and Jong-seok and Youngji Oh for their encouragement and 
support during my graduate study. I am also grateful to my church family at the First 
Baptist Church, Amherst. In particular, I am thankful to Pastor Greg Mozzell and his wife 
Carolyn, for providing me and my family with the spiritual guidance and encouragement 
during my graduate study. I am also deeply grateful to Rachel Tierney and Marie Rohan 
of the PEO Sisterhood, as well as, Mrs. Gaudence Ndikumana for their warmth and 
motherly love shown to my family during the period of this project. To all the other PEO 
sisters who also provided support and encouragement at different stages of my graduate 
study, I am deeply grateful. I am also thankful to Professor Elizabeth Asiedu of Kansas 
University whose mentorship, encouragement and support during my graduate study 
proved indispensable. 
Additionally, I am immensely grateful to my family for their love and patience 
throughout my graduate career. First, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my 
wonderful children, Afia Nshira Dansoa Danso and Charles Kofi Owusu Danso for their 
unfailing love and support during all the years devoted to completing this dissertation and 
 
viii 
the many precious moments not spent with them. Second, I remain forever indebted to 
my mother, Mary Cofie, for being an inspiration throughout my academic pursuits, and 
for her love and lifelong lessons instilled in me at an early age. Finally, I appreciate my 
siblings, Gilbert, Emmanuel, Ebenezer and Margaret Mary, for their understanding, love 
and confidence in my ability to complete my graduate studies despite all the setbacks. 
To all the above individuals and to several others whose names I cannot mention, 
I feel very much indebted and I pray that God will bless you all abundantly for your input 
in my scholarly development. To the Eternal and Most High God, I am remain thankful. I 




MICROFINANCE, HOUSEHOLD INDEBTEDNESS AND GENDER 
INEQUALITY 
MAY 2016 
THERESA MANNAH-BLANKSON, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF GHANA 
M.PHIL. UNIVERSITY OF GHANA 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Leonce Ndikumana 
My dissertation explores the implications of access to microfinance for gender 
equity and household welfare in Ghana. The study draws on the quantitative and 
qualitative evidence from a unique dataset generated from a survey of 499 households, 
with and without access to microfinance, during my field research work in Ghana from 
May to July 2013.  
The motivation for the dissertation derives from evidence suggesting that access 
to finance is an important tool for fighting poverty and reducing inequality. However, for 
most developing countries access to finance for the poor is mainly through the informal 
or the semi-formal sector, including microfinance institutions (MFIs). Microfinance is 
taking the center stage in developing countries as a major source of finance for the poor. 
The question is whether there is a risk that the conditions of the poor could be worsened 
through increased debt burden from access to credit from MFIs. This question is 
legitimate for two main reasons. First, the interest rates charged by MFIs on credit tend to 
be relatively higher than those charged by banks. Second, higher interest rates imply 
higher debt obligations for low income households with low returns on investment, which 
weakens their balance sheet. This is a cause of concern, especially given the lack of 
 
x 
institutional mechanisms for households in developing countries to deal with debt 
distress. This situation may make it harder for households to obtain additional external 
financing and to sustain expenditures, thereby leading to worsening household welfare. 
The evidence from this study shows that access to microfinance reduces gender 
asset gaps and generally improves household welfare. Further, the results suggest that 
debt burden beyond certain thresholds creates significant financial distress for households 
and reduces food expenditures while increasing the household’s credit constraints. The 
study shows that microfinance market, borrower-specific and household-specific 
characteristics are important factors explaining household indebtedness.  
Using an approach that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
and by applying different econometric approaches to household welfare analysis, this 
dissertation contributes to the growing body of empirical literature on the impact of 
access to microfinance on household-level welfare. It also contributes to a relatively new 
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1.1 Introduction  
Reducing poverty and inequality continues to feature at the top of national 
development strategies and the global development agenda. In 2010, more than 460 
million people in developing countries (over 20%), lived in extreme poverty; that is, on 
less than $1.25 a day (World Bank, 2014). Despite considerable success over the past 
decade in reducing extreme poverty, it remains high in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): 48% in 
2010, down from 58% in 1999. Sub-Saharan Africa is also characterized by high levels of 
inequality.  Perhaps more worrisome is the slow pace of reduction in gender inequality in 
the form of income, health, education, employment and human rights.1 In fact, in some 
countries within the sub-region, gender inequality is increasing, suggesting that efforts 
aimed at reducing extreme poverty have benefitted males relatively more than females. 
Among the factors which have been identified as contributing to poverty and 
gender inequality in developing countries is credit constraint, which is mostly faced by 
poor households. Despite the growth of the financial sector in SSA, the poor are still 
excluded from the formal financial sector. This is due in part to their relatively low levels 
                                                          
1 There are some improvements observed in gender equity for selected countries in some 
areas such as education and political leadership. Currently Liberia and Malawi have female 
Presidents and in general there are recorded improvements in gender representation in national 
parliament of most SSA countries. Majority of countries in SSA have also attained gender equity 
in primary education. 
 
2 
of income and lack of assets which can be used as collateral for accessing credit. This 
results in a gap in terms of demand and supply of credit for poor households.  
To help tackle these two problems of poverty and inequality, in particular gender 
inequality, access to credit for poor households must increase. However, in most 
developing countries, access to finance for the poor, the majority of whom are engaged in 
the informal sector, is mainly through the informal or the semi-formal sector, including 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). Indeed, microfinance, which exists in several forms but 
is mostly characterized as small-scale lending to poor households on an individual basis 
or on a group basis, is taking center stage in developing countries as a major source of 
finance for the poor. Microfinance lending began to increase in the late 1990s. This was 
after Muhammad Yunus, one of the key proponents of microfinance and a Nobel 
laureate, founded the Grameen Bank and convinced the world that micro-loans to very 
poor people could make a difference in their livelihoods. This led the United Nations to 
declare 2005 the International Year of Microcredit.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
With the proliferation of MFIs it is expected that the gap between the demand and 
supply of credit, especially for the very poor, would be bridged. Indeed, the main 
ideology underlying the microfinance model is to enable the poor who are mostly 
excluded from the formal financial sector to have access to financial services to improve 
their livelihoods through increased income, food security and improvement in the 
nutritional status of children. However, there are concerns with the bridging-the-gap role 
of MFIs given the relatively high cost of microfinance credit compared with bank credit. 
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The question is whether there is a risk that the conditions of the poor could be worsened 
due to increased debt burden from access to credit from microfinance institutions. This 
question is legitimate for the following reasons: 
- Cost channel: The interest rates charged by Microfinance institutions tend to be 
relatively higher than those charged by banks in the formal financial sector. This 
may be due to the high overhead costs incurred in the operation of microfinance 
institutions as well as their low deposit base relative to commercial banks. This is 
also partly a result of the lack of competition in the sector; poor households are in 
a sense a captive market. 
- Balance sheet effect: Higher interest rates imply higher debt obligations for low 
income households with low returns on investment and therefore weaker balance 
sheet. This situation may make it harder to obtain more external financing or even 
to sustain expenditures, thereby leading to worsening household welfare.  For the 
poor who access credit from MFIs not to be caught in a debt trap, it is essential 
that they apply the credit obtained from MFIs not only to consumption, but also to 
income-generating activities that enable them to generate high returns and for 
which the profit rate is greater than the interest rate. 
- Lack of institutional mechanisms to deal with financial stress on the household: In 
most developed countries, in the event that their loans go delinquent, households 
are able to acquire debt relief without large penalties toward smooth spending 
under bankruptcy systems. For most households in developing countries and 
especially for SSA countries, there are no institutional mechanisms to enable 
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households to cope with financial distress should they go delinquent on their 
loans. This means that indebted households may be forced to reduce spending, 
and in some severe cases, resort to distress sale of their limited assets.  The lack of 
institutional mechanisms may pose severe constraints particularly for women, 
especially in Ghana where there is limited pooling of household income, and 
women and men often have separate budgets and different levels of access to 
household assets. 
1.3 Justification of the Study 
Based on the context described above, and in light of the issues raised about 
access to MFI credit, policymakers are concerned not only about increasing access to 
credit, but also about the source of credit, especially for poor households. It is therefore 
important to assess the implications of the increasing access to credit from MFIs by (1) 
examining the impact of microfinance on the balance sheet of poor households, (2) 
understanding how different members of the household are affected, and (3) determining 
whether household welfare is compromised by increased debt burden.  
There is a consensus that microfinance tends to target women (Armendáriz and 
Jonathan, 2005; Bateman, 2010; Endeley, 2001; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Mayoux, 1999). 
However, the question of whether the gender asset gap within and across households 
declines from increased access to microfinance has yet to be empirically evaluated. In 
addition, evidence on the impact of access to microfinance on intra-household inequality, 
particularly between males and females, is limited. There is also a dearth of research on 
the impact of access to microfinance on household indebtedness and financial distress. 
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This dissertation, therefore, aims to fill these gaps in the literature with a specific focus 
on Ghana. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The aim of the study is to empirically explore the impact of microfinance on the 
welfare of poor households. The specific objectives of the study are the following: 
o To examine the impact of access to credit from MFIs on poor households’ balance 
sheet, specifically the effect on household indebtedness, 
o To identify the factors that influence households’ financial distress, 
o To understand households’ coping mechanisms for dealing with financial distress, 
o To assess the impact of access to microcredit on the gender asset gaps within and 
across households, and 
o To examine whether access to microcredit improves children’s school enrollment.  
1.5 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of the dissertation is set within the context of the two 
sets of theories: (1) Theories of financial market imperfections, adverse selection and 
moral hazard; (2) theories of intra-household allocation decisions, specifically the 
bargaining models of intra-household resource allocation, which are used to analyze 
conflict that may exist among members within a household.  
1.5.1 Credit Market Imperfections 
Financial markets are complex in terms of their operations and thus cannot be 
characterized as perfectly competitive. A key assumption underlying the perfect market 
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proposition is complete and symmetric information. The assumption of perfect 
information implies that all players in the market have perfect knowledge regarding the 
actions of each player and the attributes of the products in the market. In practice, 
however, borrowers may have valuable information that lenders do not have on the 
riskiness of their projects and their true ability to repay the loan. This information 
asymmetry results in adverse selection2 and moral hazard3 in credit markets, yielding 
sub-optimal supply of credit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981a).  
Sub-optimal supply of credit means that in ‘equilibrium’ there will be potential 
borrowers who are willing to take loans at the going interest rate, and even at higher rates 
who are turned down by lenders weary of the high risk of default that may be associated 
with higher interest rates. In other words, information asymmetry may generate ‘credit 
rationing’, shutting off some potential borrowers from the credit market. Information 
asymmetry in financial markets thus prevents the efficient allocation of resources 
(Stiglitz, 1993a). In particular, asymmetric information and the high fixed cost of small-
scale lending limits the access of the poor to the formal financial institutions, thus 
pushing them to the informal financial sector or to the extreme case of financial 
exclusion. Aghion and Morduch (2005) also notes that adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems resulting from imperfect information in financial markets are often 
                                                          
2 Adverse selection refers to situations in which there are difficulties in determining the 
level of risk each customer represents for which reason any attempt at raising the average interest 
rate could potentially result in having a high pool of riskier customers. 
3 Moral hazard refers to situations in which banks are unable to ascertain if indeed loans 




aggravated in situations where the judicial systems are weak due to inadequate 
enforcement of contracts.  
Evidence in African countries has shown that orthodox financial liberalization has 
failed to correct credit market imperfections (Mkandawire, 1999a).  Financial 
liberalization, as argued by Mkandawire (1999b), was expected to result in improved 
efficiency. However it ‘has reduced policy-making to the establishment of narrow and 
idiosyncratic ‘fundamentals’ confined almost exclusively to issues of stabilization and 
debt management (Mkandawire 1999: 338-339).’ As witnessed in most SSA countries 
that have adopted an inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy, the resource 
mobilization and allocation objectives of banks have given way to the stabilization 
objective. The strong emphasis placed on stabilization has compromised the ability of 
financial liberalization to address the fundamental development issues, resulting instead 
in perverse effects that undermine efforts at poverty eradication. As a result, other 
sources such as informal finance and microfinance are increasingly taking up the roles 
that formal banking institutions are expected to assume.  
Imperfections in the formal financial sector may generate gender discrimination in 
the sense that access to credit is skewed in favor of men relative to women. It has been 
documented empirically that in the formal financial sector, poor women are the subject of 
discrimination in terms of access to financial services. This discrimination stems from 
women’s weak bargaining position in the household, which in turn further constrains 
women’s access to financial services. Most of the time, men have control of marketable 
assets that can be used as collateral. Access to microfinance for women has therefore 
been proposed as a tool for poverty alleviation and women empowerment.  
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1.5.2 Intra-Household Allocation Decisions 
Empirical evidence based on bargaining models of intra-household resource 
allocation shows that in terms of distribution of resources, women are often the object of 
discrimination at the household and society levels (Berkner, 1973; Folbre, 1986, 1996). 
The literature identifies the unequal gender division of labor resulting in unequal gender 
division of rewards as a key factor of gender discrimination. Essentially, the work most 
women do (mostly household activities) is considered to be of low market value, 
resulting in lower or no rewards, ultimately undermining women’s bargaining position 
within the household. 
The weak economic position of women also means that they have less bargaining 
power and are constrained in terms of making decisions regarding how many children to 
have and investment decisions relating to their children, in particular, which of their 
children gets priority in terms of education, health, etc. Microfinance may improve 
women’s bargaining position and their overall livelihood, thus reducing gender inequality 
at both the household and country levels.       
1.6 Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the following questions:  
1. What are the implications of access to credit from MFIs on household 
welfare? 
2. Does access to microfinance increase financial distress through high debt 
burden on households? 
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3. How do households cope with financial distress? This question will be 
addressed using qualitative information collected from the field survey 
and focus group discussions. 
4. Does access to microfinance reduce the gender asset gaps within and 
across households? In other words, to what extent does access to 
microcredit help to reduce gender inequalities?  
5. How does access to credit from MFIs affect children’s school enrollment? 
1.7 Research Hypotheses 
The study will test the following hypotheses: 
1. Access to credit from MFIs reduces the gender asset gaps within and across 
households;  
2. Access to credit from MFIs improves children’s school enrollment;   
3. Microfinance market characteristics are important determinants of a 
household’s debt service burden and financial distress; 
4. Access to credit from MFIs compromises household welfare by: 
 increasing household debt burden,  
 increasing the probability of financial distress and credit constraint, and 
 reducing expenditures, in particular, food expenditures. 
5. Coping mechanisms for dealing with financial distress do not differ 




Since the focus of this study is on the impact of access to credit from 
microfinance at the household level, household survey data is required for the analysis. 
The main source of household survey data in Ghana is the Ghana Living Standards 
Survey (GLSS). While the GLSS contains rich data, its usefulness for addressing the 
questions raised in this study is limited, especially because it does not contain data on 
access to microfinance. This motivated the gathering of primary data from a field survey. 
The analysis therefore draws on the quantitative and qualitative evidence from a unique 
dataset generated from a survey of 499 households conducted from May to July 2013. 
The sample includes households with and without access to microfinance. 
The household survey collected household-level data on access to credit from 
MFIs, overall balance sheet, and demographic characteristics. The survey covered two 
regions, Central and Greater Accra. The strategy was to target communities with access 
to microfinance institutions. Households with access to microfinance were randomly 
selected from the clientele list of randomly selected microfinance institutions and 
households without microcredit were randomly sampled within the same communities. 
This was done in order to reduce selection bias. Out of the sample of 499 households 
used in the analysis, 252 households had received MFI loans while 247 had never taken 
loans from microfinance institutions. 
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1.9 Importance and Limitations of the Study 
1.9.1 Importance of the Study 
The task of reducing poverty by increasing incomes of poor households and by 
eradicating all forms of inequalities implies reexamining the current tools that have been 
adopted and determining important ways to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. 
We recognize the important roles of MFIs in the provision of small loans and financial 
services to the poor who are excluded from the formal financial institutions due to their 
weak bargaining power. Indeed the supply of credit to poor households has increased 
significantly as a result of the proliferation of MFIs.  
While empirical research has shown that access to credit and financial services 
from MFIs contributes positively to the reduction of poverty and inequality, there is little 
evidence on its impact on poor households’ balance sheet. The high repayment of MFI 
loans by borrowers has been identified as a good indicator of the effectiveness of 
microcredit. However little is known about what factors contribute to the high repayment 
of MFI loans. Similarly, the issue of how different members of poor households, 
particularly men and women, are affected by the increased access to microcredit has also 
received little attention in the empirical literature, which makes an assessment of the 
intra-household dynamics of the impact of microcredit paramount.  
While increasing access to financial services for the poor is a desirable outcome 
in itself, it is also important to examine its effects on the overall welfare of poor 
households. This is in view of the fact that the rate of interest charged by MFIs is 
significantly higher compared to the rates charged by banks. Policymakers have relied on 
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monetary policy instruments to help bring down interest rate spreads, but the available 
evidence points to the fact that the spreads between MFIs’ lending rates and banks’ 
lending rates are unresponsive to monetary policy instruments. Thus, to bring down these 
spreads and help reduce the cost of funds for poor households, specific policies targeted 
at reducing these high rates of interest on loans from MFIs are necessary. The findings 
from this study are therefore expected to help stakeholders identify effective ways to 
ensure that the overall welfare of poor households is not compromised by their increasing 
access to credit from MFIs.  
1.9.2 Limitations of the Study 
There are a number of limitations of the study which are worth mentioning. First, 
while the findings of this study are expected to guide the decisions of various 
stakeholders, overall generalizations cannot be made as the data is country-specific and 
focused on two out of the ten administrative regions of Ghana. Nonetheless, the findings 
from the study may provide a guide for future research on the same issues in other SSA 
countries. Second, the limited empirical evidence in the literature related to the issues 
discussed in this study makes comparative analysis particularly difficult. This is 
particularly the case in the analysis on the impact of access to credit from MFIs on 
households’ financial distress, which to our knowledge has not been assessed before. 
Third, since the observations were taken at a single point in time, intertemporal analysis, 
which would enable us to assess households’ poverty and welfare transitions, is 
impossible. Nevertheless, the use of cross-sectional data will still provide useful 
information. Finally, as with most self-reported data, there is the potential for some bias 
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in responses. However, every attempt will be made in the analysis to identify and 
mitigate the impacts of such biases on the results.  
1.10 Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized in 6 chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 
provides the background and historical contexts of the study. Chapter 3 describes the 
field research conducted in Ghana. Chapter 4 analyzes the implications of access to 
microcredit on households’ balance sheet and welfare. Chapter 5 presents the analysis of 
the implications of access to microfinance on gender inequality. Chapter 6 provides the 
summary and conclusion of the study with suggested policy implications and some 






POVERTY, GENDER INEQUALITY, AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
MICROFINANCE IN GHANA: HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
2.1 Introduction 
There is growing evidence that the improvement of gender development outcomes 
is critically important for sustainable development. At the micro level, improvement in 
access to education and health for women positively affects the wellbeing of children and 
the household as a whole. At the aggregate level, the improvement in health and 
education for women and increased access to productive assets result in economy-wide 
productivity gains (Pickbourn and Ndikumana, 2013). Despite this growing evidence, 
developing countries have mostly shelfed issues relating to improving development 
outcomes for women. Until recently, gender mainstreaming had failed to gain traction in 
development frameworks in most developing countries. The lack of commitment to 
gender mainstreaming perpetuates gender inequalities at all fronts leading to the possible 
reproduction of poverty, as also suggested by Awumbila (2006).  
This chapter provides the historical background for understanding the evolution of 
microfinance within the context of efforts by stakeholders aimed at poverty reduction and 
gender equity in Ghana. There has been significant improvement in the Ghanaian 
macroeconomic environment in the past decade, including accelerated and sustained 
GDP growth rates, price stability with low inflation, which, accompanied by a vibrant 
private sector, has boosted employment creation. Despite these positive developments, 
the poverty rate remains high at 24.2% in 2012/13, down from 31.9% in 2005/06 (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2014a). The Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) 6 report also 
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shows growing disparities in terms of spatial development as well as worsening welfare 
distribution within and across groups in 2012/13 compared to 2005/06.   
It is against this background that this chapter proceeds to examine developments 
in the macroeconomic environment since independence, including policy frameworks 
implemented over the period, and to situate the trends and patterns in poverty reduction 
and gender inequality within the context of these different policy frameworks as well as 
understand the nature of financial policies embedded within these policy frameworks and 
their contribution to the evolution of the microfinance market in the country. In 
particular, we will discuss specific policies aimed at directly and indirectly reducing 
poverty and gender inequalities. The analysis of gender inequality will cover economic 
inequalities, political inequalities, and social inequalities, comparing the case of Ghana 
with average trends and patterns within the SSA region.   
2.2 Poverty and Gender Inequality in Ghana 
When Ghana attained independence from British colonial rule in 1957, the 
euphoria of the moment was characterized by high expectations for economic prosperity. 
At the time, Ghana was a leading exporter of cocoa, and coupled with receipts from gold 
and timber exports, the country had “enviable external reserves” (see Coulombe and 
Wodon (2007)). By 1960, Ghana had a per capita GDP of $481.6, much higher than 
Botswana’s $379.6 (see Figure 2.1). The euphoria was to be short-lived as Ghana, who 
attained independence the same year as Malaysia, began to experience adverse effects of 
ill-advised economic policies, external and weather-related shocks which caused general 
economic and political instability during much of the 1960s and 1970s (Coulombe and 
Wodon, 2007). As a result, GDP per capita plummeted from $493.2 in 1963 to $449.6 in 
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1968 and fluctuated during much of the 1970s and declining to its lowest of $320.7 in 
1983. By comparison, over the same period Malaysia witnessed consistent increase in 
GDP per capita from $986.4 in 1960 to $2586.23 in 1983 (see Figure 2.1). Similarly, 
Botswana witnessed consistent increase in GDP per capita from $379.6 in 1960 to 
$2295.3 by 1983. 
Due to the poor economic performance characterizing most of the 1960s and 
1970s, which led to the high levels of poverty, the early 1980s saw the implementation of 
successive reform programs aimed at boosting economic growth, a necessary condition 
for poverty reduction. As had been the trend with most developing countries, Ghana 
turned to the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank for support to help 
deal with the worsening economic conditions. The IMF and the World Bank facilitated 
the implementation of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983 followed by the 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1987 in a bid to stabilize the macroeconomic 
environment.  
While these structural adjustment programs focused directly on macroeconomic 
stabilization and less directly on poverty reduction, some growth was recorded as the 
country’s GDP growth averaged 4.8% from 1983 to 1999 and a modest average growth 
in GDP per capita of 2% over the same period. The number of people living below the 
poverty line $1.25 declined from 50.6% in 1988 to 28.5% in 1998. This was, however, 
accompanied by a rising income share for the top 10% from 27.3% to 30% and a 
declining income share of the bottom 10% from 2.8% to 2.2% over the same period.  
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However, the success of the ERP and SAP was unsustainable, as the conditions 
prior to their implementation begun to rear their head once again as the economy slipped 
back into crisis by the late 1990s. Deteriorating living conditions accompanied by a high 
and unsustainable national debt during the late 1990s warranted the need for the 
government to declare the country as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) in 2001 
(Sowa, 2002). The HIPC initiative, which was accompanied by the pursuit of strict fiscal 
and monetary discipline, sought to reduce the net present value (NPV) of external debt to 
a maximum of 150 percent of exports through debt relief by the time the country reached 
the completion point. Though the initiative may not be classified as a direct poverty 
reduction strategy, its implementation was expected to release budgetary resources to be 
channeled towards poverty-related expenditures.  
2.2.1 Poverty Reduction Strategies in Ghana 
The first official Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I (GPRS I) paper was drawn 
up based upon the debt relief from the HIPC initiative. The GPRS I was implemented 
from 2003 to 2005. While the main purpose of the GPRS I was to revamp the distorted 
macroeconomic environment, it also aimed at reconditioning the macroeconomy for the 
implementation of sectoral policies towards the promotion of sustainable economic 
growth and poverty reduction (Ghana, 2007). An important part of the GPRS I was its 
strategic focus on human development, which involved the implementation of programs 
aimed at improving access of the population to basic needs and essential services, in the 
spirit of attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on poverty reduction. 
These programs included the provision of basic education, improved access to safe water, 
improved health, improvement in environmental sanitation and special programs targeted 
 
18 
specifically at the vulnerable and socially excluded sectors of the population (Ghana, 
2007).  
The implementation of the GPRS I was later followed by the Growth and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy II (GPRS II), implemented from 2006 to 2009. The GPRS II had a 
strategic focus on the implementation of growth-inducing policies with expected trickle-
down effects on wealth creation and poverty reduction (Ghana, 2007). Specific and direct 
interventions in the GPRS II aimed at poverty reduction have been focused on 
modernization of agriculture to facilitate rural development through increased production 
and employment, and increased investments in education, health, and sanitation to 
enhance the delivery of basic social services (Ghana, 2007).   
Following the GPRS I and II, several other programs have been drawn up, 
specifically to facilitate poverty reduction. These policies are embodied in the medium-
term national development framework, also referred to as the Ghana Shared Growth and 
Development Agenda (GSGDA), which was formulated in 2009 and implemented from 
2010 to 2013 (IMF, 2012). The main objective of the GSGDA is to achieve and sustain 
macroeconomic stability as well as to place the economy on a higher path of shared 
growth and poverty reduction. Specific policies within the framework expected to 
facilitate poverty reduction have been focused on improving human development, 
productivity and employment (IMF, 2012). Targeted measures aimed at reducing 
feminized poverty include the implementation of preventive, promotional and protection 
interventions to deal with chronic poverty, vulnerability and exclusion. These 
interventions include the promotion of women’s economic empowerment through 
improved access to land, labor, credit, markets, information, technology, business 
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services and networks, and social protection, in addition to the promotion of women’s 
social empowerment through access to education.  
Notable policy interventions to reduce poverty which are broadly embodied in the 
above-mentioned policy frameworks include the following: 
(1) National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)  
The NHIS is a national health insurance established by the Government of Ghana 
and established under the National Health Insurance Act. The stated mission of the NHIS 
is ‘to ensure equitable universal access for all residents of Ghana to an acceptable quality 
of essential health services without out-of-pocket payment being required at the point of 
service use’ (Ghana Ministry of Health, 2004a; Mensah, Oppong, andSchmidt, 2010). 
The scheme was implemented in 2003 and was expected to replace the out-of-pocket fees 
at point of service. The services covered by the NHIS are laid out in the minimum basic 
benefits package, which is fairly extensive and is targeted at covering 95 percent of all 
health care problems reported at any health care facility in Ghana. The premiums paid by 
members of the scheme range from GHS 7.20 – 48.00, equivalent to $3.60 - 24.004. The 
NHIS covers care provided by both public and private licensed health care providers at 
all levels of the health systems. Under the NHIS, the extreme poor and vulnerable are 
enrolled for free. Since July 2008, all pregnant women are also exempt from paying 
insurance premiums. The scheme currently covers over 50 percent of the Ghanaian 
population (Mensah et al., 2010). 
                                                          
4 The exchange rate in June 2013 was $1 to GH¢2.  
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(2) Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty (LEAP)  
LEAP is a social cash transfer program specifically aimed at providing cash and 
health insurance to extremely poor households to alleviate short-term poverty and 
encourage long-term human capital development (Handa et al., 2013). The trial phase of 
the program was launched in March 2008 and has been gradually expanding. Currently, it 
is reported that it reaches an estimated 70,000 households. Eligibility for LEAP is based 
on poverty and having a household member in at least one of the following three 
demographic categories: households with an orphan or vulnerable child, elderly poor, or 
person with extreme disability making it impossible to work (Handa et al., 2013). Aside 
the direct cash payments, beneficiaries are also provided free health care insurance 
through the NHIS, which is administered by the local health authorities. The transfer 
payment structure is based on the number of household beneficiaries: GHS¢8 – one 
beneficiary; GH¢10 – two beneficiaries; GH¢12 – three beneficiaries; and GHS¢15 – 
four and above beneficiaries (Handa and Park, 2011). 
(3) Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) 
Despite the fact that Ghana is a low-middle income country, the Northern 
Savannah Ecological Zone (NSEZ) remains the least developed in spite of efforts by 
successive governments to address the disparity between the north and the south (Donkoh 
and Awuni, 2011). The NSEZ generally has poor infrastructure, which essentially implies 
that the majority of its agriculture and other productive potential in the region, which has 
40 percent of Ghana’s land area and 20 percent of the total population, remains 
unexploited. This has resulted in low household per capita incomes and a less than 
satisfactory contribution to the economy’s GDP (Donkoh and Awuni, 2011). It is in view 
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of the above factors that the SADA project was established as a special intervention by 
the Government of Ghana under the GSGDA to tackle the north-south disparities. In 
addition, the SADA project is in recognition of the fact that the NSEZ contributes the 
largest share of national poverty and the worst performance in terms of education 
outcomes and maternal and child health (see Figure 2.1). The project aims to accelerate 
the socio-economic development of the savannah belt through investment in resource 
development, and involves a strategy for a ‘forested north’ by 2030, through the 
modernization of agricultural production, which is re-oriented towards a larger market 
within the Sahelien countries, including northern Cote d’Ivoire and Togo. The SADA 
project which is specifically targeted at investment in water resources, drainage, and 
irrigation for year-round production in the Northern Region is expected to create 
sustainable employment and increased assets for the poor (Osei-Assibey, 2014).  
 Despite the enormous challenges which have been encountered in the 
implementation of these different interventions, as described above, including financial 
mismanagement, and political interferences, the interventions are expected to facilitate 
rapid reduction in poverty as well as to promote shared prosperity at all levels of 
Ghanaian society (Osei-Assibey, 2014).  
2.2.2 Gender Equity Policies in Ghana  
 The significant focus of successive governments on strategies aimed at 
macroeconomic prosperity, as was the case in the SAP and ERPS, has also meant that 
specific policies aimed at inclusive economic prosperity have been elusive. This has been 
the case until recently, when the most vulnerable in the Ghanaian population, including 
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the aged, children, the youth and women, have been specifically targeted in policy 
frameworks, such as in the GRSP I and II and the GSGDA.  
Some specific initiatives aimed at inclusive growth, which are also expected to 
facilitate gender equity, include the NHIS, the LEAP, and SADA, all of which are 
described in the preceding section. However, the Ghana Gender Policy (1997), adopted 
by the government of Ghana following several international conventions (such as the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations Against Women (1979); 
the UN Beijing Declaration (1995); The Commonwealth Plan of Action on Gender and 
Development (1995); The African Platform for Action (1994); and the International 
Labor Organization Declaration and Resolutions Pertaining to Gender Equality and 
Equity at Work 1975, 1985, 1987, and 1991), provides the framework within which 
gender is being mainstreamed for achieving the goals of Ghana’s Vision 2020 (Ghana, 
2002). Specific gender initiatives include the following:   
(1) Education Strategic Plan (ESP) 
One notable initiative which is targeted specifically at gender equity in education 
is the Education Strategic Plan (ESP). The ESP was launched in 2003 to lend strategic 
support to Ghana’s effort towards the promotion of girls’ education. In fact, the 
promotion of girls’ education began in the 1990s, as part of the underlying reason for the 
implementation of the Free and Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) policy 
in 1995. Enshrined in the spirit of the MDGs, the ESP aimed at a Gender Parity Index of 
1 for all levels of education and training (Ghana, 2007). Specific aspects of the program 
involved direct cash transfers or in-kind support made to girls by both the government 
and NGOs. Other tangible measures implemented included the appointment of a Minister 
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responsible for girl-child education. In addition, a girls’ education unit, established in 
1997, aimed to provide emphasis to girls’ education and to improve the status of women 
and girls. The unit specifically emphasizes an increase in girls’ enrollment and reducing 
the dropout rate for girls, as well as improving the transition rate for girls to the senior 
secondary school level. 
(2) Access to Credit  
One of the critical initiatives embodied within the Gender Policy framework is to 
improve access to credit especially for women. Non-institutional facilities established for 
women include the Mutual Assistance Susu Limited (MASU) of the Women’s World 
Banking, the Women’s Credit Program of the Ghana Cooperative Credit Union 
Association and the Council for Indigenous Business Association (CIBA) (Ghana, 2002). 
Despite these initiatives, reaching the targets has been hampered by the low levels of 
literacy among women micro-entrepreneurs and the significant constraints on their time 
as well as the lower loan sizes provided to them compared to their male counterparts, thus 
limiting their productive capacities. In addition, several other microfinance institutions 
have evolved to also fill the gap in terms of access to credit for those excluded from the 
formal financial institutions.  
2.2.3 Trends in Poverty and Gender Inequality in Ghana 
Despite the challenges which have saddled most of these poverty and gender 
inequality strategies, some modest impact has been recorded for selected indicators which 




2.2.3.1 Economic Prosperity 
Despite substantial improvement in growth, Ghana still lags behind when 
compared with some of its comparators such Botswana and Malaysia (see Table 2.1 and 
Figure 2.1). Botswana is used as a comparator because it is within the sub-Saharan Africa 
sub-region and also because in 1960, both Botswana and Ghana had comparable GDP per 
capita: $380 and $480, respectively. Malaysia is selected because Ghana attained 
independence in the same year as Malaysia.  
Currently, Botswana and Malaysia both enjoy an average GDP per capita of about 
$7000 in 2013, from their levels of $380 and $986, respectively in 1960. Ghana has 
however achieved only a modest increase in its GDP per capita from $480 in 1960 to 
$769 in 2013 (see Figure 2.1). Contributing to the rapid increases in the economic 
prosperity of Botswana and Malaysia has been their relatively high and sustained 
economic growth paths since the 1960s until the 2000s when the 2008 financial crisis 
struck. The 2008 financial crisis led to both countries recording negative growth in 2009 
(i.e., -7.7% and -1.5%, respectively) and slowing their decadal averages to 3.5% and 
4.8% respectively (see Table 2.1). Ghana, on the other hand recorded low economic 
growth amidst political instability and mismanagement of the economy which resulted in 
significant fluctuations in economic growth for most of the 1960s until the 2000s, when 
the oil find in commercial quantities and prudent macroeconomic policies during this 
time contributed to accelerated and sustained or stable economic growth path.  
Economic progress has led to a decline in the poverty rate, especially for Malaysia 
where the poverty rate has dropped from its level of 37.6% in the 1970s to 1.7% over the 
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2010 to 2013 period (Table 2.1).5 Not surprising, the poverty rate6 has remained quite 
high both in most of the SSA sub-region at 44.4% over the 2010 to 2013 period 
compared to 51.8% in the 2000s (see Table 2.1). In the case of Ghana, the trend reveals a 
significant decline from its level of 63.3% in the 1980s to 25% in the 2000s. However, 
when examined using the national estimates, we do find that within groups and across 
localities poverty is rife, especially in rural localities (see Figure 2.2).    
2.2.3.2 Gender Equity 
The GLSS 6 report indicates that the incidence of poverty among female-headed 
households tends to be lower compared to their male counterparts (i.e., 19% and 26%, 
respectively). However, the recent Gender Asset Gap Project7 which compares female 
and male ownership of household physical wealth, shows a lower share for female, 
30.2% in 2013, indicating significant gender wealth gaps in Ghana (Table 2.2).  
Available statistics on gender equity indicators from the World Bank show some 
progress in gender parity in terms of educational attainment in Ghana relative to the SSA 
region (Table 2.3). While the proportion of female children in the total dropout children 
at the primary level in Ghana declined marginally from 50.3% in 2000 to 48.9% in 2010, 
                                                          
5 The poverty rate here is the Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of 
population). 
6 The poverty rate here is the Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of 
population). 
7 Measuring the Gender Asset Gap in Ecuador, Ghana and India, is a collaborative 
research study of the Centre of Public Policy (CPP) at the Indian Institute of Management 
Bangalore (IIMB), University of Ghana, American University, Yale University, University of 
Florida and the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), Ecuador. 
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the share of female children dropout within the SSA region increased from 54.3% to 
55.4% over the same period (see Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3). The gender parity index for 
school enrollment at the primary and secondary levels improved in Ghana and at the SSA 
level. Progression to secondary school for females, as well as the gender parity index for 
youth literacy rates have both increased over the 2000 to 2010 period. Improvement in 
educational attainment for females has occurred as a result of the immense commitment 
of stakeholders to achieving the MDGs on the basis of the education strategic plan. 
In the area of health, the data reveal that improvement in access to health has 
resulted in improved health outcomes in the past decade as the life expectancy at birth for 
males and females has increased from 56 years and 58 years to 60 years and 61.5 years 
respectively (Table 2.3). Progress has been made at the SSA regional level as well, 
though at relatively lower levels compared to Ghana. Similarly, life expectancy at 60 
years has also improved for males and females (Figure 2.4). The under-five mortality 
rate, which measures the probability of dying between birth and exactly 5 years of age 
expressed per 1000 births, has declined for both genders, though it remains high 
particularly for males both in Ghana and at the SSA regional level. 
Despite progress with regards to educational and health outcomes for females, 
little progress has been recorded in terms of employment for females relative to their 
male counterparts. Unemployment rate for the youth (i.e., ages 15 - 24) declined faster 
from 2000 to 2010 for males compared to their female counterparts, from 16.2% to 
10.5% and 16.5% to 12.4% respectively (Table 2.3). However, the trend has been much 
slower at the SSA regional level. Ghana recorded a decline in the proportion of employed 
females (i.e., 15 years and above) in the total female population from 45.4% in 2000 to 
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34% in 2010. This may be compared to an increase from 42.7% to 44% at the SSA 
regional level. The national estimates show a similar pattern albeit at a much higher level 
compared to the ILO estimates (Figure 2.5). The proportion of employed males in the 
total male population, however, remains high at 67.4% and 71% for Ghana and the SSA 
region, respectively. Similarly, the labor force participation rate is relatively higher for 
males compared to females, for both Ghana and the SSA region.  
In terms of political participation, the data on Ghana shows that the proportion of 
seats held by women in the national parliament is less than 10%, with a registered decline 
from 9% in 2000 to 8.3% in 2010. By comparison the average for SSA increased from 
11.6% to 19% over the same period. The proportion of women in ministerial level 
positions in Ghana was 21.6% compared to 19.5% at the SSA regional level in 2010 
(Table 2.3).   
These developments suggest the need for future strategies to tackle poverty 
vigorously in order to achieve the sustainable development goal of eliminating poverty in 
all its forms as well as reducing inequality at all levels. Recent developments, following 
the discovery of oil in Ghana, suggest that progress with poverty reduction will be much 
faster, especially in the light of the economy’s rapid growth within the last decade. 
However, given the growing evidence of the importance of improvement in gender 
development outcomes at both the micro and aggregate level of the economy of Ghana, it 
is important that national development policy remains focused on gendering poverty 
reduction strategies by facilitating improvement in women’s education and health as well 
as improved access to low-cost credit.  
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2.3 Evolution of Microfinance in Ghana 
Microfinance, as the name suggests, is the provision of financial services targeted 
at the poor who are engaged in income-generating activities and are otherwise excluded 
from formal financial institutions. Specifically, the World Bank defines microfinance as 
the provision of financial services, including savings, credit, insurance and payments 
services to low-income people. It may also be defined as offering any financial product or 
services to customers whose access to mainstream financial services is impeded as a 
result of having a weak economic position. In Ghana, the term microfinance encapsulates 
all financial bodies outside of the banking system and whose operations mainly involve 
the extension of credit and the mobilization of saving deposits at a smaller scale 
compared to that of banks. 
Microfinance services exist in both developed and developing countries but they 
are mostly widespread in developing countries where the financial systems are less 
developed. It is a widely accepted view that the low depth of the financial systems in less 
developed countries explains the rapid growth of microfinance services in the developing 
world. The inability of banks to service the poor does not imply that the poor do not 
borrow. Other sources of credit available to the poor, and which are mostly informal, 
include relatives, local traders, moneylenders, cooperatives, and neighbors. However, the 
capacity of these informal sources of credit to meet the needs of low-income households 
is constrained by limited resources (Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
In view of the various issues characterizing financial markets and the limitations 
of other informal sources of credit, different types of microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
have emerged to meet the unsatisfied demand for financial services particularly for the 
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poor. Specifically, in recent times, microfinance has been identified as instrumental in 
addressing the issue of access to credit for those caught up in the poverty trap and who by 
virtue of their lack of collateral are excluded from the formal financial markets. 
Microfinance is widely acclaimed to enable individuals to increase their income levels 
and also help in smoothing consumption of poor households and in reducing gender 
discrimination.  
2.3.1 History of Microfinance in Ghana  
The evolution of the microfinance sector in Ghana began in 1955 when the first 
credit union in Africa was established in Northern Ghana by Canadian Catholic 
missionaries (Asiama and Osei, 2007). Though it is believed that microfinance existed 
even before commercial banking practices, major microfinance activities in Ghana began 
to scale up in the late 1990s. In recognition of such efforts and notably after Muhammad 
Yunus8, one of the key proponents of microfinance and a Nobel laureate, the United 
Nations declared 2005 as the International Year of Microcredit. Presently, microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) are wide spread across Ghana as well as in most of the developing 
world.  
Policies undertaken since independence which have contributed to the growth of 
the  microfinance sector include: the establishment of Rural and Community Banks 
(RCBs); the introduction of regulations such as requiring commercial banks to set aside 
20 percent of total loan portfolio to promote lending to the agricultural sector and to 
                                                          
8 Muhammad Yunus is the founder of the Grameen Bank which he has used to convince 
the world  that micro loans to very poor people could make a difference in their livelihoods 
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SMEs in the 1970s and 1980s; and the promulgation of Provisional National Democratic 
Congress (PNDC) Law 328 in 1991 to promote the establishment of different categories 
of non-bank financial institutions which include savings and loans companies, credit 
unions, finance houses and leasing companies (Bank of Ghana Reports – several issues). 
 Another significant factor contributing to the growth of the microfinance industry 
in Ghana is the removal of credit controls, which stifled micro-funds towards rural 
agricultural and small-medium scale enterprises. This led to an increase in the supply of 
credit by the private sector to small- and medium-scale enterprises.  
These policies led to the emergence of three broad categories of microfinance 
institutions in Ghana: formal suppliers including savings and loans companies, finance 
houses, rural and community banks; semi-formal suppliers such as credit unions, 
financial non-governmental organizations (FNGOs), cooperatives; and informal suppliers 
including Susu collectors and clubs, rotating and accumulating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs and ASCAs), money lenders, etc.  
In Ghana, while the formal MFIs are regulated by the Bank of Ghana, the semi-
formal and informal MFIs are unregulated but exist under the umbrella called Ghana 
Microfinance Institutions Network (GHAMFIN), a legal entity registered in August 1998 
and made up of over 70 microfinance institutions. Other microfinance Apex bodies 
include: Association of Rural Banks; Association of Financial NGOs (ASSFIN); ARB 
Apex Bank; Ghana Cooperative Credit Unions Association (CUA); Ghana Cooperative 
Susu Collectors Association (GCSCA) 
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The end-users of the services and products of these MFIs are the economically 
active poor who by virtue of their lack of collateral are excluded from the formal 
financial system. One also notes that in recent times the mainstream/formal financial 
services institutions are engaging in microfinance activities either on a wholesale basis or 
on a retail basis. Wholesale refers to the provision of financial services to microfinance 
institutions, while retail means direct provision of financial services to individuals and 
small business entities. Other supporting and government institutions include: 
Microfinance and Small Loans Center (MASLOC), Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning (MoFEP), Ministries, Departments, Agencies (MDAs), Metropolitan, Municipal 
and District Assemblies (MMDAs), and the Bank of Ghana. 
2.3.3 Regulatory Framework and Capital Structure of MFIs 
The frameworks under which formal microfinance institutions are regulated are 
the Banking Act 2004 (Act 673) and the Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFI) Law 
1993 (PNDCL 328). Currently there is no regulatory framework governing the operations 
of semi-formal and informal MFIs, which constitutes a major problem in availability of 
obtaining frequent and reliable information about the trends in their activities. A new 
legal and regulatory framework which is all encompassing is being developed to govern 
the operations of MFIs. In the meantime, a new guideline which broadly categorizes the 
various MFIs into Tiers 1-4 was issued in July 2011.  
Currently the minimum paid-up capital required for formal MFIs (i.e., savings and 
loans companies and finance houses) is GH¢7 million (equivalent to $4.6 million). By 
comparison, the minimum paid-up capital for formal banks is GH¢60 million (equivalent 
to $39.4 million). 
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2.3.3 Incorporation of Microfinance into Poverty Reduction Strategies 
Efforts at mainstreaming microfinance into poverty reduction strategies have 
mostly been championed at the global level (e.g., UN’s declaration of 2005 as the year of 
Microcredit) and at the regional level, led by the African Development Bank’s efforts, 
including the African Development Fund Microfinance Initiative for Africa (AMINA), 
established from 1999-2002, and followed by the Strategic Plan on microfinance 
implemented from 2003-2008, among others. Efforts at the national level, especially as is 
the case of Ghana, however, have been aimed at creating a conducive enabling 
environment for the development of microfinance services (AfDB, 2006). This is in line 
with the eleven principles sanctioned at the G8 summit9, especially principle 8 which 
states that ‘the government’s role (microfinance) is an enabler, not a direct provider of 
financial services’ (AfDB, 2006, p. 16; CGAP, 2004).     
Several policies created to foster this conducing enabling environment currently 
drive development of the microfinance market in Ghana. Specifically, the microfinance 
development strategy is currently being driven by the Financial Sector Improvement 
Project, Financial Sector Strategic Plan (FINSSP), the Rural Financial Services Project 
(RFSP), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Microfinance Project, the 
Social Investment Fund (SIF), the Community Based Rural Development Program 
(CBRDP), Rural Enterprise Project (REP), and Agricultural Services Investment Project 
(ASSIP) (Asiama and Osei, 2007). 
                                                          
9 The eleven key principles of microfinance were endorsed by the G8 at its June 2004 
Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, USA.  
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2.4 Trends and Pattern on Access to Finance by Gender and Locality 
Despite the fact that the share of females in the total female population (aged 15 
years and above) who hold an account at a financial institution is lower compared to their 
male counterparts, Ghana seems to be making significantly faster progress compared to 
the SSA region (see Figure 2.6). The females’ share increased from 27% in 2011 to 34% 
in 2014, while males’ share increased from 32% to 34% over the same period. At the 
SSA level however, the percentage of males holding financial accounts increased faster 
from 26.5% to 32.4%, compared to their female counterparts (from 21.3% to 25.2% over 
the same period) (Figure 2.6).  
 According to the GLSS 6 data over the 2012-2013 round, the gender breakdown 
of the type of accounts held in a financial institution shows that males hold a significant 
share of all types of accounts held in a financial institution. In particular, males own 68 
percent of all checking or current accounts, 65 percent of all investments accounts, 59 
percent of all savings accounts and 53.3 percent of all fixed deposit accounts (Figure 2.7).  
Generally, urban households hold a high proportion of accounts in all categories 
of financial institutions in Ghana compared to rural households (Figure 2.8). Urban 
households account for 91 percent of accounts in mortgage and investment institutions 
and 81 percent of accounts in commercial banks (see Figure 2.8). Generally, rural 
households tend to access financial services from informal financial institutions due to 
accessibility of informal financial institutions relative to formal financial institutions, 
which tend to be concentrated in urban and suburban localities.     
The GLSS 6 data also shows gender disparities in terms of access to credit (Table 
2.4). Clearly, women tend to be mostly concentrated in the informal financial sector, 
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underscoring the fact that women are less integrated into the formal financial sector 
compared to men (Table 2.4 and Figure 2.9). Despite this pattern, the largest source of 
credit for men are loans from relatives, friends or neighbors, representing 25.8%, 
compared to women whose largest source of credit is savings and loans schemes (26%). 
The second source of credit for women is from relative or friend or neighbor (Table 2.4). 
While women receive 16 percent of their credit from private banks and 10% from state 
banks, men receive 21% from private banks (also their second largest source of credit) 
and 14.4% from state banks. Credit received from government agencies represents 1.4% 
and 0.7% for men and females, respectively. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a historical background for understanding the evolution 
of microfinance within the context of national strategies aimed at poverty reduction and 
gender equity since Ghana attained independence in 1957.   
Following the G8 Summit resolution of 2004 that sanctioned the eleven principles 
of microfinance, the government of Ghana enacted national policies aimed at 
mainstreaming microfinance into poverty reduction strategies to create a conducive 
environment for the development of microfinance services with very little to no direct 
government intervention in the microfinance market. The lack of direct policy 
intervention in the provision of credit to the poor, has led to the latter’s dependence on 
informal financial market sources, thus leading to the explosive growth of the 
microfinance market in Ghana. The question is, to what extent has this expansion in the 
microfinance market in Ghana contributed to improving general household welfare? How 
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has access to microfinance affected the gender asset gap within and across households? 
These questions will be explored in chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation. 
Table 2.1 Average GDP Growth (%) and Poverty Trends: 1966-2013 
Country Name 1966-69 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010-13 
GDP growth (annual %)             
Ghana 1.3 1.4 2.0 4.3 5.4 9.6 
Botswana 9.5 15.7 11.5 5.4 3.5 7.2 
Malaysia 6.1 7.7 5.9 7.2 4.8 5.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.8 4.0 1.7 1.9 4.7 4.5 
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population) 
Ghana ... ... 63.3 40.6 25.2 ... 
Botswana ... ... 42.6 34.8 24.0 ... 
Malaysia ... ... 2.2 1.1 1.5 ... 
Sub-Saharan Africa ... ... ... 58.6 51.8 44.4 
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) 
Ghana ... ... ... ... 31.9 24.2 
Botswana ... ... 59.0 32.9 25.0 ... 
Malaysia ... 37.6 ... ... 4.8 1.7 
Source: Author’s calculation based on WDI data 
 
Table 2.2: Gender Asset Gap: Female Share of Total Physical Wealth 
Country Share (%) 
Ghana 30.2 
Ecuador 53.0 
Karnataka, India 19.0 







Table 2.3: Gender Statistics – Ghana versus SSA 
Indicators 
1990 2000 2010 
Ghana SSA Ghana SSA Ghana SSA 
Educational Attainment             
Share of female children out of school, 
Primary (%) … 53.5 50.3 54.3 48.9 55.4 
School enrollment, primary (gross), 
gender parity index (GPI) 84.4 83.0 90.2 84.1 94.4 90.0 
School enrollment, secondary (gross), 
gender parity index (GPI) 66.2 76.1 80.2 80.6 84.6 82.7 
Progression to secondary school, female 
(%) … 64.3 85.9 70.2 93.8 76.8 
Literacy rate, youth (ages 15-24), gender 
parity index (GPI) … 0.80 0.86 0.82 0.94 0.86 
Employment (ILO Estimates)             
Unemployment, youth female (% of 
female labor force ages 15-24)  17.5 17.2 16.5 16.7 12.4 15.8 
Unemployment, youth male (% of male 
labor force ages 15-24)  … … 16.2 14.1 10.5 13.7 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, 
female (%)  44.5 41.4 45.4 42.7 33.9 43.9 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, 
male (%)  … … 68.8 71.0 67.4 70.8 
Labor force participation rate, female (% 
of female population 15+) 70.9 60.1 73.9 63.0 68.5 64.6 
Labor force participation rate, male (% of 
male population ages 15+) 73.1 80.7 77.1 77.9 71.5 77.0 
Political Participation             
Proportion of seats held by women in 
national parliaments (%) … … 9.0 11.6 8.3 18.8 
Proportion of women in ministerial level 
positions (%) … … … … 21.6 19.5 
Health Outcomes             
Mortality rate, under-5, female (per 1,000 
live births) 119.9 170.9 93.7 146.2 68.6 94.8 
Mortality rate, under-5, male (per 1,000 
live births) 134.6 189.3 107.3 162 80.4 107.3 
Life expectancy at birth, female (years) 57.9 51.5 57.8 51.5 61.5 57.5 
Life expectancy at birth, male (years) 55.7 48.4 56.2 49.3 59.7 55.2 






Table 2.4: Source of Loans to Households by Gender 
Source of loan Male Female All 
Relative/Friend/ Neighbor 25.8 18.3 22.0 
Savings and loans scheme 13.2 26.0 19.6 
Private bank 20.9 16.3 18.6 
State bank 14.4 9.9 12.2 
Susu scheme 4.5 11.3 7.9 
Cooperative 5.9 6.2 6.1 
NGOs 1.9 2.2 2.1 
Trader 2.6 0.8 1.7 
Other 1.2 1.6 1.4 
Farmer 2.2 0.4 1.3 
Employer 1.4 1.2 1.3 
Gov't. Agency 1.4 0.7 1.0 
Business firm 1.1 1.0 1.0 
Source: GLSS data 
 
Figure 2.1: GDP Per Capita (constant 2005 US$): 1960 – 2013 




































































































































Figure 2.2: Poverty Incidence by Locality (Poverty Line GH ¢1314) 
Source: GLSS 6  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Share of Female Children out of School, Primary (%) 
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Figure 2.4: Life Expectancy at Age 60, Female (years) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online) 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Employment to Population Ratio by Gender in Ghana 







































Figure 2.6: Population Holding an Account at a Formal Financial Institution (% of 
population aged 15 or more) 




Figure 2.7: Ghana: Type of Account held in Financial Institutions by Gender (%) 















































Figure 2.8: Type of Financial Institution in which Account is held by Locality 
Source: GLSS 6 
 
Figure 2.9: Source of Loans to Households by Gender 
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DESCRIPTION OF FIELD RESEARCH 
3.1 Introduction 
The field research from which the data for my dissertation was obtained was 
undertaken in Ghana from May to July 2013. This chapter provides detailed descriptions 
of the research design, sample size, and sampling technique, the data collection 
instrument, and adopted procedure for gathering the required information, as well as the 
data generation process. Four field research assistants, skillfully trained by the Institute of 
Statistical Social and Economic Research at the University of Ghana, were recruited to 
assist with the field research.  
3.2 Research Design  
The study uses the mixed method approach, which involves integrating qualitative 
and quantitative information obtained from the survey data (Rao and Woolcock, 2003). 
The primary data are obtained from household survey questionnaires and interviews. The 
objective of the survey was to obtain data on household demographic characteristics, 
access to credit, and balance sheet information with a reference period of May to June 
2013. The household survey data will be supplemented with data from the Ghana Living 
Standards Survey (GLSS), the Bank of Ghana, and the World Bank.  
3.3 Sample Size and Sampling Technique 
The survey covered 499 households, selected using the methodology proposed by 
Krejcie & Morgan (1970). Under this approach, the sample size for a given population is 





𝑑2(𝑁 − 1) + 𝑥2𝑃(1 − 𝑃)
 
where 𝑆  is the sample size; 𝑥2 is the table value of Chi-Square at degrees of freedom=1 
for assuming 95% confidence interval (.05=3.84); 𝑁 is the population size; 𝑃 is the 
population proportion assuming 50-50 variance in population (.50); 𝑑 is the degree of 
accuracy (we assumed a 5% margin of error) 
The estimated population of Ghana in July 2012 was 25,241,998 (CIA Factbook) 
and this translates into an estimated sample size of 384. Assuming 77% response rate 
yields an ideal sample size of roughly 500. This estimated sample size is equivalent to 
estimates using a relatively more recent method developed at Penn State University 
(Watson, 2001). In all, a total of 499 households, sampled from two (Greater Accra and 
Central regions) out of the 10 administrative regions were surveyed. To put this sample 
size in context, it is important to note that the combined population of the two regions 
where the survey focused was 6,211,917 (GSS, 2012).    
The sampling technique used was based on the probability method, which uses a 
combination of stratified and cluster sampling. After the survey, the responses received 
from the survey were grouped into two groups, A and B. Group A is the treatment group 
and comprises households who have taken loans from the MFIs for not less than one 
year, and Group B is the control group, which is made up of households who have never 
received MFI loans.  
As pointed out previously, the household survey focused on two regions, Central 
and Greater Accra regions, in Ghana. The strategy was to target communities with access 
to microfinance institutions. While households with microcredit were randomly selected 
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from the clientele list of randomly selected microfinance institutions, households without 
microcredit were randomly sampled within the same communities. This was done in 
order to reduce bias. Specifically, the strategy adopted in each community was to sample 
an equal number of comparable households with and without microcredit. Out of the 499 
households surveyed, 252 households had taken MFI loans while 247 had never taken 
any loans from microfinance institutions.  
The survey assumes a priori that microfinance services do not differ significantly 
across regions. However, the survey collected information from respondents on (i) the 
terms and conditions of loans (i.e., the term structure of loans, interest rate, collateral, 
etc.); and (ii) repayment enforcement criteria. This information was collected to examine 
whether there were significant differences that are likely to affect outcomes. 
3.4 Data Collection Instrument 
The data were collected by administering a questionnaire and conducting 
interviews for some selected households. The detailed questionnaire is provided in the 
Appendices (Appendix A). The questionnaire had both closed and open questions, and 
included quantitative as well as qualitative questions. The questionnaire had two parts, 
Part A and Part B.  
Part A provides the metadata which set the framework for categorizing the data 
required. The metadata (Part A) collected information related to the following: (1) 
interview details such as the name of the interviewer, the date of the interview, and the 
start time of the interview; (2) community details such as the name of the region (i.e., 
Greater Accra or Central regions), the community or village name, the zone in which the 
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community is located (i.e., coastal, forest or savannah), and whether the community is 
located in the urban or rural area; (3) compound details such as the compound name, and 
the number of separate households within the compound; (4) household characteristics 
such as the name of the household, the dominant ethnicity of the household, the name and 
gender of the household head, and the dominant region of the household. Household 
identification numbers were also assigned in the metadata.  
Part B is divided into eight modules. The modules aimed at collecting two types 
of information: qualitative information on how households perceive the impact of access 
to credit on household welfare; quantitative data on household incomes, expenditures, 
assets, total loans contracted from MFIs, outstanding balance on loans, the use of the 
loans and the amount of debt service burden.  
Module 1 of Part B of the questionnaire collected information on household 
members’ demographic characteristics. Module 2 obtained data on households’ social 
expenditures, in particular, health and education expenditures. Module 3 collected data on 
the specific economic activities in which household members are engaged. Module 4 
collected data on income and remittances received by the household over the 12 months 
from May 2012 to June 2013. Module 5 collected data on the households’ access to credit 
while Module 6 collected data on households’ debt servicing and welfare. Module 7 
collected information on inventory of households’ assets and ownership of each 
household asset. Module 8 collected data on food expenditures.    
In general, the questionnaires were administered to the household heads except in 
circumstances where the household head could not grant the interview; in such cases, the 
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next adult with adequate information on the required household details was interviewed. 
Some sections of the questionnaire, particularly the sections covering income and 
financial assets, required each adult in the household to provide individual information. 
In such cases, every effort was made to obtain this individual information. However, due 
to missing information on adult members’ financial assets, I exclude financial assets in 
the calculation of total household gross wealth. In effect, physical wealth, which provides 
a true reflection of household wealth, is used in the analysis. 
3.5 Field Work Procedure 
Two training workshops were conducted for field research assistants. The first, 
which explained the purpose of the research study and how to administer the survey 
instrument, was conducted before pilot testing the data collection instrument. The second, 
which sought to clarify confusion with the survey instrument and to finalize logistics for 
the field work, was conducted after the pilot test. The pilot testing was undertaken in 
Accra in the Greater Accra region and Kasoa in the Central region of Ghana and it 
involved administering 10 questionnaires to 5 respondents with MFI credit and 5 
respondents without MFI credit, sampled from the study’s target population.  
In light of the objective of the research study to examine the implications of 
access to microfinance for household welfare, the fieldwork was designed to focus on 
localities with a high microfinance presence. Recent mapping of microfinance density in 
Ghana and Uganda by Haverford Microfinance and Consulting (HMFC)10 reveals 
                                                          
10 See http://carterroadcapital.org/wp/projects/mapping-mfis/mapping-mfis-ghana/ 
 
47 
significant concentration of microfinance institutions in the southern part of the country, 
especially in three regions: Greater Accra, Ashanti, and Central (see Figure 3.1). The 
factors identified by HMFC as important in influencing the concentration of MFIs are 
population density, infrastructural development, and employment. Other significant 
factors include poverty, industry, and religion (HMFC, 2013).  
The fieldwork revealed that most of these microfinance institutions operate 
without license from the central Bank of Ghana. These unlicensed institutions are not 
registered as a business entity either. The limited staff strength of the Bank of Ghana 
means that most of these MFIs operate without oversight or regulation. Eyeballing while 
walking around the main streets in most densely populated urban areas in these three 
regions provides a snapshot of how widely concentrated MFIs are in these regions 
compared to other equally densely populated urban areas in the other seven 
administrative regions.  
3.6 Characteristics of the Surveyed Regions  
This section provides some characteristics of the regions surveyed (i.e., Greater 
Accra and Central regions).    
3.6.1 Greater Accra Region 
The Greater Accra region, which is geographically the smallest of the 10 
administrative regions of Ghana, is divided into sixteen (16) districts. With a population 
of 4 million as of 2010, the region is classified as the second most populated region in 
Ghana, following the Ashanti region (GSS, 2013c). The region accounts for 16.3 percent 
of the total population of Ghana and has the highest population density of 1235.8 
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inhabitants per square kilometers compared to a national density of 103. The regional 
capital, Accra, also happens to be the national capital, which partially explains the high 
population density as there is significant migration to the region. The urban population 
alone accounts for 90.5 percent of the total population of the region (GSS, 2013c).  
Relative to other regions, Greater Accra, home to the national capital, boasts of 
high infrastructural development, particularly improved road and transportation network. 
As shown in Table 3.1, the literacy rate population in the region, 89%, is very high 
relative to the national average of 74%. The GSS reports that the region has the highest 
literacy rates in the country (GSS, 2013a). In terms of school attainment, 92 percent of all 
males have completed primary education compared to 85% for females (Table 3.2).  
Fifty-seven percent of the population in the Greater Accra region is economically 
active (GSS, 2013c). Over 90 percent of the economically active population, mostly 
within the 25-29 year age category, is employed, with the highest proportion being in 
rural localities. The 2010 PHC report reveals that the majority of the employed 
population in the region are in the private informal sector. Quite worrisome is the fact 
that the private informal sector, which is also largely insecure and dominant in rural 
localities, employs 80 percent of all employed females in the region.  
The employed population is mostly engaged in agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
construction, transportation, storage and other services including wholesale and retail, 
and the motor vehicle and motorcycle repair industry (GSS, 2013c). The majority of 
females are employed in the wholesale and retail activities, while their male counterparts 
are mostly employed in agriculture, fishing, construction, and storage industries.  
 
49 
3.6.2 Central Region 
With a population of 2.2 million, the Central Region, has the second highest 
population density (224.1 per sq. km) and is divided into 20 districts. The region’s 
population accounts for 8.4 percent of the total national population. Despite a 9.6% 
increase of the urban population to 47 percent of the region’s total population in 2010, 
from its level in the 2000 population and housing census, the region is considered mostly 
rural (GSS, 2013b).  
At 78%, the literacy rate in the region is high compared to the national average of 
74% (see Table 3.1). The population from 6 years and above that has attained at least 
primary education accounts for 77.6% compared to the national average of 74% (Table 
3.2). In particular, 84 percent of all males in the region from 6 years and above have 
attained at least primary education compared to 71.8 percent for their female 
counterparts. It is important to note that significant variations in terms of literacy and 
school attendance also exist across ages, districts, and localities (GSS, 2013b, p. 143).  
The economically active population, that is, those who are employed or 
unemployed, accounts for 70 percent of the total regional population which does not 
differ significantly by sex. The 2010 PHC report reveals that two-thirds of the employed 
are self-employed, the majority of which are females. The self-employment ratio is 
higher for women (72%) than for males (57%). The types of economic activities engaged 
in by the population vary significantly across districts and localities. In general, people in 
the rural districts are predominantly engaged in agriculture activities (73%) while urban 
dwellers are mostly engaged in the services, sales, crafts and other related trades (GSS, 
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2013b). Skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishery workers, who dwell in rural localities 
account for 42.5 percent of all employed workers in the region.  
3.7 Key Characteristics of Sample Population 
The data from the 2010 PHC establishes both the need and expected demand for 
microcredit given that the majority of the households in both regions are engaged in the 
informal private sector and have limited access to formal financial institutions. A key 
point to note from the 2010 PHC data is the fact that over 70 percent of employed 
females are engaged in the informal private sector. A comparative welfare analysis of 
households with and without access to microcredit becomes paramount to ascertain the 
effectiveness of microfinance in reducing intra-household inequality and improving the 
livelihoods of the poor, particularly for women who are increasingly playing the role of 
breadwinners for their households.     
As shown in Table 3.3 the Greater Accra region accounts for 57.4 percent of the 
surveyed sample. The sample is mostly drawn from urban localities with significant 
access to microfinance. Out of the 317 households in the total sample that are male-
headed, about 60.6 percent are within the Greater Accra region. Of the 183 female-
headed households in the total sample, roughly 52% are within the Greater Accra region. 
The majority of members of these households (66%) are self-employed and engaged in 
the private informal sector of the economy. 
3.8 Post-survey Data Processing 
The post-survey data processing was undertaken in collaboration with the data 
processing office at ISSER, University of Ghana. The data was captured with the Census 
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and Survey Processing System11 (CSPro) software. The data processing was undertaken 
in 4 different stages, which involved recoding, dictionary design, data entry and 
concatenation, and exporting the data in CSPro format into Stata.  Recoding the 
questionnaire after the survey based on answers, and in particular for open-ended “other” 
response option, is an essential step in any data processing as this facilitates data entry 
and analysis.  
The data dictionary design was carried out in 4 phases. Phase 1 was the dictionary 
design, which involved typing the real questions in the questionnaire. Phase 2 involved 
putting value sets on the individual variables in the dictionary, which involved assigning 
labels to the codes (e.g., assigning number values based on gender, ethnicity, region, 
localities, etc.). In addition, ages are restricted to be within 0 to 110 years carried out for 
all closed-ended questions and discrete variables. Phase 3 involved the creation of the 
data form, which is required for dropping items from the designed dictionary. The final 
phase, Phase 4, involved adding logic to the form by instructing the entry program to 
follow certain skip patterns as well as the application of other consistency checks.  
Finally, the entry setup is put in the system-controlled mode and then compiled. 
The compiled setup file is provided to the data entry clerks to be used to enter the data 
following which the captured data in concatenated and exported from the CSPro format 
into a Stata using the created dictionary. The detailed questionnaire used for the survey 
                                                          
11 The CSPro is a public domain (open source) software package used primarily for 




required a batch export file to be prepared to export each of the sections and tables into 
separate files.  
Further processing of the data was needed in order to have the data in a usable 
format to address the questions in the research study. First, there was the need to 
undertake pre-analysis of the data using the questionnaire and the purpose was to validate 
the processed data to ensure consistency between the survey questions and the recorded 
responses. Second, since the data was collected at the individual level within each 
household, it became necessary to recalibrate to obtain household level data. Third, given 
that the data for different modules were filed separately, there was also the need to merge 
these files before proceeding to analyze the data.  
Several other tasks after the data was processed were also undertaken, and where 
it is necessary, these tasks are described within the analysis in the following two chapters.  
 Table 3.1: Literate12 Population 11 years and older, by Region, Sex and Locality (%) 
Region Total Male Female Urban Rural 
National Average 74.1 80.2 68.5 84.1 62.8 
Greater Accra Region 89.3 93.6 85.3 90.2 79.6 
Central Region 78.2 86.3 71.1 82.0 74.6 
  Source: GSS 2013, 2010 Population and Housing Census 
  
Table 3.2: Population 6 years and older with at least Primary Education, by Region and Sex 
(%) 
Region Total Male Female 
National Average 74.0 78.9 69.4 
Greater Accra Region 88.6 92.2 85.1 
Central Region 77.6 84.2 71.8 
  Source: GSS 2013, 2010 PHC and author's own calculations  
                                                          




Table 3.3: Sample by Region, Locality and Sex of Household Head 










N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent 
287 57.4 282 66.5 5 6.6 192 60.6 95 51.9 
Central 
Region 213 42.6 142 33.5 71 93.4 125 39.4 88 48.1 
Total 500 100 424 100 76 100 317 100 183 100 





Figure 3.1: Density of Microfinance in Ghana  







IMPLICATIONS OF MICROFINANCE FOR HOUSEHOLD INDEBTEDNESS 
AND WELFARE 
4.1 Introduction 
The importance of access to financial services for poverty reduction is well-
documented. Birchall and Ketilson (2009) have argued that financial exclusion facing 
poor people is both a result of poverty and a cause of greater poverty and that fostering 
financial inclusion, a critical component which facilitated rapid growth and development 
in most of the developed world, is crucial for reducing poverty.  
While access to financial services for most of the world’s poor is being touted at 
the global and national levels, the channels through which this access leads to poverty 
reduction is largely contested in the research literature. In the financial development 
literature, the main channels identified as critical for poverty reduction include savings, 
credit and the provision of other financial services, such as micro-insurance or money 
transfer services (Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011; McKinnon, 1973; Quartey, 2005). Some 
researchers have argued that credit is the critical component which facilitates the process 
of poverty reduction (S. M. Hashemi, Schuler, andRiley, 1996; Mark Martin Pitt, 
Khandker, andMundial, 1996). On the other hand, some have stressed the relative 
importance of saving for poverty reduction, with the underlying view that credit may 
exacerbate the conditions of the poor through indebtedness, which is unfortunately one of 
the major adverse effects of credit (Allen, 2007; Kabeer, 2001; Rahman, 1999; Rogaly, 
1996; Woller, 2002). Others, however, contend that both credit and savings are important 
(Vonderlack and Schreiner, 2002; Zeller and Sharma, 2000).  
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For most developing countries, access to credit, for the poor is provided mainly 
through the informal sector or the semi-formal sector, including microfinance institutions 
(MFIs). In particular, microfinance has been lauded in both the literature and 
development policy arena as a major tool for improving access to credit for most of the 
world’s poor. The question is whether there is a risk that the conditions of the poor could 
be worsened through increased debt burden from access to credit from microfinance 
institutions. This question is legitimate given the following reasons: cost channel: the 
interest rates charged by microfinance institutions tend to be relatively higher than those 
charged by banks, partly a result of the lack of competition in the sector, and thus poor 
households are in a sense caught up in a captive market; balance sheet effect: higher 
interest rates imply higher debt obligations for low income households with low returns 
to investment and therefore weaker balance sheet; and the lack of institutional 
mechanisms for households in developing countries to deal with debt distress. This 
situation may make it more difficult to obtain more external financing or even to increase 
or sustain expenditures thereby leading to worsening households conditions.  
For the poor who access credit from MFIs not to be caught in the debt trap, it is 
essential that they apply the credit obtained from MFIs to investments that generate high 
returns so that the profit rate is greater than the interest rate. In most developed countries, 
households are able to acquire debt relief toward smooth spending without large penalties 
under bankruptcy systems in the event that their loans become delinquent. For 
households in developing countries and especially for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
countries, however, there are no institutional mechanisms to enable households to deal 
with financial distress should they go delinquent on their loans. This means that often 
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there would be a reduction in household spending, and in some severe cases, a distress 
sale of their limited assets. 
In response to the severe exposure of many poor people to microfinance 
institutions in developing countries such as India, Nigeria, Bosnia and Pakistan, there 
have been increasing calls for further scrutiny of the use of microfinance as a tool for 
poverty reduction (Bateman, 2010; Hulme, 2000). Bateman (2010) argues that 
microfinance, while it may offer some minimal benefits, is a ‘poverty trap’ and an ‘anti-
development policy’ which may harm local communities economically and socially 
undermine their drive for escaping poverty. Fundamental to this argument is the belief 
that the ‘new wave’ model of microfinance was based on a neo-liberal agenda that was 
being pushed in earnest during the 1980s (Bateman, 2010; Bateman and Chang, 2009).  
This chapter seeks to examine the negative and net balance sheet effects of access 
to microfinance for poor households. Specifically, the paper uses data13 obtained from a 
household survey conducted in Ghana from May to July 2013 to qualitatively and 
quantitatively examine the determinants of household indebtedness and welfare. The 
study applies ordinary least squares in conjunction with two-stage least squares and 
maximum likelihood estimation methods to test the following two hypotheses: (1) 
microfinance market characteristics are important determinants of a household’s debt 
service burden; and (2) high debt burden compromises household welfare.  
                                                          
13 The survey covered 499 households, out of which 252 households were categorized as 
having received microfinance with 247 categorized as households without microfinance. 
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The findings suggest that while access to microfinance is generally good, being 
highly indebted compromises household welfare through reduction in expenditures, in 
particular food expenditures, and by increasing the probability of being credit-
constrained. In addition, the evidence suggests that debt service to essential expenditures 
ratio above 30 percent creates significant financial distress. The analysis shows that 
microfinance market, borrower-specific and household-specific characteristics are 
important factors explaining household indebtedness. A household’s indebtedness is 
positively influenced by the type of microfinance (formal MFI relative to informal MFI), 
the interest rate, the household’s being below the poverty line, and a household 
contracting more than one loan. The share of the loan allocated to investment and the 
loan user being female, however, have a negative effect on the probability of a household 
being highly indebted. Contrary to expectations, neither financial literacy programs 
offered by MFIs nor the education of the household head had any significant effect on 
household indebtedness. 
The chapter consists of six sections. Following this introduction, Section 4.2 
reviews the empirical literature on the impact of microfinance on household indebtedness 
and welfare. Section 4.3 provides the conceptual framework for the analysis of the impact 
of microfinance on household indebtedness and welfare. Section 4.4 presents the research 
methodology and the data. The empirical results are discussed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 
concludes with recommendations and suggestions for further research. 
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4.2 Microfinance, Household Indebtedness and Welfare: An Empirical Review 
While debt in itself may not necessarily be a bad thing, excessive debt burden is 
problematic. The empirical literature views debt as a two-edged sword, welfare-
improving but also potentially leading to disaster (Cecchetti, Mohanty, andZampolli, 
2011). It is welfare-improving as long as it is moderate and put to wise use. However, it 
can have negative effects when it is used imprudently and excessively.  
According to theory, debt improves households’ welfare in two key ways: through 
the alleviation of credit constraints, and through consumption smoothing. In other words, 
it helps to increase the risk-bearing capacity and enhance the risk-coping strategies of 
households. The empirical evidence on the impact of microfinance at the household level 
suggests that the poor mostly borrow to improve household production (i.e. fund home 
enterprises) or to directly smooth consumption over time (Green, Kirkpatrick, 
andMurinde, 2006, p. 1024). An empirical analysis that draws upon a national level 
cross-sectional household dataset in India found that microfinance plays a significant role 
in reducing household poverty when used for productive purposes and the results are 
even stronger for the rural poor relative to urban poor (Imai, Arun, andAnnim, 2010). 
Similarly, it is also argued that credit programs applied to all categories of the poor may 
be beneficial as they result in increased income which eventually helps to reduce their 
vulnerability to shocks (Khandker, 2005).  
4.2.1 Microfinance and Household Indebtedness 
While indebtedness by itself may not constitute significant risk to household 
financial stability, its interactions with developments within the households and the 
 
60 
broader macroeconomic environment can lead to a cycle of excessive and multiple 
borrowing leading to over-indebted households. And as noted earlier, excessive debt can 
lead to disaster. Cecchetti et al (2011) argue that for individual households and firms, 
over-borrowing leads to bankruptcy and financial ruin and for a country, excessive debt 
blights the government’s ability to deliver essential services to its citizens. A large build-
up of household indebtedness is therefore seen as critical to economic contraction 
(Mishkin, 1978) and financial sector stability (Hull, 2003). This implies the need for all 
stakeholders to be concerned about high and rising debt.  
In the empirical literature, a household’s indebtedness is measured as the ratio of 
total monthly installment on household debt to monthly net income (Kappel, Krauss, 
andLontzek, 2010). The limitation of this measure has necessitated the use of debt to 
household wealth ratio in some studies, and this has been identified as having higher 
explanatory potential relative to debt to income ratio measures (Dynan and Kohn, 2007). 
However, measuring over-indebtedness empirically has been elusive. In fact, no clear 
definition of what really constitutes over-indebtedness has been agreed upon in the 
literature. A common set of measures of over-indebtedness, which employ either a 
quantitative (in monetary terms) or a qualitative measure or a combination of the two, 
include making high payments relative to income, being in arrears, multiple borrowing 
around and in excess of four loan commitments, and the borrower finding debt repayment 
as a burden (D'Alessio and Iezzi, 2013). According to Stamp (2009) borrowers become 
over-indebted when their net resources, including income and realizable assets, make it 
persistently difficult to meet essential living expenses. In the same vein, Schicks (2010) 
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defines over-indebtedness as having occurred when a borrower struggles to meet 
repayment deadlines and requires repeatedly high sacrifices to meet loan obligations. 
The processes that lead to over-indebtedness, its scale, as well as its economic and 
social impact on poor households in financially excluded areas served by microfinance 
institutions have been the subject of recent scrutiny in the empirical literature. Indeed, the 
attention to borrowers’ over-indebtedness from microfinance is increasing relative to a 
few years ago, when the rhetoric surrounding microfinance was that it was the most 
effective poverty reduction tool. The advent of research work related to borrowers’ over-
indebtedness  began to gain traction, following the chronic credit delinquency crises 
which emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, Morocco and Nicaragua from the 
mid to late 2000s (Chen, Rasmussen, andReille, 2010). On the basis of the severe 
exposure of many poor people to microfinance institutions in developing countries such 
as India, Nigeria, Bosnia and Pakistan, there have been increasing calls for further 
scrutiny of the use of microfinance as a tool for poverty reduction (Bateman, 2010). 
A study using a quantitative measure of over-indebtedness, was commissioned by 
the European Funds for Southeast Europe (EFSE) for three countries, Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Azerbaijan in 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively. These 
studies found that 28 percent of microcredit clients are seriously indebted or over-
indebted in Bosnia Herzegovina, 25 percent are over-indebted in Kosovo and 30 percent 
are over-indebted in Azerbaijan (Maurer and Pytkowska, 2010; Pytkowska and Spannuth, 
2011, 2012). The study measures the level of indebtedness using the ratio of debt service 
payment to net income and constructs a Net Indebtedness Index (NII) upon which 
borrowers are categorized. Based on this measure, a borrower is classified as over-
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indebted when the NII is equal to or above 100 percent, at risk of being over-indebted 
when the NII is between 75-100 percent and not over-indebted when the NII is below 75 
percent.  
Some other studies which employ a subjective measure, based on the borrowers’ 
own perceived struggles with the loan repayment, include Schicks (2014), who finds that 
30 percent of sampled micro-borrowers in Ghana are over-indebted. Similarly, for the 
period 1997 to 2001, it was found that over-indebtedness of microfinance borrowers in 
Bolivia was comparatively high at 85 percent (Gonzalez, 2008, p. 125). In the case of 
Southern India, the debt-driven suicide of more than 30 micro-borrowers in 2010 which 
occurred mostly in the state of Andhra Pradesh preceded critical attention to an elusive 
assessment of the extent of over-indebtedness among micro-borrowers who were mostly 
rural farmers (Dobusch, Mader, andQuack, 2013; Schicks, 2013a, p. 168). Employing 
qualitative analysis and complemented by quantitative data, Guérin et al (2013) also 
report that 20 percent of the households from among four villages in Tamil Nadu were 
over-indebted between 2005 and 2009.   
In general, the factors identified as the main causes of over-indebtedness for the 
poor households include socio-demographic characteristics, economic-related factors, 
business and loan-related factors, sociological influences and cognitive influences 
(Schicks, 2013b, p. 15)14. On the basis of these factors Schicks (2014) finds that micro-
borrowers, in particular male borrowers, are more likely to be over-indebted. In addition, 
                                                          
14 See Schicks (2013b) for a comprehensive review of the drivers of over-indebtedness. 
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the study finds that borrowers with adverse economic shocks, low return on investments, 
and engagement in non-productive use of loans are more prone to being over-indebted.  
Maurer and Pytkowska (2010) classify factors that contributed to over-
indebtedness in Bosnia Herzegovina into demand- and supply-related factors. In terms of 
demand, it was found that deterioration of economic conditions and the evolution of an 
easy credit culture significantly contributed to over-indebtedness of micro-borrowers. In 
terms of supply, fierce competition, riskier lending, fast growth and lack of industry code 
of conduct as well as high capital inflow into the financial sector were identified as 
significantly contributing to over-indebtedness among microfinance borrowers (Maurer 
and Pytkowska, 2010, pp. 7-8).  
In Bolivia, over the period 1997 to 2001, it was also found that one contributory 
factor to over-indebtedness of microfinance borrowers was the adverse shocks to 
economic activities (see Gonzalez (2008, p. 159)). In-depth qualitative interviews, 
drawing on 47 households in the Lake Alaotra region in Madagascar from 2008 to 2009, 
find that microfinance reinforces the possibility of financial juggling of institutions, 
products, and between formal and informal credit by households (Wampfler, Bouquet, 
andRalison, 2014). The increased juggling options, which potentially influences the 
‘trajectories towards greater empowerment, diversification and accumulation’ also imply 
greater risk of over-indebtedness mostly for the poorest households whose juggling 
practices are more frequently observed to be a reactive, rather than a proactive response 
(Wampfler et al., 2014, p. 229).  
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4.2.2 Consequences of Household Indebtedness 
High household indebtedness, which may also be classified as over-indebtedness, 
may have economic consequences at the household level with potential spill-over effect 
to the macro-economy at large, particularly when it results in contagion. On the 
individual borrower level, along with a high possibility of transferring to the household 
level, potential social and psychological consequences have also been identified (Schicks, 
2013a). While research on borrowers’ indebtedness from microfinance and its 
consequences is a burgeoning field, there is a well-documented literature for borrowers in 
advanced countries. This section examines the consequences of high household 
indebtedness identified for advanced countries, in addition to the available literature on 
micro-borrowers in developing countries.   
In general, a high debt relative to a household’s income implies a high debt 
service burden. Maki (2002) explains that a high debt service burden poses a risk to the 
financial health of households and can ultimately result in reduced spending especially 
for poor households whose debt service to net worth ratios are significantly higher than 
for those in richer households. According to Maki (2002), increased household 
delinquencies and bankruptcies are seen to be the direct consequences of high levels of 
household indebtedness. The empirical evidence provided on the US economy, however, 
suggest no direct and consistent short-term impact of debt service burden of households 
on their consumption pattern (Maki, 2002, p. 6). Similarly, evidence provided for the UK 
economy from 1997 to 2004 suggest that in general higher debt levels do not raise the 
sensitivity of spending to shocks (Benito, Waldron, Young, andZampotli, 2007, p. 74). A 
possible reason for this weak link for the US, according to Maki, is that under the US 
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bankruptcy system, households often acquire debt relief without incurring huge penalties 
and this usually results in household consumption rising after the completion of 
bankruptcy cases.  
This may suggest the need to raise the penalty for default, but Olney (1999) 
argues that a high cost of default for high household indebtedness can further threaten 
future consumption, as the high debt service burdens could make household future 
consumption more sensitive to falls in current or future income. In effect, while making 
default expensive may serve to protect and secure financial institutions, the strategies that 
households may adopt to avoid expensive defaults can harm those whose livelihoods 
depend upon consumer goods industries. Upping the penalty can further threaten the 
health of lenders’ balance sheets if loan losses increase through the ‘financial accelerator’ 
effects (Benito et al., 2007).  
Given that consumer spending is a high component of any country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) it stands to reason that there are macroeconomic consequences 
from debt increases beyond reasonable thresholds. Cecchetti et al (2011), using data for 
18 OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2010, find that on average debt above 85 
percent of GDP for government and households and 90 percent for corporate entities is a 
drag on economic growth. Guérin, Morvant-Roux, and Villarreal (2013) argue that 
because debt is perceived in different ways by different people, using static analyses 
alone may obscure the reality on the ground. This suggests the increasing importance to 
examine the issue of over-indebtedness in a comprehensive manner to reveal this reality.        
Aside from the impact on consumption, high household indebtedness has 
implications for the human capital investment leading to lower income-generating 
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capacity (Schicks, 2013a). In particular, high indebtedness which affects repayment 
capacity is identified to be associated with lower education levels and adverse health 
outcomes (Gonzalez, 2008; Schicks, 2013a; Turunen and Hiilamo, 2014). In addition, 
high household indebtedness may lower households’ buffer against shocks (Burton, 
2012) creating dependency on close circle for daily survival (Guérin, Roesch, 
Venkatasubramanian, andKumar, 2013).    
The negative effects of over-indebtedness on household consumption and welfare 
as well as the overall macroeconomic implications may be even more severe for 
developing countries compared to advanced countries for obvious reasons. In particular, 
for most developing countries the absence of institutional mechanisms in the event of 
borrowers’ financial distress, either from over-indebtedness and/or high debt service 
burden, aggravates the livelihood conditions of borrowers, especially poorer ones. Debt 
with high constraints, such as high interest rates and short maturity, accompanied with 
high frequency repayments, characteristic features of microfinance loans, are by 
themselves enough to trigger significant concerns over financial distress. Added to the 
problem of debt with constraints is the volatility which characterizes the macroeconomic 
environment in most developing countries.  
Aside from the economic implications, household indebtedness which results in 
financial distress can also have sociological consequences. Measuring risk in terms of 
magnitude and likelihood, Guérin et al (2013)   have argued that over-indebtedness can 
lead to borrowers’ further material impoverishment and sociological consequences such 
as social stigma, domination in the household, and the loss of social networks. And from 
the perspective of Sen’s concept of development as freedom, they argue that the 
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consequences, should they occur, imply a reduction in the borrower’s personal freedom 
of choice and ability to determine their lives. Guérin et al (2013) employ both descriptive 
statistics and qualitative analysis for micro-borrowers from four villages in Southern 
India that were over-indebted and found that debt can be a source of impoverishment (i.e. 
for families with monthly debt service being about a third of monthly income), 
pauperization (i.e. where monthly debt service is 100 of monthly income), and 
dependency (where families are unable to repay and find themselves in cycles of debt and 
dependency on relatives). Guérin et al (2013) argue that in view of irregularity and 
uncertainty of incomes, monthly debt service around half of a borrower’s average 
monthly income is worrisome for poor households.  
Other direct psychological consequences15 of high indebtedness identified in the 
literature include depression, low self-control, feelings of self-efficacy, insufficiency, 
alienation and guilt pushing defaulters into crime and suicide (Hatcher, 1994; 
Maciejewski, Prigerson, andMazure, 2000; Schicks, 2013a). Empirical evidence in 
Canada, Britain, and the US suggest that high household debt is indeed correlated with 
lower psychological well-being (see Brown (1952); Bridges and Disney (2010) and 
Drentea and Lavrakas (2000)). The aggressive tactics of close-marking, abusive 
languages and threats, which are usually employed by lenders to enforce repayments by 
delinquent borrowers, may also have adverse psychological impacts (also see Schicks 
(2013a).  
                                                          
15 See Schicks (2013a) for an extensive review of the related literature. 
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High household indebtedness may also trigger high rates of defaults and 
delinquency crises. Among the main factors, identified as being at the heart of the 2004-
2008 delinquency crisis in the microfinance markets in Nicaragua, Morocco, Pakistan 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, are lending concentration and multiple borrowing, 
overstretched MFI capacity and a loss of MFI credit discipline (Chen et al., 2010). Other 
secondary factors identified as also influencing the speed and spread of delinquency crisis 
included external forces operating through macroeconomic conditions, local politics and 
events, and contagion (Chen et al., 2010, p. 14). The factors likely to have worked 
through borrowers’ over-indebtedness, creating a vicious cycle of over-indebtedness and 
delinquencies, would include multiple borrowing and macroeconomic conditions.  
Indeed, as a result of the increasing over-indebtedness and repayment crises 
experienced by majority of borrowers in some microfinance markets, an attempt has been 
made to develop an early warning index using a sample of 13 countries (Kappel et al., 
2010). On the borrower side, multiple borrowing, often associated with ‘debt juggling’ in 
the literature, is among the leading variables identified as preceding and predicting most 
of delinquency crises in some microfinance markets (see Maurer and Pytkowska (2010); 
Pytkowska and Spannuth (2011) and Kappel et al. (2010)). Average loan balances per 
borrower as well as loan requirements placed on borrowers are other leading indicators 
from the demand side which were found to be critical in the construction of the over-
indebtedness index (Kappel et al., 2010, p. 6). 
While indebtedness, by itself, may not constitute significant risk to household 
financial stability, how it interacts with developments within the households and the 
broader macroeconomic environment is the subject of this study. This chapter examines 
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the extent to which households in our sample are indebted to microfinance institutions 
and examine the thresholds of indebtedness that contributes to household financial 
distress in our sample population. This study is the first attempt to provide the threshold 
for indebtedness at the household level in Ghana beyond which a household is at a high 
risk of being financially distressed.  
4.3 Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual framework draws on theories explaining why households borrow 
and theories that help to explain household indebtedness, mainly, financial sector 
deregulation, asymmetric information, and consumer behavior. These are described in the 
following sub-sections.  
4.3.1 Theories on Household Borrowing Behavior 
The life-cycle and permanent-income theories, both of which expound the 
traditional Keynesian consumption function, provide the basis for relating consumption 
with borrowing. The central idea from the life-cycle and permanent-income theories is 
that an individual’s consumption at any given period depends on his/her total lifetime 
income also referred to as permanent income. Specifically, the permanent-income 
hypothesis, developed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1975), 
expands Keynes’ earlier finding that aggregate consumption crucially depended on 
aggregate income. The implication of these theories is that individuals use savings and 
borrowing to smooth the path of consumption (Romer, 2006).  
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The above theory suggests that households who seek to maximize their utility 
over their lifetime may potentially resort to borrowing as a means to smooth consumption 
over time. The proponents of the permanent-income hypothesis have argued that, on 
average, unless they are permanent, changes in income do not have any considerable 
impact on consumption. This argument suggests, on one hand, that households’ 
borrowing behavior is contingent on whether they consider changes in income to be 
negative and more or less permanent. Under this scenario a household may choose to dis-
save (borrow) to sustain their consumption path. On the other hand, the permanent-
income hypothesis implies that expectations about future earnings facing most 
households in developing countries are certain. However, one of the critical challenges 
facing a significant number of households in developing countries is uncertainty, which 
characterizes employment and income. Hurwitz and Luiz (2007, p. 111) have argued that 
in South Africa, where poverty remains high and widespread coupled with the lack of 
long-term assets for most households and uncertain future earnings against which to 
borrow, transitory income changes may be more important in influencing households’ 
borrowing behavior for consumption smoothing.   
Given the uncertainties characterizing expectations about future earnings for poor 
households in developing countries, one may also argue that a crucial element to why 
poor households in developing countries may resort to borrowing is also to finance 
wealth creation to improve upon their livelihoods through household production. 
Borrowing to finance wealth creation has been argued to foster entrepreneurial drive 
among the poor in developing countries. Upon the basis of entrepreneurship growth, 
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some have argued that the link between finance and growth is strengthened (Green et al., 
2006; King and Levine, 1993)   
While borrowing for wealth creation has the potential to facilitate the process 
through which poor households may move up the income trajectory from their low 
financial positions, the question is whether debt-financing of micro-level income-
generating activities is the most appropriate way to get the poor out of poverty and help 
to reduce the inequalities they face. In the absence of equity financing for micro-level 
income-generating activities in most developing countries, these households are caught in 
a captive market. These households, even when they manage to scale up their activities, 
tend to find it difficult to access other types of financing other than microfinance due to 
the limited commitments of governments of developing countries towards the provision 
of small-scale financial products tailored to their needs.   
4.3.2 Theories Explaining Household Indebtedness 
So why does over-indebtedness occur? This is the subject of this section. A 
critical review of the theoretical underpinning of household indebtedness would involve 
an analysis of the intersection of household finance, macroeconomics and contract theory 
(Zinman, 2014) which ultimately affect the demand and supply of loans. First, an analysis 
of the implication of financial deregulation for household finance is presented. Second, 
the section elucidates the various models that relate asymmetric information to 
indebtedness. And finally, behavioral analysis of borrowers and lenders in loan 




4.3.2.1 Financial Deregulation and Household Finance 
There were justifiable reasons for financial deregulation that engulfed most of the 
developing world during the mid- to late 1980s (Mkandawire, 1999b). Among the several 
reasons provided was the huge problem of controls on credit allocation and interest rates 
which had led to elite capture. Elite capture of the financial sector implied inefficient 
allocation of capital or resources that were critical for development. The McKinnon-
Shaw hypothesis16 which spearheaded the process of financial liberalization posited that 
the removal of limits on credit and controls on interest rates can stimulate economic 
growth rates as interest rates rise towards their competitive market rates (Gemech, 2006).  
The deregulation of the financial system led to the broadening of the available 
institutions, products, and services, an offshoot of which is a thriving environment for the 
growth of the microfinance sector. Unsurprisingly, associated with these developments is 
the resulting increase in credit supply for those mostly excluded from the formal financial 
sector, but mainly from the informal financial market of which the microfinance sector 
was a critical part in the early stages of the deregulation of the financial system in 
developing countries. With the increase in the supply of credit, at supposedly market-
determined interest rates, the liquidity constraints facing households were relaxed. In 
effect, the deregulation of the financial sector has implied greater ability of households to 
access credit, not to mention the greater access of local financial institutions to cheaper 
foreign capital. The greater ability to access credit, among some significant positive 
                                                          
16 Refer to Gemech (2006) for a review of the literature on the McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis over the last 30 years. 
 
73 
benefits, has also created the conditions as well as increased the potential for over-
indebtedness of households.  
While the ease in credit supply is an important variable in household over-
indebtedness, other variables acting through the demand for credit, which have had varied 
and significant influences on indebtedness, include cultural changes and macroeconomic 
developments which impinge on household finance. In particular, subprime lending to 
vulnerable groups tends to expand subsequent to financial sector deregulation (see 
Braucher (2006) in the case of the US). This scenario may be comparable to the case of 
developing countries, where profiteering through microfinance lending at pernicious 
interest rates, which are mostly targeted at the poor, has emerged, thereby promoting a 
credit culture that was non-existent prior to financial sector deregulation. Indeed, the 
expected benefits from financial deregulation, which include higher national savings, 
lower lending interest rates, and financial inclusion, have yet to be realized for most 
developing countries. On the flip side, financial deregulation has been associated with 
lower saving rates, increased tendencies towards financial crises and creating 
macroeconomic instability (Campbell and Mankiw, 1990; Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Hull, 
2003; Jappelli and Pagano, 1994; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, andServén, 2000).      
4.3.2.2 Asymmetric information and household indebtedness 
Models of imperfect information which result in moral hazard and adverse 
selection also offer some theoretical foundations for examining the issue of household 
indebtedness. Jaffee and Russell (1976) have argued that the principles of moral hazard 
and adverse selection can be used to explain the fallouts from the borrower-lender 
relationship. Notably higher defaults, symptomatic of borrowers’ level of indebtedness, 
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are associated with asymmetric information in credit markets. As Akerlof (1970) notes in 
his novel piece on the ‘market for lemons’, imperfect information about borrowers in 
credit markets leads to an adverse selection of borrowers who have a high risk of 
defaulting. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981b) argue that the critical factors which increases the 
riskiness of a pool of loans, as a result of imperfect information characterizing credit 
markets, are the interest rate, the amount of the loan and the value of the collateral 
required of loan applicants. In abstraction, a world characterized by perfect information 
should enable the forces of demand and supply to facilitate the efficient allocation of 
loanable funds in equilibrium. Imperfect information in credit, therefore, acts as a catalyst 
for the divergence of credit markets from ‘neoclassical equilibrium’ or the presence of 
this equilibrium but with credit rationing.  
It is important to note that the proliferation of microcredit providers in most of the 
developing world has led to the replacement of a borrower’s personalized relationship 
with an impersonal relationship with a larger pool of potential lenders which also imply 
an increase in asymmetric information problems in these credit markets (McIntosh and 
Wydick, 2007). In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty and assuming 
that there are both ‘honest’ and ‘dishonest’ borrowers at the extreme ends, Jaffee and 
Russell (1976) use a life-cycle consumption function and contend that loan defaulters (i.e. 
borrowers characterized as ‘dishonest’), usually those with loan sizes greater than the 
market equilibrium loan amount, do so to maximize their utility if their expectation about 
future income is lower than thought.  
Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) also model hidden-actions in economies where 
contractual relationships are non-exclusive and argues that endogenous borrowing and 
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lending positions can generate a negative correlation between the amount borrowed and 
the actions chosen by the agents. This moral hazard potentially creates the problem of 
higher defaults. Upon this basis, information sharing, which is expected to improve the 
pool of borrowers by mitigating borrowers’ incentive to juggle with multiple loans, has 
been shown to reduce the risk of default and the indebtedness of defaulting borrowers 
(Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; McIntosh and Wydick, 2007; Pagaon and Jappelli, 1993). 
4.3.2.3 Borrowers’ behavior and indebtedness 
Behavioral concerns related to borrowers, coupled with the absence of effective 
advisory services for the liabilities market, may also explain the problem of indebtedness. 
Borrowers’ preferences, price perceptions, expectations, and decision rules, as they relate 
to the credit market, are among the contractual behavioral biases which are often modeled 
as having potential adverse consequences on households’ balance sheet resulting in over-
indebtedness (Zinman, 2014). While these biases affect mainly the loan amounts a 
household may take on, the implication of the loan size for excessive risk-taking behavior 
(moral hazard) which potentially leads to indebtedness has been observed in the literature 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981b).   
Meier and Sprenger (2010) argue that there is a correlation between present-
biased individuals and credit card debt in the presence of high interest rates. This implies 
that individuals who place a high premium on the present relative to the future hold more 
debt relative to dynamically consistent individuals. Others have also argued that 
borrowers’ biased perception about the cost and benefits of borrowing can influence the 
amount borrowed (Bertrand and Morse, 2011; Stango and Zinman, 2009). Against this 
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view, more information disclosure about the cost of credit in the payday lending industry 
tend to reduce the observed biases and is shown to be associated with lower borrowed 
amounts, particularly for borrowers without college education and those with higher self-
control,  (Bertrand and Morse, 2011). Biases related to expectations about the future is 
also a critical factor driving excessive borrowing (Hyytinen and Putkuri, 2012; Mann, 
2013).  
Factors which may drive present-biased preferences and expectations, and lead to 
excessive borrowing, may include a household’s perceived inequality in its present 
consumption and/or income levels and the ever-rising desire to ‘keep up with the 
Joneses.’ It has been argued that the existence of microfinance institutions, by virtue of 
their effects on easing the liquidity constraints facing poor households in developing 
countries, provides an avenue for borrowing beyond one’s need (see Pardo and Sánchez 
Santos (2014)). While rising inequalities in income can potentially aggravate the cycles 
of inequality and poverty, excessive borrowing to remedy this situation can also fuel the 
cycles of inequality and poverty through the financial pressures from over-indebtedness, 
given the high cost of microcredit. But should the poor remain in poverty to the point of 
being dependent on families and friends for survival, despite the market option provided 
through microfinance? It has been argued that the poor, faced with a ‘Faustian’ choice 
between on the one hand, the financial price of the market, and on the other, the social 
cost of dependency, may resort to borrowing to the point of being over-indebted due to 
their material poverty as well as growing social aspirations (Guérin, Morvant-Roux, et 
al., 2013).  
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In summary, the different theories reveal the complexities related to the factors 
that drive excessive debt holdings which in general may be individually and or externally 
induced. It is worth noting that among the factors which led to the recent global financial 
crises in 2008 is excessive leverage which ultimately resulted in the impairment of 
households’ balance sheet in the US and most of Europe. Subsequent to the financial 
crises, which led to the Great Recession, is the microfinance default crises which 
engulfed much of India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Bosnia Herzegovina in the late 2000. 
These developments have raised concerns about the possible risks posed to poor 
households from the rising indebtedness from the excessive reliance/use of microfinance.  
The main ideology underlying the microfinance model is to enable the poor who 
are mostly excluded from the formal financial sector to have access to financial services 
and in particular access to credit to improve their livelihoods. The question is whether 
indeed access to microfinance credit promotes healthy balance sheets of poor households 
and improves household welfare. This is in view of the negative impact that debt stress 
has on households. High debt burden affects households in several ways and its effects 
may have economic and social dimensions. The next section will examine the interplay of 
indebtedness, financial distress and credit constraint as well as the overall net effect of 
access to microfinance, or lack of access thereof, on household welfare. The increase in 
the debt burden beyond a certain threshold would result in financial distress, leading to a 
fall in future consumption and also a decline in human capital development as households 
would spend less on the education and health of their families. Together, these impacts 
have the potential to dampen economic growth and development. 
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4.4 The Data17 
The analysis draws on the quantitative and qualitative evidence from a unique 
dataset generated from a survey of 499 households, with and without access to 
microfinance, during my field research work in Ghana from May to July 2013. The 
household survey collected household-level data on access to credit from MFIs, overall 
balance sheet, and demographic characteristics. The survey covered two regions, Central 
and Greater Accra. The strategy was to target communities with access to microfinance 
institutions. Households with microfinance were randomly selected from clientele list of 
randomly selected microfinance institutions and households without microcredit were 
randomly sampled within the same communities. This was done in order to reduce 
selection bias. Out of the sample of 499 households used in the analysis, 252 households 
had received MFI loans while 247 had never taken loans from microfinance institutions.     
4.4.1 Definition of Household Head in this Study  
 The study defines the head of the household based on two criteria: (1) an 
individual who contributes over 50 percent to household resources; and (2) an individual 
who makes all or most of the important decisions related to the household. In majority of 
Ghanaian households where the household head is married, the head is usually a male 
adult. That is reflected in the sample used in this study. There is, nonetheless, a number 
of households in which the household head is female and married (8.5 percent).  
                                                          
17 Refer to Chapter 3 for details about the methodology and data used. 
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4.4.2 Business Models of Microfinance Institutions in Ghana 
 Microfinance institutions mostly target the poor in the provision of financial 
products and services. While MFIs play an important role in bridging the financing gaps 
facing the poor, credit may have unintended consequences on the poor. In general, MFIs 
operate under 2 main business models: the capitalist model and the co-operative business 
model.  
Most MFIs in Ghana adopt the capitalist business model. A few, however, operate 
under the co-operative business model. Hopeline Microfinance Institute is one such the 
microfinance institutions operating under the co-operative business model and whose 
clients were randomly sampled and interviewed for this study. Among others, the 
Hopeline MFI engages in the provision of both microfinance products and services such 
as education in entrepreneurial skill development to marginalized groups in the society, 
in particular women on both group and individual basis. In terms of savings, members of 
groups usually pool their savings together over a period of time, usually, one year. Out of 
this pool of savings, loans are granted to members within each group. These loans 
granted to individual members attract an average interest rate of 3.5 percent. At the end 
of the year, profits generated on loans granted to members within each group are 
distributed to members of the group. Hopeline MFI thus acts as a manager to members, 
enabling them to grow their business enterprises, thereby promoting wealth creation. This 
approach seems to be the modus operandi for most financial non-governmental 
organizations (FNGOs) in Ghana, who have a mission to directly fight poverty by 
targeting the marginalized in society.     
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4.4.3 Stylized Facts from the Data 
This section presents the socioeconomic characteristics of the sample, the 
characteristics of the microfinance institutions serving borrowers in the sample, and 
describes the uses of the credit received.  
The survey data confirm that MFIs targets women (81.6 percent of the 
microfinance borrowers in the sample are females). As shown on Table 4.1, a higher 
proportion of households receiving microcredit (70.8 percent) are self-employed 
compared to households who do not receive microcredit (61.5 percent). The economic 
activities of those within the self-employed category range from petty trading, farming, 
livestock rearing, hairdressing, carpentry, making clothing, etc. On average, children 
(both male and female) of households with credit from MFIs tend to have more years of 
schooling (5.8 years and 5.4 years for male and female children respectively) relative to 
children of households without credit (4.6 years for both male and female children).  
It is commonly believed that microfinance targets the poorest of the poor. The 
survey data shows that roughly half of the households in the sample live below $2.5 per 
day (Table A4.1 in Appendix B). Interviews of a selected number of personnel from 
MFIs revealed that ownership of a home business seems to be the main determining 
factor in accessing credit from microfinance institutions (Table A4.2 in Appendix B). 
A new guideline issued in July 2011 by the Central Bank of Ghana categorizes 
MFIs into 4 groups: 
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Tier 1: includes Rural and Community Banks, Finance Houses and Savings & 
Loan Companies which up until now operate under the Banking Act, 2004 (Act 
673). 
Tier 2: includes Susu Companies and other financial services providers which 
include Financial Non-Governmental Organizations (FNGOs) which are engaged 
in deposit-taking and profit-making activities; Credit Unions. 
Tier 3: comprises Money Lenders, Non-Deposit taking FNGOs. 
Tier 4: includes Susu Collectors whether or not previously registered under the 
Ghana Cooperative Susu Collectors Association (GCSCA) and individual money 
lenders.  
Table A4.3 (see Appendix B) presents key characteristics of microfinance 
institutions covered by this study. While some borrowers indicated that no services were 
provided after being allocated the credit, majority of borrowers were recipients of regular 
services ranging from advisory, training, workshop/seminars and book-keeping. Most of 
the microfinance institutions extend credit both on an individual-liability and group-
liability lending basis. Contrary to perceptions that MFIs do not require collateral before 
extending credit, the survey data reveal that almost all microfinance institutions require 
some collateral, mostly in the form of savings and reputable personalities to serve as 
guarantors.  
Most of the loans were granted on a short-term basis, ranging from 3 to 6 months 
period (Figure 4.1). About 10 percent of the loans ranged from 7 to 24 months. In 
general, loan repayments were on a daily, weekly, biweekly or monthly basis. The 
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objective was to minimize defaults. This has implications for the operational cost of 
microfinance institutions given the small size of most of these loans. Loan officers within 
each demarcated area have the tedious task of keeping track of their clients to enforce 
repayments as agreed in the loan contract.  
The cost of the loans sourced from MFIs is generally perceived to be high relative 
to commercial bank loans. The survey data show that the monthly interest rates charged 
on these loans averages around 5 percent, with a range from 0.5 percent to 19 percent. 
The monthly interest rate average of 5 percent translates into an average annual 
percentage rate of 79.6 percent. Roughly 77 percent of respondents who have accessed 
credit from MFIs do not know the interest rate being charged on these loans (206 out of 
268 individuals).  
The average monthly rate was calculated using information provided on monthly 
debt service, the maturity of the loan, the amount of credit received and the total 
payments of the loan. The survey data further reveals that loans with longer maturity tend 
to have lower monthly interest rates (Figure 4.2). The average monthly interest rate of 
loans with a maturity of 3 months is roughly 6 percent (see Table 4.2), compared with 5 
percent and 4 percent average monthly interest rate for loans with a maturity between 4 to 
6 months and 7 to 12 months, respectively. On average loans with a maturity greater than 
12 months up to 24 months carry a monthly interest rate of 2 percent. 
On average, the amount of credit received was GH¢1,410 (US$705) with a 
significant proportion of individuals (88 percent) receiving loan amounts ranging from 
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US$50 to US$1,000 (Figure 4.3)18. The average amount of credit for male recipients was 
GH¢2,082 (US$1,041) compared to GH¢1,116 (US$558) for female recipients.  
The loans were given specifically for engaging in small and medium scale 
business activities and rarely for household expenditures. Roughly 63 percent of loan 
recipients applied the credit received fully to their business enterprises (Table 4.3). 
Eleven percent of loan recipients applied the credit to household expenditures 
(specifically to consumption, education, and health expenditures). The remaining 26 
percent applied varying percentages to either home enterprise or to household 
expenditures. The strict rule by the MFIs requiring recipients to apply the credit to their 
business enterprises are difficult to enforce in practice.  
4.4.4 Definition of Key Variables 
4.4.4.1 Access to Microfinance 
Access to finance can be measured in 3 different ways, by institutions, services or 
products (World Bank, 2006). In the literature, a frequently used measure of households’ 
access to credit is their participation and experiences in the credit market (Bebczuk & 
Haimovich, 2007; Coleman, 2006; Montgomery, 2006). To analyze the impact of access 
to microfinance on household welfare, this study uses a household’s participation in MFI 
programs as a measure of access to microfinance. In addition, other quantitative 
measures, which examine the debt holdings in relation to household expenditures and 
                                                          
18 The exchange rate at the time of the survey was US$ 1= GH¢2. 
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wealth (i.e. income and physical assets) will also be used to ascertain the impact of 
microfinance debt holding on the welfare of households.  
4.4.4.2 Household Indebtedness 
Following conventions in the literature on indebtedness, this study measures a 
household’s indebtedness (HI) as the ratio of its monthly debt service to its monthly 
income. However, given the problems with reported income in developing countries, 
other measures of indebtedness will be explored. In particular, the monthly debt service 
to essential household expenditures ratio, and debt to asset ratio seem to be the most 
objective measures of indebtedness for developing countries as these provide true 
reflections of the extent of household indebtedness.  
4.4.4.3 Credit Constraints19 
To ascertain the extent to which households are credit-constrained, the study 
examines both the qualitative and quantitative evidence. In terms of the qualitative 
evidence, an individual is said to be credit-constrained when s/he was discouraged from 
borrowing, or made the attempt to borrow but was rejected. In terms of the quantitative 
credit constraints facing a household two measures are used. For the first measure, the 
data used is based on responses obtained from households who were asked to indicate the 
loan amount they would like to borrow (DD credit)
20 and the loan amount that was granted 
                                                          
19 See Boucher, Guirkinger, and Trivelli (2009) for detailed analysis of measuring credit 
constraints. 
20 Module C1 and C2 of the household survey questionnaire provide the details of the 
data used here. 
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(SS credit). The difference between DD credit and SS credit provides us with the first measure 
of credit constraint. A positive value implies the household is credit constrained. A 
negative value implies the household faces no credit constraint. In the second measure of 
credit constraint, we examine the difference between DD credit and the borrowers’ reported 
credit limit.21 As noted by Diagne (2000), this measure of access to credit depends on 
both lender and borrower characteristics and actions as well as on random events that 
affect the fortune of lenders and other potential borrowers. Specifically, one has access to 
a certain type of credit when the maximum credit limit, bmax, for that type is strictly 
positive. In the same vein, a positive value implies the household is credit-constrained 
and a negative value implies the household faces no credit constraints. On the basis of the 
second measure of credit constraint, we derive a dummy variable for credit constraint 
which takes the value “1” if a household is credit constrained and “0” otherwise. 
4.4.4.4 Financial Distress  
This paper defines household financial distress as “the persistent difficulty 
encountered by households in the servicing of their debt.” Specifically, a dummy variable 
for financial distress is created for households who have persistent difficulty servicing 
their loans in addition to those households who frequently forego basic needs in order to 
service loans. Using the measures of indebtedness above, the study will examine 
thresholds of household indebtedness that result in financial distress. This paper shares 
the belief that while microfinance customers have good reasons to take loans, over-
                                                          
21 This follows Diagne (2000) who quantifies the extent of household access to credit 
using the credit limit concept. 
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indebtedness has detrimental effects on household welfare. Financial distress is also 
assessed based on the subjective responses from the interviewees.  
4.4.4.5 Household Welfare 
This study uses two measures of household welfare to examine the impact of 
access to microfinance on a household’s welfare. The first measure is household 
expenditures, which is defined at two levels, food expenditures and total essential 
household expenditures. The second measure is a qualitative measure and is based on a 
household’s perceived welfare. Specifically, households were asked to assess their 
relative welfare, that is, in comparison to their contemporaries and in relation to the last 
12 months. The responses provided allow us to derive a measure of a households’ 
perceived welfare after accessing microfinance. This qualitative measure takes the value 
“1” if a household perceives its current welfare to be above or equal to average, and “0” 
otherwise.  
4.4.5 Patterns in Key Variables 
4.4.5.1 Evidence on Credit Constraints  
The qualitative evidence suggests that roughly 23.8 percent of households in our 
sample are credit-constrained, that is, with no access to credit even though they have a 
positive demand for credit (Table 4.4). The main reasons associated with the lack of 
access to credit was fear of not getting approved, the cumbersome nature of applying for 
credit and the fear associated with holding debt, constituting 6.9 percent, 6.5 percent and 
4 percent respectively of the total sample of adults.  
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About 2.1 percent indicated they actually applied but were rejected, while 2.3 
percent attributed their lack of access to credit to low sales, economic shocks and high 
interest rates. About 7.1 percent with some access to credit from sources other than 
microfinance institutions indicated that they were constrained in terms of accessing credit 
from microfinance institutions. In addition to the qualitative evidence on credit 
constraints, the data is further examined using the defined quantitative measure, where a 
household is credit-constrained if the amount of credit demanded is greater than the 
amount of credit supplied or the households’ perceived credit limit. The evidence 
suggests that between 24 to 27 percent of households with access to credit are credit 
constrained (Table 4.4). For households that have access to credit, it is mainly from 
microfinance institutions. Combining the qualitative evidence and the quantitative 
evidence, we find that between 46 to 52 percent of households in our sample are credit-
constrained (Table 4.4). 
4.4.5.2 Household Total Debt Holdings  
The aggregate debt holding from all sources for households with access to 
microfinance in our sample stands at GH ¢ 503,598.4 (equivalent to US $251,799.2)22, 
with microfinance debt accounting for approximately 90 percent of this total debt 
holdings (Table 4.5). In general, women hold more debt relative to men, in terms of both 
total debt holdings and total microfinance debt with 65.7 percent and 67.5 percent 
respectively. Though not surprising, given the fact that women account for a majority of 
microfinance clients, the high debt holdings of women, particularly in the microfinance 
                                                          
22 The exchange rate at the time of the survey, June 2013, was $1 to GH ¢2. 
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loan market, suggest the feminization of debt. The other loans, made up of loans that 
have been sourced from relatives, friends or from trader groups, are only a tiny fraction 
of total debt holdings, (i.e. 10 percent of debt holdings).  
4.4.5.3 Credit Constraint and Debt Holdings 
To put the analysis above into perspective we analyze the actual credit constraints 
facing households to ascertain if any relationship exist between the amount of debt held 
and the credit constraint a household faces. The hypothesis here is that the level of credit 
constraint facing a household is positively associated with household debt holdings. 
Meaning, households with high debt holdings are mostly credit-constrained.  
Using the current national poverty line measures, we examine the actual credit 
constraints facing households by the gender of the household head. The national poverty 
line measures used in the analysis is based on 2 nutritionally-based poverty lines derived 
based on the 2013 GLSS report. These are the lower poverty line of GHS 792.05 and the 
upper poverty line of GHS 1314.00, both of which are per adult per year. While the lower 
poverty line focuses on what is needed to meet the nutritional requirements of household 
members, the upper poverty line on the other hand incorporates both food and non-food 
consumption data.  
The analysis is presented in Table 4.6. The first part of the table examines the two 
measures of credit constraint in nominal values and as a percentage of annual household 
expenditures excluding food expenditures, for male-headed households, while the second 
part does same for female-headed households. The third part of the table examines the 
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outstanding debts of households in both nominal values and as a ratio of annual total 
expenditures excluding food expenditures, by gender of the household head.  
The data shows that on average, households above the two poverty lines tend to 
be more credit-constrained compared to households below the poverty lines. When we 
examine households below the poverty lines, by the gender of the household head, we 
also note that on average, female-headed households below the two poverty lines tend to 
be more credit-constrained relative to their male counterparts. On the other hand, female-
headed households above the lower and upper poverty lines tend to be less credit-
constrained on average relative to their male counterparts. The data further reveal that, on 
average, households below the poverty lines have lower outstanding debt relative to 
households above the poverty lines. As a ratio of total household expenditures excluding 
food, average total outstanding debt for female-headed households who are above the 
poverty line is higher relative to their male counterparts, that is 81 percent relative to 72 
percent using the lower poverty line and 74 percent relative to 66 percent using the upper 
poverty line, even though in nominal terms, the values are lower for female-headed 
households relative to their male counterparts.  
The above analysis suggests that credit constraints are positively associated with 
household indebtedness. Theoretically and in practice, causality may run in both ways. 
Let’s assume that we are operating in a perfect credit market, where all players in the 
market have perfect information relating to the market. Under the assumption of perfect 
credit market, a person with more debt will seem to be more credit-constrained relative to 
one with less debt as it will be difficult to obtain credit with a high debt coverage ratio. 
On the other hand a person with high credit constraint will be more willing to take on a 
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lot more debt. Whichever one of these two scenarios is occurring in a less developed 
credit market, such as is the case in Ghana, would be the subject of broader research 
work, nevertheless, we test the hypothesis that being highly indebted is positively 
associated with being credit constrained.  
4.4.5.4 Financial Distress – Qualitative Evidence 
This section provides the qualitative evidence in relation to household financial 
distress. Qualitative measures from the empirical literature used to ascertain distress 
among borrowers border mostly on the struggles faced in the repayment of their loans. To 
understand the nature of the struggles faced by microfinance borrowers, the survey 
sought to determine whether borrowers had missed periodic payments and if so, what 
factors led to its occurrence. In addition, borrowers were asked whether they encountered 
difficulty in repaying their monthly loan installment and if so, the extent to which they 
experience this difficulty.    
From the survey data, we find that 22 percent of borrowers missed periodic 
payments over the course of the loans. Since missing periodic payments is not a sufficient 
condition to be financially distressed, borrowers were further asked to indicate if they had 
experienced difficulties in the servicing of their loans. Roughly, half of the sample of 
households with access to microfinance indicated they experienced difficulties in 
servicing their loans. Respondents who affirmed difficulty in loan repayments were asked 




In general, 25.6 percent of respondents having difficulty repaying loans attribute 
this difficulty to macroeconomic developments. Loan-specific factors affecting loan 
repayment such as high interest rates were reported by 5.2 percent of respondents. Health-
related problems and education costs also explain financial distress, with 3.2 percent and 
5.2 percent of respondents respectively attributing the problem to these factors (Table 4.7). 
About 12 percent of respondents also attributed financial distress to other problems which 
ranged from seasonal problems, death of a family member, and short duration of loan 
repayments among others.   
Out of the sample experiencing difficulty servicing loans, 9.2 percent indicated 
they were frequently experiencing difficulties servicing the loans contracted. To 
understand some of the specific factors that influenced borrowers’ difficulties in 
servicing monthly loans repayments, some of the respondents who had also indicated that 
they missed periodic repayments were separately interviewed. A key point to note about 
those missing periodic payments and also having difficulties servicing their loans is that 
they are mostly self-employed and engaged in trading activities, specifically the buying 
and selling of consumer goods. As a result of the nature of their jobs, they mostly do not 
have regular and stable streams of income as their jobs are significantly affected by 
general macroeconomic developments. The responses of some of those separately 
interviewed are presented below. The responses are categorized in terms of the main 
problems affecting loan repayment, including those that are health-related, household-
specific factors, and those that are due to macroeconomic developments as well as those 




4.4.5.4.1 Macroeconomic Developments 
These are some of the accounts of those attributing financial distress experienced to 
macroeconomic developments which reflects in low business activities. Anthony, an 
unmarried young business man who recently graduated from Vocational School, is an 
automobile parts dealer. He explained: 
“Prices keep changing every time and that means I have to constantly adjust the 
price of my goods upwards almost every week. But this constant price adjustments 
affects sales and that is why I am unable to service my loan as expected.” 
Benedicta is 32 years and a middle school graduate. She is a trader but contracted the loan 
for her late mother’s funeral. According to her, servicing the loan has been difficult due to 
low sales and as a result, she has had to reduce the family’s daily meals in order to service 
the loan. 
Patience is 34 years and also a middle school graduate. She is self-employed and a retail 
trader. She contracted a loan of 500 GHS (equivalent to $250 – value in 2013) to expand 
her retail trading. She explained:  
“Due to low sales I am unable to service my loan regularly. I reduce my impulse 
buying in order to service the loan.”  
Comfort is 30 years and a middle school graduate. She is self-employed and regularly goes 
to Lome in Togo, to buy goods to sell in Accra, Ghana. She also attributed her inability to 
service her loan to low sales. She explained: 
“Business activity has slowed down so my regular customers are not even buying 
my goods this year compared to the previous year. But once business picks up I will 




The story is no different for many others including Augustina, a 23 years old and a recent 
high school graduate who is self-employed and engaged in small-scale trading activities. 
She also explained:  
“I contracted the loan (1000 GHS) to expand my trading business. However, it 
has been difficult to repay the loan regularly. The difficulty is due to the very low 
sales.” 
4.4.5.4.2 Microfinance Market/Loan-related Factors 
Felicia is 37 years and a high school graduate, who is currently a caterer. She also 
contracted the loan to expand her catering business. She explained that the short duration 
of the loan repayment makes it difficult to service the loan regularly. Similarly, Elizabeth 
is 50 years and a middle school graduate. She is a trader who contracted the loan to expand 
her trading business. She also indicated that the daily servicing of the loan was increasingly 
making it difficult to make ends meet. Diana is 30 years and a junior high school graduate. 
She is also a trader and contracted a loan of 500 GHS to expand her home business 
enterprise. She attributed her difficulty in servicing her loan to the high interest rates (the 
Annual Percentage rate on her loan was 133.8%). 
4.4.5.4.3 Household-specific Factors 
Grace is also a middle-aged woman who contracted the loan to boost her trading 
business. She is still in the process of finalizing repayment of her loan. She explained, 
“When I took the loan everything went well until some few weeks ago when I lost 
a relative in my hometown. I had to bear most of the funeral cost and that also 
slowed up my business. Right now, I don’t have the means to repay the loan, at 




4.4.5.4.4 Health-related Factors 
Margaret is a middle-aged self-employed woman who is a microfinance loan recipient. 
The loan repayment period has elapsed but she has been unable to fully repay the debt. 
She contracted the loan in order to grow her home enterprise trading business. Margaret, 
upon seeing us at her house, had wanted to run and take cover because she thought we 
had come to her house to enforce repayment of the debt she owed to one microfinance 
institution located in her vicinity. She explained, 
“Some few weeks after I took the loan, I fell sick and I am yet to fully recover. My 
blood pressure is always high and the doctors have told me to rest. That is why I 
have not been able to work to be able to repay the loan. Right now, it is my 
husband who has promised to help me to repay the loan that is why I have 
pleaded with the microfinance people to be patient with me.”    
What was alarming about the level of financial distress being reported by those missing 
periodic payments is the fact that within some households there is more than one person 
experiencing financial distress. The case of one particular household is worth mentioning. 
In this case the household head together with his spouse had accessed separate loan 
packages from the same microfinance institution. Augustine, the household head is 57 
years old and operates a licensed chemical shop. He explained: 
“I took the loan to restock my drug store. But the location of my shop makes it 
difficult to increase sales. But the loan officers are here every month to collect 
repayment and I don’t have the amount because all the things I bought with the 
loan are on the shelf. I now have BP (meaning high blood pressure). I wish I could 
have applied for a bank loan instead but the banks require collateral and I don’t 
have one.”  
His wife, Elizabeth, is 51 years old. She operates a small business selling sachets and 
bottled water on the same premises her husband uses as his chemical shop. She also took a 
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microfinance loan to expand her business and also to supplement the educational cost for 
their children. She added that, 
“The short period given to repay the loan generates anxiety for us and we now have 
to spend so much on our health because we both have high blood pressure. Madam, 
they (MFIs) are killing us slowly.” 
4.4.5.4.5 Multiple Factors 
Edem is 30 years and also a middle school graduate. Edem’s story is no different, however, 
she revealed another dimension of the nature of problems related to the microfinance 
market. She explained:  
“I took the loan to expand my shop business. The microfinance institution did not 
tell me the interest rate on the loan and then they also used part of the loan as 
collateral (200 out of 1000) in the event I failed to repay on time. The weekly 
repayment has made things very difficult for me and my family.” 
Adwoa is 48 years and only completed primary school. She is also self-employed and deals 
in second-hand clothing, commonly referred to as “Obroni wawu” (meaning “dead white 
man’s” clothing) in Ghana. The loan amount granted to her was 400 GHS, the equivalent 
of $200 in 2013 (when the research was conducted). The purpose of the loan was to 
supplement her household expenditures. She recounts:  
“The sudden death of both of my parents during the period I contracted the loan 
has meant missing periodic repayments of the loan. What makes it even more 
difficult is the short duration of the repayment period.” 
Rebecca is 38 years old and divorced. She is a professional dressmaker, with a specialty in 
making wedding dresses and selling wedding accessories at her rented shop located in 
Madina, a suburb of Accra. At the time of the interview, she informed us that she had taken 
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the loan for her business as well as to help her to pay for the educational cost for her 2 of 
her children, both of whom are in high school. In her own words she explained: 
“After I took the loan, my business slowed so I couldn't repay any of the original 
loan of 2000 Ghana cedis plus 750 Gh cedis interest. The microfinance company 
told me I now have to pay 2750 plus 6.25% monthly interest rate for the next six 
months. It has been over a year and I am still repaying the loan. Every month they 
come here and I give them 300 Ghana Cedis. When I ask them how much I have 
left to pay they ask me to go to the office for them to explain to me. So I don’t even 
know when I will complete repayment. Because of this situation I can’t even save 
and my living cost keeps rising” 
Jennifer is 38 years and has completed vocational school and trades in second hand goods 
at Buduburam in the Central Region of Ghana. She also took the loan to expand her 
business but is currently having difficulty servicing the loan. She explained: 
“Madam, low sales and high household expenses (meaning rising living costs) 
makes it so difficult to make repayments every two weeks and that is why I have 
difficulty making periodic payments to the microfinance company.” 
Augustina is 23 years and has recently completed high school, but due to her family’s 
financial difficulties she was unable to further her education. She started selling eggs to 
raise money to further her education and that was why she took the loan to further expand 
her business. She also explained, 
“Nowadays, sales have gone down. People are not buying like they used to and that 
makes it difficult to repay the loan every time. I am unable to apply for a loan from 
the bank because I don’t have collateral nor a guarantor. People say it is cheaper 
to take loans from the bank (meaning interest rates are low) and also they (the 
banks) won’t worry me to repay like the microfinance people. But I don’t have a 
choice. I also need to raise money so I can go back to school.” 
Florence is 38 years and also a high school graduate. She is self-employed, engaged in the 
retail business of buying and selling shoes. She contracted a loan of 1000 GHS to also 
expand her trading business. She explained: 
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“My main problem is low sales and also the high interest rates (the APR on her 
loan is 79.6 percent) on the loan. These have made it extremely difficult to service 
the loan each month.” 
Eric and Ruth are a married couple, both of whom are self-employed. Together they 
contracted a loan of 2,200 GHS ($1,100.00). While Eric contracted the loan (1200 GHS) 
for the couple’s children education expenditures, Ruth on the other hand contracted the 
loan (1000 GHS) for their home enterprise. Eric explained that servicing of the loan has 
been difficult due to low sales. On the other hand Ruth explained that the frequency of loan 
repayment made loan servicing each month difficult. 
The qualitative evidence presented above clearly point to the fact that the 
households who access loans from microfinance institutions do so because they are credit-
constrained. But there are several factors that also impinge on their ability to service their 
loans, a critical component of which is adverse macroeconomic developments which lead 
to rising living costs, the high interest rates of microfinance loans relative to bank loans, 
short maturity of microfinance loans, as well as other critical but unforeseen circumstances 
such as failing health and death occurring within a family. As a consequence of these 
adverse developments on loan repayment, households choose to miss periodic payments or 
continue servicing the loans but foregoing some basic necessities. There was limited coping 
mechanism strategies for households aside foregoing some basic necessities. The evidence 
reveal that while a few borrowers may have family members providing some support 
during the period they experienced difficulties, such as was the case of Margaret, most 
borrowers have no other option than to reduce household expenditures, in particular food 
expenditures, in order to service their loans. 
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 About 16.5 percent of respondents indicated that they often forego some basic 
necessities in order to service their loans (Table 4.7). This percentage (16.5 percent) 
comprises 12 percent who indicated they reduce meals, 2.1 percent who reduce other 
household expenditures, and 1.6 percent who take their children out of school and 0.8 
percent who close down their home enterprise, the very reason for which they contracted 
the loans. This development clearly show that while debt may be good, given its potential 
to increase wealth, it also has the potential to adversely affect the welfare of households 
beyond certain thresholds.  
 On average, we find that households that choose to forego some basic household 
needs have a higher monthly debt service ratio compared to households who do not have 
to forego basic needs to service their debt (Table 4.8a). This necessarily implies lower net 
income for households with high debt service to income ratio compared to their 
counterparts with lower debt service to income ratio.  
 In general, the data show that being relatively less credit-constrained and less 
indebted is important for meeting the basic needs of a household (Tables 4.8a and 4.8b). 
Specifically, the survey data shows that on average, households who forego basic needs to 
service debt and also with a relatively high debt service to income ratio are also relatively 
more credit-constrained, compared with households that do not forego basic needs and who 
have relatively lower debt service to income ratio. This is confirmed by the two different 
quantitative measures of credit constraints, which further strengthens the hypothesis made 
earlier that a high level of indebtedness is positively correlated with being credit-
constrained. As previously explained, the direction of causality between being credit-
constrained and being highly indebted may run both ways. This study is limited in that it 
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uses a one-time cross-sectional data set, thus, the use of longitudinal data will be useful in 
establishing this relationship. Nevertheless, we test the hypothesis that a high debt burden 
is positively associated with being financially distressed and credit constrained. In the 
welfare analysis we will also examine the impact of being credit-constrained, access to 
microfinance, and actual debt holdings on household welfare. 
4.4.5.5 Household Indebtedness 
The main explanatory variable employed in the analysis of household financial 
distress is the monthly debt service to monthly income ratio. A comparative measure of the 
debt service ratio, that is, the monthly debt service to monthly essential expenditures ratio, 
will also be explored due to the problems with reported income from developing countries.  
From the survey data, we find that in general, households in our sample have high 
debt service to income ratio, with roughly about 50 percent of households with debt service 
to income ratio above 40 percent. This percentage is made up of about 29 percent with debt 
service to income ratio above 60 percent (Figure 4.4). More worrying is the fact that a high 
percentage of households have debt service to income ratio above 100 percent, which is 
14.5 percent of the sample with access to microfinance. The median and mean debt service 
to income ratio for the entire sample of households holding debt is 40 percent and 64 
percent respectively. 
4.4.5.6 Debt Service Burden and Microfinance Market Characteristics 
The debt service ratio is examined by the loan/microfinance market characteristics. 
The data shows a mean and median of 69.3 percent and 40 percent respectively for 
households with a monthly interest rate above 5 percent (Table 4.9a). Those with a monthly 
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interest rate below or equal to 5 percent have a mean and median debt service ratio of 57.9 
percent and 33.9 percent respectively. Those holding individual loans also have a higher 
debt service ratio compared with those holding group loans, that is, a mean and median of 
75.3 percent and 40.3 percent respectively for individual loans compared with 45.5 percent 
and 31.1 percent for group loans. Households with more than one loan also tend to have a 
relatively higher debt service ratio, that is, a mean and median of 153.5 percent and 68.6 
percent respectively, compared with 56.6 percent and 38.5 percent for those holding one 
loan. The type of microfinance institution, that is, whether it is formal or informal, also has 
implications for the debt service ratio. The data also shows that households with loans from 
formal MFIs have a relatively lower debt service to income ratio. 
In general, those using 50 percent or above for investment tend to have a lower debt 
service ratio in terms of the mean and median, 62.6 percent and 37.5 percent respectively 
compared with 73.2 percent and 48 percent for those using less than 50 percent for 
investments. The debt service ratio does not differ significantly by the gender of the loan 
user. A household that receives some form of financial literacy on the use of the loan also 
tends to have a lower debt service ratio compared to counterparts who do not receive any 
form of financial literacy on the use of the loan. The term of the loan also mattered for the 
debt service ratio as shown by the mean and median. On average, households with loan 
maturity at 6 months and below have a relatively lower debt service ratio compared with 
those with loan maturity above 6 months, though we note that, in terms of the median, the 
reverse is the case.   
Given the problems with reported income in developing countries, we derive a 
comparative measure of the debt service ratio, which is the monthly debt service to the 
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monthly essential household expenditures and compare these with the debt service to 
income ratio (Figure 4.5). The debt service to the monthly essential household expenditures 
ratio is relatively lower compared to the debt service to income ratio but closely matched 
in terms of the trends (Figure 4.5). The debt service to essential expenditures ratio is also 
examined in relation to the microfinance market characteristics, and this ratio reveals 
similar trends compared with the debt service to income ratio, except for the following 
variables, type of microfinance and the repayment period.  
On average, the debt service to essential household expenditures is higher when the 
loan is accessed from a formal MFI relative to when accessed from an informal MFI (Table 
4.9b). In terms of financial literacy, the debt service to essential household expenditures 
ratio is relatively higher when the term of the loan is less than 6 months compared with 
when it is 6 months and above, that is, a mean and median of 52.8 percent and 52.7 percent 
respectively for less than 6 months and 51.3 percent and 45.9 percent respectively for when 
the loan term is 6 months and above. 
4.4.5.7 Characteristics of Financial Distressed and Not Financially Distressed 
Households  
We further examine the impact of debt on financial distress. To undertake this 
exercise, we derive the frequently financially distressed category based on netting out 
households who were frequently experiencing difficulties in servicing their loans and 
include those who had to forego basic needs in order to service their loans (Table 4.7). 
On this basis, 23.2 percent of our sample with access to microfinance are frequently 
financially distressed (Table 4.7). 
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The data shows that, on average, households that are frequently financially 
distressed report a relatively higher debt service ratios compared to households reporting 
less or no financial distress (Table 4.10). Specifically, households that are frequently 
financially distressed have a mean and median debt service to income ratio of 113 percent 
and 49.7 percent respectively, compared with an average of 50 percent and 35.6 percent 
respectively for those reporting little or no financial distress (Table 4.10). On average, the 
debt service to essential expenditure ratio follows a similar trend with 56 percent for 
frequently financially distressed households, compared with 50.7 percent for households 
reporting little or no financial distress.  
In terms of age, educational attainment and age dependency, the data shows that, 
on average, households that are frequently financially distressed do not differ 
significantly from households reporting less or no financial distress (see Table 4.10). On 
average, households that are frequently financially distressed tend to have a slightly 
larger household size compared with households reporting less or no financial distress. In 
terms of credit constraint, the data reveal that, on average, households that are frequently 
financially distressed tend to be more credit-constrained compared to their counterparts 
reporting little or no financial distress. The hypothesis to be tested is that controlling for 
household demographic characteristics, a high debt burden is positively associated with 
being frequently financially distressed and credit-constrained.  
4.4.5.8 Welfare and Access to Microfinance 
The data shows that the odds for a positive welfare review for a household with 
access to credit is 1.24 (153 divided by 123) compared with 0.79 (97 divided by 122) for 
a household with access to credit but with negative welfare review (see referred 
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frequencies in Table 4.11). The ratio of these two odds is 1.56 (1.24 divided by 0.79) 
implying that the odds for a positive welfare review for households with access to credit 
is higher than for a negative welfare review with access to credit by 56 percent. Similarly, 
the odds of a positive welfare review for a household that is credit-constrained is 0.70 
(114 divided by 162) compared with 0.94 (106 divided by 113) for a household that is 
credit constrained with negative welfare review. The ratio of the two odds is 0.75 (0.70 
divided by 0.94) implying that the odds for a positive welfare review for households that 
are credit constrained are 25 percent lower than for a household with negative welfare 
review and credit constrained.  
On average, households that perceived their relative welfare to be above or equal 
to average were older compared to those below average, 41.8 years and 38.7 years 
respectively (Table 4.12). Similarly, the years of schooling was higher for households 
who perceived their welfare to be better or equal to their peers compared to those below, 
10.8 years and 8.6 years respectively. Households with positive welfare perceptions also 
had greater access to credit and were less credit constrained compared to their 
counterparts with negative welfare perceptions. In general, all measures of wealth were 
also greater for households with positive welfare perceptions compared to their 
counterparts with negative welfare perceptions.  
In the same view, we examine the food expenditure per adult household member 
by access to credit and the gender of the household head. The data shows that male-
headed households with access to credit are on average better off as they have a higher 
food expenditure per adult household member compared to their counterparts without 
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access to credit (Table 4.13). Female-headed households with access to credit are also 
better off on average compared with their counterparts without.  
To understand the main factors that influence indebtedness and household 
welfare, the next section employs econometric analysis to examine the patterns observed 
for our key variables. In particular, we estimate models for household indebtedness and 
welfare in the following section.  
4.5 Econometric Analysis 
This section applies econometric analysis to examine the implication of access to 
microfinance for household indebtedness and welfare. Specifically, the study tests the 
following two hypotheses based on the analysis in the previous section; 
(1) Microfinance market characteristics are important determinants of a household’s 
debt service burden;   
(2) A high debt burden compromises household welfare by  
- increasing the probability of financial distress and credit constraint;  
- reducing expenditures, in particular, food expenditures. 
4.5.1 Empirical Models 
4.5.1.1 Determinants of Household Debt Service Burden 
To test hypothesis (1), we postulate the following relationship between the debt 
service burden and the characteristics related to the microfinance market, the borrower, 
the household and geographical location of the dwelling: 
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Debt Service Burden = f (MFI market characteristics, borrower characteristics, 
household characteristics, and locality characteristics). 
The dependent variable, debt service burden, is defined as the monthly debt service 
to essential expenditures ratio23. First, we estimate a pooled OLS regression using the 
actual debt service ratios as follows:  
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝛼𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖       (1) 
Where i refers to the household, Di is a measure of household indebtedness, the 𝑋𝑖 
is a set of control variables including household, borrower and locality specific 
characteristics. The independent variable, MFI, implies the inclusion of specific 
characteristics related to the microfinance market and 𝜖𝑖 is an error term.  
Due to the fact that the debt service ratio is not normally distributed24, an alternative 
technique is to derive thresholds of the debt service burden and modeled to arise 
sequentially as a latent variable, y*, which crosses progressively higher thresholds. 
Specifically, three thresholds25 of the debt burden are derived. The thresholds are based on 
the increasing levels of severity of the ratio of debt service to essential expenditures 
(monthly). This approach seems more appropriate given that we are interested in 
understanding factors that influence being in a higher debt burden category relative to a 
lower category. The three categories are low debt burden, moderate debt burden and high 
                                                          
23 Results using the debt service to income ratio are reported on Table A4.6 in Appendix.  
24 See Appendix: Figures A4.1 and A4.2. 
25 Similar thresholds are used for the debt service to income ratio measure. 
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debt burden: Low debt burden takes the value “1” for debt service ratios less than 25 
percent; Moderate debt burden takes the value “2” for debt service ratios between 25 
percent and 40 percent; High debt burden takes the value “3” for debt service ratios above 
40 percent. 
The following ordered logit model is estimated: 
𝑃(𝐷𝐵𝑖 = 𝑗) = 𝛹[𝜂𝑗 − 𝑿𝑗𝛾] − 𝛹[𝜂𝑗−1 − 𝑿𝑗𝛾]   (2) 
Where 𝑗=1, 2, 3 (1: Low debt burden; 2: Moderate debt burden; and 3: High debt burden); 
i refers to the ith households and 𝑿 is a set of control variables. 
To estimate this model, a log-likelihood is required, thus we define an indicator variable, 
𝑍𝑖𝑗, which equals 1 if 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗 and 0 otherwise. The log-likelihood is given by: 





𝐼𝑛[𝛹𝑖𝑗 − 𝛹𝑖𝑗−1] 
Where Ψij = 𝛹[𝜂𝑗 − 𝑿𝑗𝛾] and 𝛹𝑖𝑗−1 = 𝛹[𝜂𝑗−1 − 𝑿𝑗𝛾] 
The independent variables are chosen based on the theoretical and empirical 
literature on household finance. The independent variables of interest are the microfinance 
market/loan characteristics. The characteristics of the microfinance market that the data 
allow us to analyze include the type of microfinance institution from which the loan was 
accessed, that is, whether the loan was accessed from a formal or informal microfinance 
institution; whether the loan was granted on an individual basis or on group basis; whether 
the MFI program provided some form of financial literacy; and whether the loan term was 
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above 6 months; as well as the interest rate charged on the loan. The household-specific 
characteristics include the age, education level and employment status of the household 
head; the household size and the poverty status. Other characteristics which are borrower-
specific are the number of loans, and the use of the loan, specifically, whether more than 
50 percent of the loan was used for home enterprise or not and the gender of the loan user. 
The ordered outcome model from equation (2) above is estimated using the maximum 
likelihood estimation method.  
4.5.1.2 Welfare Implications of Access to Microfinance 
We test our second hypothesis using different econometric approaches involving 
the use of logistic regression, two-stage least squares and OLS analysis. First, we 
examine whether the mere access to microfinance is welfare-enhancing for households. 
Second, we are interested in understanding the relationship between indebtedness and 
household financial distress and credit constraint. Finally, we analyze the impact of actual 
debt burden (i.e. debt to asset ratio) on food expenditures.  
To examine the impact of access to microfinance on household welfare, we apply 
logistic regressions and two-stage least squares. This is because the welfare analysis will 
involve the use of both qualitative and quantitative measures of welfare and access to 
microfinance. To avoid obtaining inconsistent and bias estimators, the two-stage least 
squares methodology is applied to the quantitative measure given potential endogeneity 
of some of the regressors used to predict household welfare.  
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4.5.1.3 Overall Welfare Analysis 
The impact of access to microfinance on the household subjective welfare will be 
investigated by estimating the following logistic regression model:  
𝑃𝑟(𝑊𝑖 = 1) = 𝜑(𝛿 + 𝑿𝑖
′𝛾2 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑖)      (3) 
Where 𝜑 is the cumulative density function of a normal distribution; i refers to the ith 
households; 𝑊𝑖 takes the value “1” if household perceives its welfare to be average or 
above average, and “0” if it perceives welfare to be below average; 𝐴𝐶𝑖 is a dummy that 
indicates access to microfinance; it takes the value “1” when the household has access to 
microfinance and “0” otherwise. The use of the dummy is appropriate in view of the fact 
that we want to examine the impact of access to microfinance on welfare for all 
households in our sample, including those with and without access to credit. We 
hypothesize that 𝛽2 > 0. 𝑿𝑖 is a set of control variables.  
Following the literature, we control for household-specific characteristics which 
also impact household welfare. The household-specific variables include demographic 
characteristics and current levels of wealth. The following are the demographic 
characteristics of households that are also controlled for: the level of education and 
marital status of the household head and whether the household head is self-employed; 
the household size and age dependency and household’s access to utilities and 
infrastructure, proxied by the access to clean water. We control for the wealth of the 
household by including a dummy for land ownership, which takes the value “1” when the 
household owns land and “0” otherwise as well as a dummy for the ownership status of 
the dwelling which also takes the value of “1” when the dwelling is owner occupied and 
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“0” otherwise. In addition, assets and income measures are controlled for by running 2 
separate equations which interchanges the asset and income measure. In addition, we 
control for the share of health and education expenditures in total household 
expenditures. Equation (3) is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation 
method.  
The following model, which uses food expenditures as an objective measure of 
household welfare will also be estimated using the two-stage least squares methodology. 
This is due to the possible endogeneity of some of the regressors explaining household 
welfare.   
𝐹𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝑿𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝛼𝐴𝐶𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖       (4) 
Where i refers to the ith households; 𝐹𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑖 is the dependent variable and refers to the 
quantitative measure of household welfare being food expenditure per person; 𝐴𝐶𝑖 and 𝑿𝑖 
are as defined in equation (3) above. We hypothesize here that 𝛼 > 0. 
4.5.1.4 Financial Distress and Credit Constraint Analysis 
We further examine the impact of household indebtedness on the probability of a 
household being financially distressed and credit-constrained using the following logistic 
regression models: 
𝑃𝑟(𝐹𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝜑(𝛼 + 𝑿𝑖
′𝛾1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐵𝑖
2)   (5) 
𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 1) = 𝜑(𝛿 + 𝑿𝑖
′µ1 + 𝜏2𝐷𝐵𝑖)    (6) 
Where 𝜑 is the cumulative density function of a normal distribution; i refers to the ith 
households; 𝐹𝐷𝑖 in equation (5) takes the value “1” if household is financially distressed, 
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and “0” otherwise; 𝐶𝐶𝑖 in equation (6) takes the value “1” if a household is credit 
constrained and “0” if otherwise; 𝐷𝐵𝑖 is a measure of the household’s indebtedness; for 
equation (5) we use the debt service ratio and for equation (6) we use the thresholds of 
debt derived for equation (1). 𝑿𝑖 is a set of control variables. The control variables 
include household-specific characteristics and MFI-specific variables. The household-
specific variables include demographic statistics: the age of the household head, the level 
of education; wealth indicators: ownership of land, number of rooms within the 
household, access to utilities and infrastructure, proxied by the location of the household 
in urban area MFI-specific variables to be included the type of microfinance finance 
institution, that is, whether the MFI from which the loan was accessed is a formal or an 
informal institution and whether the loan contracted on an individual or group loan. 
Equations (5) and (6) are also estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation 
method. For equation (5), we hypothesize that 𝛽1  > 0; and 𝛽1< 0. For equation (6) we 
hypothesize that 𝜏2 < 0 at low levels of debt and 𝜏2 > 0 at higher levels of debt. 
4.5.1.5 Debt Burden and Food Expenditures Analysis 
The implications of the debt burden for food expenditures will further be 
examined using the following model:  
𝐸𝑖 = 𝑎0 + 𝑿𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝛼𝐷𝐵𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖       (7) 
Where i refers to the ith households; 𝐸𝑖 is the dependent variable and refers to a 
household’s annual food expenditures. As a robustness check, the model is re-estimated 
using total household expenditures as the dependent variable; 𝐷𝐵𝑖 is a measure the debt 
 
111 
burden, which in this case will be the debt to asset ratio. 𝑿𝑖 is as defined in equation (3) 
above. The model will be estimated using OLS.  
4.5.2 Discussion of the Results 
4.5.2.1 Determinants of Debt Service Burden 
Hypothesis 1: Microfinance market characteristics are important determinants of a 
household’s debt service burden 
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented on 
Table A4.4 in the Appendix. The results for the pooled regression are presented on Table 
4.14. The results from the OLS estimation confirm the hypothesis that microfinance market 
characteristics are important determinants of the debt service burden, though some of the 
relationships differed from expectations.  
The results from the pooled regression show that on average, holding an individual 
loan, the number of loans held by the household, and the monthly interest rate are positively 
associated with the debt service burden and most of the coefficients are statistically 
significant (Table 4.14). Specifically, when holding all other variables constant, 
contracting an additional loan will increase the debt service ratio by between 30 to 58 
percent, and this is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (Table 4.14, columns 1-4). 
Similarly, a 100 percent increase in the monthly interest rate induces a 14 to 15 percent 
increase in the debt service ratio though the results are insignificant for the debt service to 
income ratio but significant at the 10 percent level for the debt service to essential 
household expenditures ratio (Table 4.13, columns 2 and 4). While holding an individual 
loan induces a 3 to 27 percent increase in the debt service burden, but statistically 
significant only for the debt service to income ratio estimation (Table 4.14, columns 1-4).  
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It was expected that contracting the loan from a formal MFI relative to an informal 
MFI will be negatively associated with the debt service burden in view of the fact that 
formal MFIs, who are subjected to tight regulations, usually offer lower interest rates 
relative to their informal counterparts who are also less regulated and often charge higher 
interest rate. Similarly, it was expected that receiving some form of literacy from the MFI 
will induce benefits that will necessarily reduce the debt service burden. However, contrary 
to these expectations, contracting the loan from a formal MFI and receiving financial 
literacy on managing the loan induces an increase in the debt service burden but in both 
cases the coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
The share of credit allocated to investments in total MFI credit, on the other hand, 
is negatively associated with the debt service burden. Specifically, when we hold all other 
variables constant, a 100 percent increase in the share of credit allocation to investment 
will reduce the debt service ratios from between 14 percent to 52 percent and for both 
measures of the debt service burden the coefficients are statistically significant (Table 4.14, 
columns 1-4). It was also expected that a longer loan term will reduce the debt service 
burden, while it was true for the estimation using the debt service to essential household 
expenditure ratio the results were insignificant for both measures of the debt service ratio. 
Generally, the results show the household size, age of the household head, and the years of 
schooling of the household head to be negatively associated with the debt service burden 
while being below the upper poverty line of GH 1314, and a self-employed household head 
are positively associated with the debt service burden. 
Further, we examine the determinants of the debt service burden using the proposed 
debt thresholds to ascertain factors that trigger being in the low, moderate and high debt 
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burden category and for this we estimate the ordered logit for equation 2 above using 
maximum likelihood estimation. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
analysis are presented on Tables A4.5 and A4.6 (Appendix B). The results are reported on 
Table 4.15. The results show the importance of microfinance market characteristics as well 
as borrower and household characteristics for indebtedness. We test the relationship also 
using the debt service to income ratio and the results are mostly similar (Table A4.7 in 
Appendix B). 
Microfinance characteristics that have statistically significant influence on being in 
a higher debt burden category relative to a lower debt burden category are, the interest rate, 
the type of microfinance, and the loan maturity. In particular, holding all variables at their 
means, a 100 percent increase in the interest rate increases the probability of being in the 
high debt burden category by 16 percent (Table 4.15, column 5), while contracting the loan 
from a formal MFI increases the probability of being in the high debt burden category by 
18 percent (Table 4.15, column 5). The finding that formal MFIs, relative to informal MFIs, 
increases the probability of being highly indebted is plausible, in that, formal MFIs on 
average offer larger loan amounts compared to the informal MFIs. Loan maturity above 6 
months decreases the probability of being in the high debt burden category by 12.5 percent 
(Table 4.15, column 5). Holding an individual loan and receiving financial literacy 
decreases the probability of being in the low debt burden category, however, they are 
statistically insignificant.  
Borrower characteristics that have statistically significant influence on being in a 
higher debt burden category relative to a lower debt burden category are, the number of 
loans, share of investment credit in total MFI credit and the gender of the user of the 
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credit. Holding all variables at their means, contracting more than one loan increases the 
probability of being in the high debt burden category by 31.7 percent (Table 4.15, column 
5). A unit increase in the share of investment credit in total MFI credit decreases the 
probability of being in the high debt burden category by 28 percent (Table 4.15, column 
5). Similarly, the probability of being in the high debt burden category decreases by 20.2 
percent when the user is female. 
Household characteristics are critical for the debt service burden as indicated by the 
statistically significant coefficients on the poverty status, the owner occupier status of the 
dwelling, the household size and the number of rooms in the household. Specifically, the 
probability of being in the high debt burden category increases when the household is 
below the poverty line, owns the dwelling and has relatively more rooms. Further, the 
results suggest that household size greater than 4 decreases the probability of being in the 
high debt burden category, which is counter-intuitive. A priori, one would expect that a 
larger household size positively influences indebtedness. The negative relationship 
between household size and indebtedness, however, imply that household size alone is not 
a sufficient condition for indebtedness and that the composition of the family in a 
household and as well as their occupation are important for household indebtedness.  
Hypothesis 2: High debt burden compromises household welfare. 
4.5.2.2 Welfare implications of Access to Microfinance – All Households 
First, we discuss the results of the impact of access to microfinance on household 
welfare which are estimated by including all the households in our sample. The 
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descriptive statistics are reported on Table A4.8 (Appendix B). The results26 are reported 
on Tables 4.16 and 4.17 for equations (2) and (3) respectively. The results show that 
access to microfinance is positively associated with household welfare.  
 Specifically, the results show that the odds of a household being well-off are 77 
percent higher for households with access to microfinance than their counterparts 
without, and this is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (Table 4.16, column 3). 
Having a 1-standard-deviation-higher percentage of households with access to 
microfinance increases the odds of household being well off by 33 percent (Table 4.16, 
column 4). In addition, a 1-standard-deviation-higher percentage of the years of 
schooling of the household head, asset per person, and the share of human capital 
expenditures in total household expenditures increases the odds of a household being well 
off, all of which are statistically significant. A 1-standard-deviation-higher percentage of 
household heads that are self-employed reduces the odds of being well off by 20.4 
percent and this is statistically significant at the 10 percent level (Table 4.16, column 4). 
 The results from the two-stage least squares regression are reported in Table 4.17. 
The results indicates that access to microfinance increases household welfare as 
measured by food expenditures per capita, between 95 to 135 percent (Table 4.17, 
columns 1 and 2). Further, a 100 percent increase in assets per person increases food 
expenditure per adult household member between 14 to 16 percent and this is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, access to clean water increases food 
                                                          
26 See Tables A4.9 in the Appendix B for detailed results including the base and full 
regression results for the logit model estimation of household welfare.  
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expenditure per adult by 58.6 percent and this is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level of significance, while the number of rooms and the years of schooling of the 
household head is positively related to the food expenditures per adult. In another 
estimation, which is not reported, we control for ownership of land and income per 
person. We find that both ownership of land and income per person have positive effects 
on the food expenditures per adult. However, while the effect of land ownership on food 
expenditures per adult is significant, the effect of income per person is insignificant.  
The age dependency ratio is positively related to the food expenditure per adult 
and statistically significant at the one percent level. A unit increase in the age dependency 
ratio results in a 140 percent increase in food expenditures per adult while household size 
is negatively related to the food expenditures per adult. A unit increase in the share of 
health and education expenditures in total household expenditures reduces food 
expenditures per adult by 24.3 percent and this is statistically significant (Table 4.17, 
column 2). Dwelling ownership also reduces food expenditures per adult between 31 
percent and 32 percent, and this is statistically significant. 
4.5.2.3 Impact of Debt Burden on Financial Distress  
The descriptive statistics for the financial distress analysis are reported on Table 
A4.10 (Appendix B). The results for equations (5) showing their marginal effect 
estimates are reported in Table 4.18. The results confirm the hypothesis that, on average, 
when we control for microfinance market, household, and borrower characteristics, the 
probability of reporting financial distress is positively associated with the debt service 
burden. The results show that a unit increase in the debt service ratio increases the 
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probability of reporting financial distress by about 76 percent, and this is statistically 
significant (Table 4.18, columns 2 and 4). The squared term of the debt service ratio 
entered significantly suggesting a non-linear relationship between financial distress and 
the debt service ratio.  
We find that being a female loan user is negatively associated with the probability 
of financial distress, and its effect is significant. While receiving financial literacy from 
MFIs is negatively associated with the probability of financial distress, its effect is 
insignificant. Similarly, accessing the loan from a formal MFI relative to an informal 
MFI is positively associated with the probability financial distress, though, its effect is 
insignificant. This result was however, contrary to expectation given that loans from 
formal MFIs have longer maturity and lower interest rates compared to informal MFIs, 
which can potentially reduce financial distress. We interacted the dummy variable for 
formal MFI with the interest rate and found a negative coefficient for the interaction 
term, but its effect was insignificant. Including the interaction term, however, renders a 
positive and significant effect of formal MFIs on the probability of financial distress.  
A borrower characteristic which is positively associated with the probability of 
financial distress is application of more than 50 percent of the loan to home enterprise, 
and this is statistically significant (Table 4.18, column 2). Applying more than 50 percent 
of the loan to home enterprise increases the probability of reporting financial distress by 
18 percent, and this is also statistically significant. Theoretically, the relationship between 
loan use and the probability of financial distress could be negative or positive. The 
relationship could be positive if applying more credit to investment constrains the 
household in terms of the ability to initially afford basic household needs. Over time, one 
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would expect that if the investment is profitable, the financial constraint experienced 
initially will ease and possibly result in a negative relationship.  
Other household characteristics that are negatively associated with the probability 
of financial distress are the years of schooling of household head, annual income, and a 
self-employed household head, and their effects are also significant (Table 4.18). 
Household characteristics that are positively associated with the probability of financial 
distress are when the household is located in the regional capital, the household size, 
health problems and number of rooms, and their effects are statistically significant (Table 
4.18).  
The prediction plots of financial distress as a function of the debt service ratio, 
ranging from 0.01 to 1, are also shown on Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. On average, predicted 
probability of financial distress is lower for debt service ratios below 0.3 (30 percent) and 
begins to rise afterwards (Figure 4.6). We examine the predicted probability of financial 
distress by the gender of the household head as well as the poverty status of the 
household and the plots suggest that on average, the probability of reporting financial 
distress as a function of the debt service ratio differs by the gender of the household head 
and the poverty status of the household (Figures 4.7 and 4.8).  
We note that on average, though the probability of financial distress begins at a 
threshold of about 0.35 to 0.40 of the debt service to essential expenditures ratio for 
female-headed households compared to about 0.20 for male-headed households, the rate 
of increase in the probability of financial distress of debt service ratio from 0.40 is higher 
for female-headed households compared to male-headed households (Figures 4.7 and 
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4.8). In our model used to estimate financial distress, we include a dummy for if the 
household head is female, and find a positive but insignificant coefficient. While the 
probability of reporting financial distress begins at a threshold of about 0.40 of the debt 
service to essential expenditures ratio for households on or below the upper poverty 
line27, the probability of financial distress begins at about 0.30 of the debt service to 
essential expenditures ratio for households above the upper poverty line.  
The computed average predicted probabilities based on the estimated model for 
debt service ratios from 0.01 to 1 for equation (5) are also shown in Figure 4.9. We note 
that, after controlling for MFI market, borrower and household characteristics, the 
average predicted household financial distress is higher at higher levels of the debt 
service burden and begins to taper off at a debt service ratio of about 80 percent (see 
Figure 4.9).  
We also test the relationship using the debt service to income ratio measure28 and 
the results are similar (Table A4.11 in the Appendix).   
4.5.2.4 Impact of Debt Burden on being Credit-Constrained 
The descriptive statistics for the analysis of the implication of indebtedness for a 
household reporting to be credit-constrained are reported on Tables A4.12 and A4.13 
(Appendix B). The results for equations (6) using the expenditure measure and including 
the marginal effects are reported on Table 4.19. Here, the hypothesis that a high debt 
                                                          
27 Upper poverty line is at GHS 1314 per adult (equivalent to $657.00). 
28 We do not include the quadratic term in this estimation because the plots showed a 
positive linear relationship between financial distress and the debt service to income ratio. 
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service burden is positively associated with being credit constrained, after controlling for 
selected household characteristics, is confirmed. We also test the relationship using the 
debt service to income ratio measure and the results are similar (Table A4.14, Appendix 
B). 
The results show that the probability of being credit constrained increases with the 
increasing severity of the debt service burden (for debt service to essential household 
expenditures ratios above 25 percent). In particular, after controlling for household 
characteristics, a change from the low burden to moderate burden category increases the 
probability of being credit-constrained by 25.8 percent while a change from the low 
burden category to the high burden category increases the probability of being credit-
constrained by 34.2 percent (Table 4.19, column 2). Some household characteristics enter 
significantly and are positively associated with the probability of being credit 
constrained: the years of schooling of the household head, the regional location of the 
household, household size above 4, and when the household reports health problems 
(Table 4.19).  
The prediction plots of credit constraint as a function of the debt service ratio, 
ranging from 0.01 to 1, is also shown on Figure 4.10. On average, the plots show that the 
probability of reporting credit constraint increases from about 0.45 (i.e. 45 percent) of the 
debt service to essential expenditures (Figure 4.10). 
4.5.2.5 Impact of MFI Debt Burden on Food Expenditures 
We further examine the impact of microfinance debt holdings only for households 
with access to microfinance by estimating equation (7) above using ordinary least squares 
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(OLS). Quadratic terms for the debt to asset ratio (per person) and the age of the 
household head are also introduced to allow for non-linear effects of these variables on 
welfare measures.29 This analysis was necessary given the somewhat convex relationship 
between our welfare measures and our main explanatory variable, being the different 
measures of MFI debt holdings (Figure 4.11 and 4.12). We carry out the estimation by 
also controlling for the share of investment credit in total MFI credit. The summary 
statistics are reported on Table A4.15 (Appendix B).  
The results from the OLS estimation of equation (7) is reported in Table 4.20. The 
results confirm a negative relationship between expenditures and debt holdings indicating 
that higher levels of debt reduces expenditures, in particular, food expenditures. We test 
the robustness of these results using other measures of microfinance debt holdings, all of 
which confirm the results.30 The results from Table 4.20 suggest that a unit increase in 
debt to assets (per person) ratio will result in over 100 percent reduction in expenditures 
and this is statistically significant (Table 4.20, columns 1-4). Similarly, a 100 percent 
increase in the share of investment credit to total microfinance credit will lead to roughly 
14.8 percent to 22 percent decrease in expenditures (Table 4.20, columns 1-4).  
The plot of the average predicted probabilities of the log of annual food 
expenditures and all household essential expenditures over the debt to asset ratio (per 
                                                          
29 Welfare measures used are the annual food expenditures and the annual total household 
essential expenditures. 
30 Other measures employed are MFI debt to income, total debt to total assets, and MFI 
debt service to income. These results are reported on tables A4.16, A4.17, and A4.18, 
respectively (Appendix B).  
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person), ranging from 0.01 to 1 suggest that debt distress is a real problem for households 
in our sample (Figure 4.13). In particular, we note that at low levels of debt, household 
expenditures are relatively higher compared to households with high debt burden. At 
higher debt burden expenditures are lower, probably due to the fact that households must 
necessarily spend more to service their loans, hence the lower expenditures. However, as 
debt crosses a certain threshold, households are able to increase their expenditures, 
probably allocating some of the debt to expenditures. The results shown on Table 4.21, 
indicate that the debt to asset (per person) ratio at which food expenditures begin to 
increase is about 0.66 (also see Figure 4.13). The estimated log of household food and 
total essential expenditures is 5.16 and 4.82 respectively which is lower than their 
respective mean of 7.8 and 8.5.  
We also compute and plot the average predicted log of food expenditures for debt 
to asset ratios ranging from 0.01 to 1, based on the estimated results for equation (7). The 
plots reveal that after controlling for MFI market, borrower and household 
characteristics, the predicted probability of the log of food expenditures declines until a 
debt to asset threshold of about 65 percent and then begins to rise thereafter (Figure 
4.14).   
4.6 Conclusion  
The study applied ordinary least squares in conjunction with two-stage least 
squares and maximum likelihood estimation methods to test the following hypotheses: 
(1) access to credit from MFIs compromises household welfare by increasing household 
debt burden and the probability of financial distress and credit constraint, and reducing 
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expenditures, in particular, food expenditures; (2) microfinance market characteristics are 
important determinants of a household’s debt service burden and financial distress; (3) 
households coping mechanisms for dealing with financial distress do not differ 
significantly. 
 All hypothesis are confirmed. The results from the econometric analysis all hold 
even when we control for outliers. Four key findings are worth mentioning;  
I. There is a feminization of debt confirmed by the high debt holdings of women 
and the high debt service burden for women relative to men;  
II. External factors (i.e. microfinance market characteristics) working mainly through 
the interest rate, and on a lesser level, through the type of microfinance (i.e. 
formal MFI relative to informal MFI), positively influences household 
indebtedness while internal factors (i.e. household and borrower-specific 
characteristics) working through the number of loans held by the household and 
the application of a greater percentage of the loan (i.e. above 50 percent), 
negatively and positively, respectively, influences household indebtedness and 
financial distress. Contrary to expectations, financial literacy, as it stands now, 
does not have any meaningful impact on household indebtedness, and neither 
does the education level of the household head; 
III. Debt service to income and essential expenditures ratios above 45.6 percent and 
47.1 percent, respectively, result in a household being frequently financially 
distressed and credit-constrained;  
IV. And while access to microfinance is generally good for household welfare, being 
highly indebted compromises household welfare. This conclusion is established in 
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conjunction with the results from the financial distress analysis, which clearly 
indicate that debt distress is a real problem for households. 
The implications from this study are that there is a greater need for developing 
countries to maintain regular statistics on households’ balance sheets, as this is important 
for monitoring the effects of macroeconomic developments on household welfare given 
that factors that have important implications for household welfare stem from household 
vulnerabilities and general macroeconomic instability. In addition, it is also critical for 
MFIs to go beyond the current level of financial literacy programs being offered, which 
mainly involve book-keeping and seminars on how to apply loans, by including financial 
education on debt management. In fact, there is an ever-increasing need for policymakers 
in developing countries to introduce financial education in the general educational 
curriculum of their countries. This will help ensure a greater positive impact in any 
poverty reduction framework that employs credit as a tool. As Jonhson (2014) points out, 
debt relations involve complex interconnections of the material, social, and cultural, 
which implies that any poverty reduction framework employing debt as a tool must adopt 
strategies that effectively integrate these complexities into the repayment mechanisms to 
ensure the maximum positive impact.   
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Mean Household Size  4.2 3.6 
Mean Age of Household Head 42.1 39.1 
Female Headed Household (% of Total) 35.2 34.4 
Mean number of years of schooling - Household Head 10.2 9.5 
Mean number of years of schooling - Male Children 5.8 4.6 
Mean number of years of schooling - Female Children 5.4 4.6 
Marital Status of Household Head (% of Group Sample)     
Never married 12.3 17.5 
Married 70.2 63.8 
Divorced / separated 10.3 11.8 
Widow / widower 7.1 6.9 
Primary Employment of Household Head (% of Group 
Sample)     
Self-employed 70.8 61.5 
Government Employee 8.7 6.1 
Other Employee 18.6 29.1 
Retired 1.2 1.6 
Unemployed 0.8 1.6 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
Table 4.2: Loan Maturity and Interest Rate (In Percent) 
Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Loan Maturity ≤ 3 months 37 6.2 2.8 3.3 16 
3 months < Loan Maturity ≤ 6 months 204 4.9 2.0 0.5 19.3 
6 months < Loan Maturity ≤ 12 months 24 4.1 1.5 1.1 8.9 
12 months < Loan Maturity ≤ 24 months 5 1.8 0.9 1.0 3.2 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
   
Table 4.3: Household Credit Allocation 
Borrowers (In 
Percent) 
Home Enterprise Uses (% of 
Credit) 
Household Expenditures Uses 
(% of Credit) 
63 100 0 
7 100<=>75 0>=<25 
13 75<=> 50  29>=< 50 
5 45<=> 15 55>=< 85 
11 0 100 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data  
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Table 4.4: Credit Constraints: Qualitative Evidence 
Questions Percentage of Respondents 
1. Has this person obtained a loan in the last 12 months?  
Yes 31.5 
No 68.5 
2. If Not, why?  
Does not need credit 46.7 
Did not believe it would be approved 6.9 
Procedure too cumbersome 6.5 
Applied and was rejected 2.1 
Afraid to hold debt 4.0 
Economic shocks 0.5 
Low sales 0.4 
Interest too high 1.3 
Guarantor has no bank account 0.1 
3. Have you been refused any MFI credit in the last 12 months?  
Yes 7.1 
No 22.8 
Never tried 1.7 
Credit Constrained Individuals: without access to credit 21.8 
Credit Constrained at Household Level: without any debt 
holdings 23.8 
Credit Constrained at Household Level: but held debt- Measure 
131 28.2 
Credit Constrained at Household Level: but held debt- Measure 
232 22.2 
Source: Author's calculations based on survey data  
  
                                                          
31 Measure 1 provides the difference between DD credit and SS credit. 
32 Measure 2 provides difference between DD credit and Credit Limit. 
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Table 4.5: Total Debt Holdings (GHS), Households =248  
Description MFI Others Total 
% share of 
MFI 
Male 129,687.7 25,060.0 154,747.7 83.8 
Female 305,171.7 25,929.0 331,100.7 92.2 
Joint 17,250.0 500.0 17,750.0 97.2 
Total 452,109.4 51,489.0 503,598.4 89.8 
% share of Female in total 67.5 50.4 65.7  
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
 




Credit Constraint 1 
(GHS)= DD credit - SS 
credit
Credit Constraint 1  




Credit Constraint 2 
(GHS) = DD credit - 
Credit Limit
Credit Constraint 2 
(ratio of All Other 
Expenditures)
 Below 48 225.0 11% 96 -15.1 -5%
 Equal/Above 109 1700.0 113% 219 495.8 37%
 Below 32 100.0 19% 69 -15.2 -5%
 Equal/Above 125 1543.2 98% 246 439.8 32%
 Below 18 583.3 26% 38 203.9 10%
 Equal/Above 75 652.7 60% 141 114.2 11%
 Below 13 230.8 31% 27 172.2 4%
 Equal/Above 80 705.6 57% 152 126.3 12%
No. 
HHs Outstanding Debt
Outstanding Debt  




Outstanding Debt  
(ratio of All Other 
Expenditures)
 Below 96 554.0 45% 39 531.4 38%
 Equal/Above 219 1279.9 72% 141 1064.2 81%
 Below 69 496.5 56% 28 554.0 59%



































Table 4.7: Subjective Financial Distress as reported by Microfinance Borrowers  
Questions Percentage of Respondents 
1. Have you missed periodic payments? 22% 
2. Do you encounter difficulty repaying your loans? (Yes) 50% 
3. How often do you encounter difficulty repaying loans?  
Never 50% 
Not Frequent 40.8% 
Frequently 9.2% 
4. What factors influence your repayment difficulties?  
Macroeconomic shocks 25.6% 
Interest rates 5.2% 
Rising education cost 5.2% 
Health-related problems 3.2% 
Others 11.9% 
5. Does loan repayment force your household to forego some 
basic needs? (Yes) 16.5% 
Take children out of school 1.6% 
Reduce meals 12% 
Close down home enterprise 0.8% 
Reduce other household 
expenditures 2.1% 
Financially Distressed Households* 23.2% 
Source: Survey data. *Financially Distressed Households are those who are frequently 
having difficulty repaying their loans and foregoing basic needs to service their loans. 
 
Table 4.8a: Debt Service Thresholds and Foregoing Basic Household Needs 
Does loan repayment force 
your household to forego 




Monthly Debt Service to 
Monthly Income Ratio 
(In percent) 
Monthly debt to All 
Essential Household 
Expenditures (In percent)  
Mean Median Mean Median 
No 203 54.7% 38.5% 51.4 49.4 
Yes 46 107.1% 45.6% 54.5 47.1 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
 
Table 4.8b: Credit Constrained and Foregoing Basic Household Needs  
Does loan repayment force 
your household to forego 





(Measure 1) In GH S 
Credit Constrained 
(Measure 2)  In GH S 
Mean Median Mean Median 
No 203 916.3 100.0 297.9 0.0 
Yes 46 1479.8 500.0 1261.7 500.0 




Table 4.9a: Debt Service to Income Ratio, in Percent (Monthly)  
Variables Variable Definition Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Interest 
Burden 
Monthly Interest rate <=5% 104 57.9 33.9 82.7 1.5 707.6 
Monthly Interest rate >5% 144 69.3 40.0 110.4 4.4 866.7 
Loan Type 
Group 91 45.5 31.1 41.9 1.5 202.5 
Individual 158 75.3 40.3 119.7 3.3 866.7 
Number of 
Loans 
Only 1  229 56.6 38.5 77.7 1.5 866.7 
Greater than 1  20 153.5 68.6 218.9 11.8 826.7 
Type of MFI 
Informal MFI 201 65.6 38.8 107.7 1.5 866.7 
Formal MFI 48 59.4 49.7 54.2 3.3 240.4 
Use of Loan 
<50% of loan used for 
home enterprise 42 73.2 48.0 74.4 7.3 400.0 
>=50% of loan used for 
home enterprise 207 62.6 37.5 104.0 1.5 866.7 
Loan User 
Gender 
Male 42 65.5 37.9 131.8 1.5 866.7 
Female 205 64.6 40.0 92.4 3.3 826.7 
Financial 
Literacy  
No 75 69.9 40.0 125.4 1.5 826.7 
Yes 174 62.0 39.6 86.4 4.4 866.7 
Repayment 
Period 
Repayment <= 6 months  219 64.3 39.8 103.7 4.4 866.7 
Repayment> 6 months 29 66.5 49.3 63.0 1.5 240.4 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
 
Table 4.9b: Debt Service to All Essential Household Expenditures % (monthly)  
Variables Variable Definition Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Interest 
Burden 
Monthly Interest rate <=5% 104 49.0 43.2 33.7 3.9 233.2 
Monthly Interest rate >5% 144 52.3 52.4 20.4 7.7 141.7 
Loan Type 
Group 91 48.6 47.4 20.3 3.9 142.1 
Individual 158 52.7 49.7 30.2 7.7 233.2 
Number of 
Loans 
Only 1  229 50.2 47.5 27.3 3.9 233.2 
Greater than 1  20 62.7 68.0 21.5 26.4 105.7 
Type of MFI 
Informal MFI 201 50.9 50.0 26.1 7.7 233.2 
Formal MFI 48 52.6 46.1 31.0 3.9 142.1 
Use of Loan 
<50% of loan used for 
home enterprise 42 55.5 50.5 35.3 12.1 233.2 
>=50% of loan used for 
home enterprise 207 50.3 48.7 25.1 3.9 219.0 
Loan User 
Gender 
Male 42 61.0 59.6 37.6 7.7 233.2 
Female 205 48.8 47.1 23.6 3.9 219.0 
Financial 
Literacy 
No 75 51.8 47.1 35.9 8.6 233.2 
Yes 174 51.0 49.7 22.3 3.9 142.1 
Repayment 
Period 
Repayment <= 6 months  219 51.4 49.6 26.9 7.7 233.2 
Repayment> 6 months 29 47.3 45.0 26.0 3.9 90.5 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
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Table 4.10: Characteristics of Households Reporting Financial Distress 





No of Obs. 192 No of Obs. 58 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Age of Borrower 39.8 39 39.7 39 
Age of household Head 42.1 42 41.7 42 
Years of schooling of Borrower 9.2 10 8.8 10 
Years of schooling of Household Head 10.3 10 9.7 10 
Household Size 4.2 4 4.3 4.5 
Age Dependency (%) 44.9 50.0 44.2 50.0 
Monthly Debt service to income (%) 49.9 35.6 113 49.7 
Monthly debt to All Essential Household 
Expenditures (%)  
50.7 49.4 56.1 47.9 
Credit Constraint 1 (Demand - Supply) 
Ghana Cedis 995.8 100 1109.5 500 
Credit Constraint 1 (Demand - Credit 
Limit) Ghana Cedis 399.4 0 744.8 200 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
Table 4.11: Welfare by Access to Microfinance and Credit Constraint  
Qualitative Welfare 
Analysis 




Access  Total No Yes Total 
Below Average 
122 97 219 113 106 219 
24.7 19.6 44.2 22.8 21.4 44.2 
Equal/Above Average 
123 153 276 162 114 276 
24.9 30.9 55.8 32.7 23.0 55.8 
Total 
245 250 495 275 220 495 
49.5 50.5 100 55.6 44.4 100 
Source Author's calculations. Notes: Frequency first and cell percentage reported below. 
Table 4.12: Welfare by Household Characteristics 
Household Characteristics  
Welfare >=Average Welfare<Average 
No of Obs. 276 No of Obs. 219 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Age of Household Head 41.8 40.0 38.7 38.0 
Years of schooling of Household Head 10.8 10.0 8.6 10.0 
Household Size 4.0 4.0 3.8 4.0 
Age Dependency (%) 39.6 50.0 41.8 50.0 
Access to Microfinance - Dummy 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.0 
Credit Constrained - Dummy 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Food Expenditures Per Person (Adult), in GHS 1753.2 1509.6 1534.1 1116.0 
Assets Per Person, in GHS 4890.4 1828.7 3457.5 915.2 
Income Per Person 2752.6 1950.0 1866.1 1350.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
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Table 4.13: Food Expenditures per Adult by Access to Microfinance and Gender of 
Household Head (In Ghana Cedis) 
Quantitative Welfare 
Analysis 
Male-headed Households Female-headed Households 
No. 
HHs Mean Median 
No. 
HHs Mean Median 
Access to 
Microfinance 
No Access 158 1541.1 1288.2 87 1669.6 1304.4 
With Access 157 1639.9 1350.0 93 1867.2 1272.0 
Source author's calculations based on survey data.  
Table 4.14: Determinants of the Debt Service Burden – Pooled OLS Regression  
Variables 
Pooled Regression 
Dep. Var1:                          
Debt service ratio1 
Dep. Var2:                
Debt service ratio2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Number of Loans 0.580*** 0.502*** 0.297*** 0.296*** 
  (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) 
Share of Investment Credit in Total 
MFI Credit -0.517*** -0.539*** -0.147** -0.141** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.027) 
Individual Loan 0.272*** 0.259** 0.029 0.055 
  (0.010) (0.022) (0.575) (0.319) 
Age of household head -0.011** -0.011** -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.037) (0.043) (0.490) (0.405) 
Household Size -0.377*** -0.362*** -0.380*** -0.369*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Head is Self-Employed 0.165 0.116 0.006 -0.013 
  (0.130) (0.299) (0.911) (0.813) 
Below the upper poverty line 0.177 0.204 0.144** 0.127** 
  (0.140) (0.103) (0.016) (0.037) 
Formal MFI   0.195  0.100 
    (0.149)  (0.129) 
Financial Literacy   0.061  0.088 
    (0.591)  (0.110) 
Monthly interest rate   0.152  0.144** 
    (0.278)  (0.035) 
Repayment period> 6 months   0.171  -0.074 
    (0.311)  (0.366) 
Years of Schooling of household head   -0.011  -0.013* 
    (0.406)  (0.058) 
Constant -1.050*** -0.489 -0.593*** -0.090 
  (0.001) (0.400) (0.000) (0.750) 
Observations 248 248 248 248 
R-squared 0.260 0.270 0.310 0.348 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pval in parentheses. Dependent variable1 is Log of 
monthly debt service to income ratio; Dependent variable2 is Log of monthly debt service to total 











- Overall Model 
Marginal 
Effect - Low  
Marginal 
Effect - High 
Number of loans greater>1 1.509*** 4.520*** -0.245*** -0.295*** 0.317*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of Investment Credit in 
Total MFI Credit (%) -1.330** 0.265** 0.216** 0.260** -0.280** 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) 
Log of monthly interest rate  0.766** 2.150** -0.124** -0.150** 0.161** 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.039) (0.045) (0.043) 
Loan user is female -0.963** 0.382** 0.156*** 0.189** -0.202** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
Financial literacy received 0.319 1.375 -0.052 -0.062 0.067 
  (0.295) (0.295) (0.291) (0.295) (0.295) 
Formal MFI 0.850** 2.339** -0.138** -0.166** 0.179** 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029) 
Loan maturity >=6 months -0.593* 0.552* 0.096* 0.116* -0.125* 
  (0.082) (0.082) (0.078) (0.084) (0.081) 
Individual loan 0.170 1.185 -0.028 -0.033 0.036 
  (0.569) (0.569) (0.568) (0.569) (0.569) 
Urban -0.600 0.549 0.098 0.118 -0.126 
  (0.223) (0.223) (0.220) (0.223) (0.224) 
Below Upper Poverty Line 1.235*** 3.437*** -0.200*** -0.242*** 0.260*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Owner occupied house 0.578** 1.783** -0.094** -0.113** 0.122** 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.040) (0.045) (0.044) 
Household size>4 
-
1.290*** 0.275*** 0.210*** 0.253*** -0.271*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of 
rooms=>household size 1.310*** 3.708*** -0.213*** -0.257*** 0.275*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age of household head -0.013 0.987 0.002 0.002 -0.003 
  (0.367) (0.367) (0.365) (0.366) (0.368) 
Household head has post 
primary Education  0.184 1.202 -0.030 -0.036 0.039 
  (0.599) (0.599) (0.599) (0.600) (0.600) 
Self-Employed Household 
Head 0.264 1.303 -0.043 -0.052 0.056 
  (0.377) (0.377) (0.375) (0.377) (0.377) 
cut1 
-
5.420*** 0.004***      
  (0.002) (0.002)      
cut2 -3.566** 0.028**      
  (0.036) (0.036)      
Log likelihood -218.96 
 Observation: 
248     
Prob > chi2 0.000     
LR chi2(16) 106.49     
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.196     
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pval in parentheses. Dependent variable is defined at 3 levels; Low 
burden = "1" if debt service to essential expenditures ratio<25%; Moderate burden ="2" if 25% >=essential 
expenditures ratio< 40%; High burden ="3" if essential expenditures ratio>=40%.  
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Ratio percent %StdX SDofX 
Access to Microfinance  0.572*** 1.772*** 77.2 33.1 0.499 
  (0.009) (0.009)       
Log of household head years of 
schooling 1.494*** 4.455*** 345.5 38.4 0.218 
  (0.006) (0.006)       
Number of rooms 0.106 1.112 11.2 12.7 1.124 
  (0.355) (0.355)       
Self-Employed Household head -0.469* 0.626* -37.4 -20.4 0.485 
  (0.050) (0.050)       
Log assets per person 0.219** 1.245** 24.5 35.6 1.387 
  (0.016) (0.016)       
Log of household size -0.342 0.710 -29 -17.2 0.552 
  (0.349) (0.349)       
Dwelling Owned 0.280 1.323 32.3 14 0.468 
  (0.265) (0.265)       
Log of share of human capital 
expenditures in total household 
expenditures  0.361** 1.435** 43.5 43.4 0.998 
  (0.012) (0.012)       
Access to clean water 0.175 1.191 19.1 8.8 0.481 
  (0.458) (0.458)       
Age dependency ratio -0.587 0.556 -44.4 -13.7 0.252 
  (0.357) (0.357)       
Household Head is Married 0.115 1.122 12.2 5.2 0.441 
  (0.709) (0.709)       
Observation: 494      
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pval in parentheses. The dependent variable is Households 
Perceived Welfare which takes the value of "1" if HH welfare>=average and "0" if below average. 
Percent=percent change in odds for unit increase in X; %StdX=percent change in odds for SD increase in 





Table 4.17: Welfare Implications of Access to Microfinance – All Households 
Variables 
Two-stage least squares 
Model 1 Model 2 
Microfinance Dummy 1.351** 0.956* 
 (0.034) (0.068) 
Household Size -0.221* -0.134 
 (0.065) (0.272) 
Dwelling is owned -0.321*** -0.310*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Number of rooms in household 0.080* 0.056 
 (0.087) (0.124) 
Assets per person 0.161*** 0.139*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Access to water  0.586*** 
  (0.000) 
Age Dependency ratio  1.409*** 
  (0.000) 
Log of Share of health and education 
expenditures in total household expenditures  -0.243*** 
  (0.000) 
Household head Years of Schooling  0.404** 
  (0.041) 
Household Head is Married  -0.182* 
  (0.087) 
Constant 5.536*** 3.656*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 488 424 
R-squared -0.504 0.099 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pval in parentheses. The dependent variable is Food 




Table 4.18: Impact of Debt Burden on Household Financial Distress – Expenditure Measure 
VARIABLES 









Debt service to essential expenditures ratio 5.502*** 0.759*** 5.559** 0.760*** 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) 
Debt service to essential expenditures ratio squared -3.555*** -0.491*** -3.682*** -0.503*** 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
More than 50% of Credit Used for home enterprise 1.324** 0.183** 1.362** 0.186** 
  (0.017) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) 
Financial literacy received -0.377 -0.052 -0.364 -0.050 
  (0.342) (0.344) (0.364) (0.366) 
Loan user is female -0.947* -0.131* -1.104** -0.151** 
  (0.062) (0.053) (0.030) (0.022) 
Formal MFI 0.429 0.059 0.986* 0.135* 
  (0.291) (0.281) (0.071) (0.058) 
Household head years of schooling -0.393*** -0.054*** -0.386*** -0.053*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Household head years of schooling squared 0.024*** 0.003*** 0.023*** 0.003*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Greater Accra Region 2.129*** 0.294*** 2.102*** 0.287*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban -1.003* -0.138* -0.965 -0.132 
  (0.097) (0.096) (0.114) (0.113) 
Household head is female 0.674 0.093 0.692 0.095 
  (0.173) (0.169) (0.166) (0.160) 
Total annual income -0.791*** -0.109*** -0.826*** -0.113*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Household Size 1.042** 0.144** 1.015** 0.139** 
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) 
Household head is self-employed -0.919** -0.127** -0.937** -0.128** 
  (0.028) (0.024) (0.031) (0.026) 
Number of rooms=>household size 1.223** 0.169** 1.173* 0.160* 
  (0.044) (0.041) (0.054) (0.051) 
Health problems 0.935* 0.129* 0.887* 0.121* 
  (0.060) (0.059) (0.075) (0.075) 
Formal MFI*Interest Rate     -15.679 -2.142 
      (0.182) (0.172) 
Constant 2.724   3.166   
  (0.251)   (0.173)   
Log pseudolikelihood -106.84 -105.55 
Prob > chi2 0.001 0.001 
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.20 0.20 
Observations 249 248 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust pvalue in parentheses. Dependent variable= 
financial distress: takes value "1" if financially distressed and "0" otherwise. 
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Table 4.19: Impact of Debt Burden on being Credit Constrained – Expenditure measure 
VARIABLES Logit Coefficient Marginal Effects 
Debt service burden      
      
Moderate 1.767*** 0.258*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
High 2.221*** 0.342*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Household head years of schooling 0.277*** 0.035*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) 
Household head years of schooling squared -0.015** -0.002** 
  (0.015) -0.014 
Greater Accra Region 0.586* 0.073* 
  (0.087) (0.087) 
Urban 1.927** 0.240** 
  (0.027) (0.022) 
Below the upper poverty line -0.643 -0.080 
  (0.122) (0.122) 
Total physical assets -0.059 -0.007 
  (0.523) (0.521) 
Household size>4 1.075*** 0.134*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Household head is self-employed 0.274 0.034 
  (0.343) (0.341) 
Number of rooms=>household size 0.351 0.044 
  (0.277) (0.273) 
Health problems 1.485*** 0.185*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -6.503***   
  (0.000)   
Log pseudolikelihood -193.03 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Wald chi2(15) 78.57 
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.239 
Observations 491 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust pvalue in parentheses. Dependent variable: 





Table 4.20: Welfare Impact of MFI Debt – Households with Access to Microfinance 
Variables 
Dep. Var1: Log of Annual 
Food Expenditures 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
MFI Debt to Asset (Per Person) -1.184*** -1.197*** -1.044*** -1.452*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MFI Debt to Asset (Per Person) 
Squared 0.877*** 0.901*** 0.419*** 0.920*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Log of Investment Credit Share of 
Total MFI Credit -0.193** -0.165* -0.221** -0.148* 
 (0.025) (0.060) (0.017) (0.097) 
Log of Annual Household Income 0.206*** 0.188*** 0.265*** 0.201*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female years of schooling 0.016* 0.015 0.022** 0.021** 
 (0.098) (0.136) (0.034) (0.035) 
Access to clean water 0.540*** 0.544*** 0.480*** 0.526*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban Dwelling 0.474*** 0.501*** 0.235** 0.301*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.006) 
Age Dependency Ratio  0.313**  0.873*** 
  (0.048)  (0.000) 
Age of Household Head  -0.015  0.019 
  (0.527)  (0.428) 
Age of Household Head Squared  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.403)  (0.528) 
Self Employed Household Head  -0.022  -0.118 
  (0.767)  (0.123) 
Constant 5.297*** 5.553*** 5.682*** 5.393*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 230 230 232 231 
R-squared 0.528 0.533 0.475 0.552 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pvalue in parentheses. Essential household expenditures is the 
sum of annual household expenditures on rent, education, health, water, electricity, and food. 
 






Estimated threshold debt to asset ratio (per 
person) 0.66 0.79 
Estimated log household expenditures 5.16 4.82 
Estimated volume of Household expenditure 173.37 123.98 




Figure 4.1: Microfinance Loan Maturity 
Source: Survey data 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Loan Maturity and Interest Rate 










































Figure 4.3: Loan Amount (US Dollars) 
Source: Survey data 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Debt Service to Income Ratio  























































Monthly debt service to income ratio (%)
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Figure 4.5: Debt Service Ratios  
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
Figure 4.6: Predicted Probabilities of Financial Distress as function of Debt Service Ratio 
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Figure 4.7: Predicted Plots of Financial Distress as a Function of Debt Service Ratio by 
Gender of Household Head  




Figure 4.8: Predicted Plots of Financial Distress as Function of Debt Service Ratio by 
Household Poverty Status  
Note: Average predicted plots of financial distress based on debt service ratio ranging from 0.01 




Figure 4.9: Predicted Probabilities of Financial Distress as a Function of Debt Service Ratio 
Note: Average predicted probabilities of financial distress examined at values of the debt service 




Figure 4.10: Predicted Plots of Credit Constraint as Function of Debt Service Ratio 
Note: Average predicted plots of being credit constrained based on debt service ratio ranging 




























 Figure 4.11: Graph Matrix: Welfare Impact of MFI Debt – Annual Food Expenditures  
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
 
  
Figure 4.12: Graph Matrix: Welfare Impact of MFI Debt –Annual Total Essential 
Expenditures 























































































Figure 4.13: Predicted Plots of Log of Annual Expenditures as a Function of the Debt to 
Asset (Per Person) Ratio 
 
Note: Average predicted plots of log of annual food expenditures based on debt to asset ratio 
ranging from 0.01 to 1. 
 
Figure 4.14: Predicted Probabilities of Log of Food Expenditures as a Function of the Debt 
to Asset Ratio 
Note: Average predicted probabilities of the log of food expenditures examined at values of the  
debt to asset ratios, ranging from 0.01 to 1. The computation is derived using the estimated results 










































IMPLICATIONS OF MICROFINANCE FOR GENDER INEQUALITY IN 
GHANA 
5.1 Introduction 
Reducing poverty and inequality, which are two main goals of developing 
countries, continue to feature at the top of the global development agenda. In 2010, more 
than 460 million people in developing countries (over 20 percent), lived in extreme 
poverty; that is, on less than $1.25 a day (World Bank, 2014). Despite considerable 
success over the past decade in reducing extreme poverty, it remains high in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA): 48 percent in 2010, down from 58 percent in 1999. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
also characterized by high levels of inequality.  Perhaps more worrisome is the slow pace 
of reduction in gender inequality in the form of income, health, education, employment 
and human rights in the sub-region33. In fact, in some countries within the sub-region, 
gender inequality is increasing, suggesting that efforts aimed at reducing extreme poverty 
benefit males relatively more than females. 
Among the factors which have been identified as contributing to poverty and 
gender inequality in developing countries is the lack of access to finance. Despite the 
growth of the financial sector in SSA, the poor are found to be mostly excluded from the 
formal financial sector on account of their relatively low levels of income and lack of 
                                                          
33 There are some improvements observed in gender equity for selected countries in some 
areas such as education and political leadership. Currently Liberia and Malawi have female 
Presidents and in general there are recorded improvements in gender representation in national 
parliament of most SSA countries. Majority of countries in SSA have also attained gender equity 
in primary education. 
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assets that can be used as collateral. It is expected that the proliferation of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) would help bridge the gap between the demand and supply of credit for 
poor households. Indeed the main ideology underlying the microfinance model is to 
enable the poor who are mostly excluded from the formal financial sector to have access 
to financial services, specifically credit, to improve their livelihoods leading to a reduction 
in poverty and inequality. The question is to what extent access to microcredit helps to 
reduce inequality between men and women both at the country level and also within the 
household. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by examining the impact of 
access to microfinance services on gender inequality in relation to ownership of household 
physical wealth and children’s school enrollment across and within households in Ghana. 
There is a general consensus that microfinance is mostly accessible to women (Corsi, 
Botti, Rondinella, andZacchia, 2006; Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Khandker, 2003), but the 
central question of this chapter is whether increased access to microfinance is making any 
significant impact on gender inequality in Ghana. The objective of the chapter is twofold. 
First, it examines the impact of access to microfinance on women’s ownership of physical 
assets relative to men within the households and on the gender asset gap between male-
headed and female-headed households. Second, the paper investigates the impact of 
microcredit children’s school enrollment. The following hypotheses are tested: (i) access 
to microcredit reduces intra-household inequalities; (ii) access to microcredit reduces the 
gender asset gap between male-headed households and female-headed households; (iii) 
access to microcredit improves children’s school enrollment.  
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In addition to comparative analysis between households with and without 
microfinance, the chapter uses the beta distribution to model the impact of access to 
microfinance on intra-household gender inequality. In addition, the chapter uses the 
Oaxaca decomposition methods to explore the determinants of gender asset gap between 
male-headed and female-headed households using cross-sectional data obtained from a 
household survey conducted in Ghana from May to July 2013.34 The evidence shows that 
access to microfinance is important for reducing gender asset gaps within households and 
between male-headed and female-headed households. The comparative analysis also 
shows that having microfinance may play an important role for children’s education, 
especially for female-headed households who are relatively more financially constrained 
compared to their male counterparts. 
The chapter consists of six sections. Following this introduction, section 5.2 
reviews the empirical literature on the impact of microfinance on the poor and in particular 
women. Section 5.3 provides the theoretical framework for the analysis of the impact of 
microfinance on gender inequality. Section 5.4 presents the research methodology and the 
data. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 Microfinance, Women and the Poor: A Review of the Literature  
The 2010 Ghana Population and Housing Census found that 65 percent of the 
working population is found in the private informal sector (GSS, 2013a, p. 267). Not 
surprisingly those in this group, majority of whom are women, have limited access to 
                                                          
34 The survey covered 500 households, out of which 253 households were categorized as 
having received microfinance with 247 categorized as households without microfinance. 
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credit (Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011). Access to financial services is necessary for 
the growth and development of the informal sector. In addition, access to financial 
services also has the potential to mobilize savings that can be channeled into investment 
capital for national development.  
A recent analysis by the Bank of Ghana has shown that less than 10 percent of the 
population has access to formal finance. Given the importance of finance to any poverty 
reduction strategy, it is imperative for policymakers to examine the ways through which 
credit constraints facing the unbanked population can be alleviated. The financing gap 
facing those in the private informal sector is due to their exclusion from the formal 
financial sector. Research has established that only half of Ghanaian SME applications for 
bank loans have any chance of being considered favorably (Aryeetey, 1994). According to 
bankers, the high rejection rate is attributed to the absence of viable or bankable projects. 
The entrepreneurs, however, argue that it is because they are not seen to have good 
collateral (Aryeetey, 1994). 
Poor households, in particular, are at a disadvantage relative to rich households 
regarding access to financial services from the formal financial system. This is due to their 
relatively lower levels of income which makes it difficult for them to save with formal 
financial institutions and their lack of collateral which prevents them from accessing 
credit. Microfinance has been touted as the means to bridging this financing gap between 
the poor and the rich. It is expected that by increasing poor households’ access to financial 
services they will escape poverty and that the income gap between them and the rich will 
be greatly reduced.   
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As in most developing countries, women in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) often 
assume a disproportionate responsibility for the welfare of their families. However, the 
available empirical evidence suggests that poor women are the subject of discrimination in 
terms of access to financial services from the formal financial sector (Baydas, Meyer, 
andAguilera-Alfred, 1994). This stems from their weak bargaining position within the 
household. Most of the time, men have control of the household’s marketable assets that 
can be used as collateral. Several studies, therefore, suggest that access to microfinance for 
women is critical for poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment (Brau and Woller, 
2004; Cheston and Kuhn, 2002; Hermes and Lensink, 2011; Littlefield, Morduch, 
andHashemi, 2003).  
In a cross-country empirical study on 61 developing countries which examined the 
relationship between microfinance and inequality, it was established that universally, 
access to microfinance reduces inequality between the rich and the poor, hence 
microfinance is an effective redistribution tool (Kai and Hamori, 2009). Indeed, some 
studies suggest that high inequality characterizing most of the developing world is a result 
of credit constraints facing poor people (Deininger and Squire, 1998). This implies that 
access to small loans for the poor in developing countries is crucial for reducing poverty 
and inequality. The study was however limited to inequalities between the rich and the 
poor; it did not consider intra-household inequalities and in particular whether gender 
inequalities are reduced by the access to small loans. There are important developments 
within the household with implications for intra-household inequality which cannot be 
ignored (Woolley and Marshall, 1994). 
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If microfinance has an equalizing effect then how are women and men differently 
affected by access to microfinance? That microfinance mostly targets women is a forgone 
conclusion in the literature. For instance, in Asia and Africa, the available empirical 
evidence suggests that women constitute the majority of the clientele of microfinance 
institutions (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Khandker, 2005; Lapenu and Zeller, 2001). The 
suggestion that microfinance targets the poorest of the poor is however not supported, 
which this study will confirm (Navajas et al, (2000); S. Hashemi and Rosenberg (2006)). 
Empirical evidence on the impact of access to financial services provided by MFIs in 
reducing intra-household inequality as they relate to income, education and health in 
developing countries is, however, limited.  
There are two major approaches adopted in the empirical literature for analyzing 
the welfare impact of credit on a given population. The first approach, which is objective 
in nature, uses indicators set in monetary value terms such as income and expenditures or 
other such indicators to assess impact. The second approach, which is subjective in nature, 
uses indicators, which are usually not set in monetary value terms, such as food security, 
health and women’s empowerment, to examine the impact of micro-credit.  
The second approach may be viewed in the light of Sen’s capability approach 
(Sen, 1999) which fosters the use of multi-dimensional approach to the measurement of 
well-being rather than the uni-dimensional approaches often used in the development 
literature. One may ask, does an increase in women’s income after assessing microfinance 
translate into women’s empowerment?  
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Among the studies that have assessed the impact of access to MFIs on women 
using the first approach is Khandker (2003) who finds that a 100 percent increase in credit 
to a woman results in a 5 percent increase in per capita household non-food expenditure 
and a 1 percent increase in food expenditure while a 100 percent increase in credit to a 
man results in a 2 percent increase in non-food expenditure of the household and a trivial 
change in food expenditure.  
Using a multipurpose quasi-experimental household survey data on rural 
Bangladesh, Pitt et al (2003), also show that relative to their male counterparts, credit 
provided to women has a large and significant positive impact on arm circumference and 
height of their children. Specifically, they provide evidence that shows that evaluated at 
their means, a 10 percent increase in credit allocated to females results in an increase in 
the arm circumference of girls and boys by 0.45 and 0.39 centimeters, respectively (Mark 
M Pitt, Khandker, Chowdhury, andMillimet, 2003, p. 110). In contrast, the same 
percentage increase in credit allocated to males increases arm circumference for girls by 
0.21 cm and reduces that of boys by 0.14 cm. Similarly, while a 10 percent increase in 
credit to females leads to an increase in height of girls and boys by 0.36 and 0.50 
centimeters per year respectively, the same increase in credit to males reduces the height 
of girls and boys by 0.16 and 0.11 centimeters, respectively.    
 Dupas and Robinson (2012) also provide experimental evidence on the role of 
micro-savings services in reducing poverty for market women in rural Kenya. They find 
that micro-savings services contribute to increased savings despite negative returns on 
these savings. In addition their study shows that these micro-savings services led to 
substantial positive impact on business investments by market women, with an estimate of 
 
152 
about 45 percent increase of daily average investment as well as about 27 to 40 percent 
higher private expenditures for market women accessing these services compared to 
women in a comparator group. They also find that market women accessing micro-savings 
services were less vulnerable to illness shocks relative to market women in the comparator 
group who tend to resort to their working capital in response to health shocks (Dupas and 
Robinson, 2012, p. 4). 
Most other empirical studies which have examined the impact of access to MFIs 
on women often adopt the second approach. One such study examines the impact of 
access to MFIs on women’s empowerment and reports that microfinance in Bangladesh 
has led to a reduction in domestic violence against women (Kabeer, 2005). Yet another 
study finds that for one village being served by Grameen, roughly 70 percent of the 
borrowers experienced an increase in domestic violence (Rahman, 1999). Another study 
finds that by increasing the opportunity cost of women’s time, access to microfinance has 
contributed positively to the use of contraceptives by women and decreased women’s 
vulnerability to domestic violence (Schuler, Hashemi, andRiley, 1997).  
Hashemi et al (1996)    have further argued that “minimalist credit programs 
provide access to an important economic resource” (pp. 650) and acts as a “catalyst in 
transforming the lives of women.” Hashemi et al (1996) create a composite empowerment 
indicator based on eight components. These include mobility, economic security, ability to 
make small and larger purchases, involvement in major household decisions, relative 
freedom from domination within the family, political and legal awareness and 
involvement in political campaigning and protests. They find that membership of any of 
the two credit programs evaluated increases the likelihood of a woman being empowered 
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by 16 percent. They further argue that though minimal, credit programs empower women 
by increasing their mobility and bargaining power within the household which allows 
them to have control over their assets and income. 
From their research on the impact of microfinance on women in Mediterranean 
countries, Corsi et al. (2006) argue that empowerment through finance is more effective 
than programs that are specifically targeted at reducing gender discrimination. But that 
begs the question, ‘Is the provision of microcredit alone sufficient to empower women?’ 
Several other studies have pointed out that the provision of credit alone is not sufficient to 
empower women (Armendáriz and Jonathan, 2005; Corsi et al., 2006; Rankin, 2002). 
However, when credit is provided in conjunction with non-financial services, such as adult 
literacy, healthcare and management training, the impact on women’s empowerment is 
significantly increased (Armendáriz and Jonathan, 2005; Corsi et al., 2006).  
Both the theoretical and empirical arguments put forth seem to suggest that the 
impact of access to microfinance will depend on the context. Hence, its impact on poverty 
reduction and women’s empowerment cannot be generalized. Indeed, from a survey of 
fifteen different microfinance programs in Africa, Mayoux (1999) reports that the extent 
to which microfinance can contribute to women’s empowerment is household and region-
specific and mostly depends on the flexibility associated with social norms and traditions. 
Armendáriz and Jonathan (2005) argue further that the impact on women’s empowerment 
also depends on how particular programs are designed.  
There are other studies that suggest that access to microcredit may not necessarily 
lead to any positive outcomes on women. For instance, Goetz and Gupta (1996) show that 
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the increase of credit to rural women in Bangladesh and the high repayment rates they 
exhibit does not necessarily reflect effective loan investment strategies by women, 
implying that the impact of microcredit on women’s empowerment deserves more 
scrutiny. Reporting on their research work which focuses on special credit programs 
targeted at poor rural women, these authors find that despite the fact that women 
borrowers are solely responsible for servicing loans, a significant proportion of the loans 
are directly controlled by their male relatives. In this vein, Endeley (2001) has argued that 
the objective of women’s empowerment through microcredit programs will not be 
achieved if loans are given to women who do not have control over their incomes.   
To the best of our knowledge there is currently no empirical evidence on the 
quantitative impact of access to microfinance on intra-household gender inequalities using 
the recently developed gender asset gap measure (see Oduro, Baah-Boateng, and Boakye-
Yiadom (2011)). This study is an attempt to fill the gaps in the empirical literature on the 
impact of access to microfinance on intra-household wealth inequality and gender asset 
gaps between male-headed and female-headed households. In addition, the study 
examines the impact of access to microfinance on educational gaps between male and 
female children of poor households. 
5.3 Theoretical Framework 
5.3.1 Gender Norms and their Implications for Intra-household Inequality 
The study of Russian peasant economy by Chayanov and Chai͡ anov (1966) and the 
publication of Becker’s ‘Treatise on the Family’ in 1981 were instrumental in drawing 
attention to the family in economic analysis (Bermant, 2008). In particular Becker’s 
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‘Treatise on the Family’ has been the basis for the neoclassical approach to the study of 
households (Bermant, 2008). According to the United Nations, the household may be 
defined simply as “a group of people who live and eat together” (see Bolt and Bird (2003, 
p. 10)). Bolt and Bird (2003) point out that the definition applied in any research study has 
varied implications for the outcome of the research study arguing that researchers need to 
be clear on the assumptions underlying any research related to household level analysis. 
Broadly, theories of household behavior and intra-household allocation decisions 
may be classified in two categories. The first category comprises models that operate 
under the assumption that the household is a single decision-making agent. Models in the 
second category argue otherwise.  
The main classes of intra-household resource allocation models under the first 
category are the common preferences and unified household models (Doss, 1996, p. 
1599). In both of these models an aggregate household utility function is assumed. In 
particular, these models view the household as a collection of individuals with the same 
utility function where all members have the same preferences. However, as Arrow (1950) 
points out, in what has been generally recognized in microeconomic theory as “Arrow’s 
General Possibility Theorem,” aggregation of individual preferences to the societal or 
household level can only be classified as satisfactory or rational under the mechanism of 
dictatorship.  
Many have pointed to the altruistic tendency within families (Samuelson, 1956) to 
solve the problem of aggregation (Bergstrom, 1995; Doss, 1996; Folbre, 1986). Indeed 
there are significant reasons to expect that to some extent altruism may exist within the 
 
156 
household but that the actual effect of any level of altruism on resource allocation may be 
elusive. As is the case under the unitary approach for the intra-household allocation of 
resources, the assumption of altruism provides researchers with no basis to assess conflict 
among members of a household either by gender, age etc. Indeed, the idea that individuals 
within a household act altruistically toward each other, especially in the allocation of 
resources, is a key theme in the majority of research that builds on the unitary model of 
the household.  
Models in the second category argue that the household utility function may be 
disaggregated (see Doss (1996) for a detailed review). It is important to note, however, 
that there are two different views within this category that relate to the outcome of intra-
household resource allocation decision. The first view suggests the possibility of the 
household attaining Pareto-efficient outcomes. These theories are generally classified as 
collective models of the household. The second view suggests that the household is a 
place where there is significant bargaining which may lead to a definite Pareto-efficient 
outcome (cooperative bargaining models) or non-Pareto-efficient outcomes (non-
cooperative bargaining models). In particular, the bargaining models of intra-household 
resource allocation hold promise for analyzing conflict that may exist among members 
within a household.   
The available empirical evidence, most of which employs bargaining models of 
intra-household resource allocation, shows that in terms of distribution of resources, 
women are often the object of discrimination, both at household and society levels 
(Berkner, 1973; Folbre, 1986, 1996).  The literature identifies the unequal gender division 
of labor resulting in unequal gender division of reward as a key factor of gender 
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discrimination. Essentially, the work that most women do (mostly household activities) is 
considered to be of low market value, resulting in lower or no rewards, ultimately leading 
to women’s weak bargaining position within the household. 
The weak economic position of women also means that they have less bargaining 
power and are constrained in terms of making decisions regarding how many children to 
have and investment decisions relating to their children, in particular, which of their 
children gets priority in terms of education and health, etc. Microfinance is touted as 
serving to improve women’s bargaining position and their overall livelihood. For this 
reason we expect that access to microcredit should help in reducing gender inequality both 
at the household and country levels.  
5.3.2 Access to Credit from Formal Credit Markets 
In the theoretical and empirical literature, access to credit has been identified as 
one of the effective tools that can help to reduce poverty and inequalities. Access to credit 
can also help to smooth consumption and income following exogenous shocks. In Ghana 
for instance, barely 10 percent of the population is served by formal financial institutions 
which means that most small and medium scale enterprises and most of the poor 
population have little or no access to financial services. The lack of access to financial 
services from formal financial institutions is a matter of concern especially given that the 
poor represent the largest share of the population and that small- and medium-scale 
enterprises represent an important part of the economies of most SSA countries.   
Many factors make it difficult for those caught up in the poverty trap to access 
credit at formal financial institutions. These include imperfections in financial markets due 
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to adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection refers to situations in which there 
are difficulties in determining the level of risk each customer represents. In such an 
environment, any attempt at raising the average interest rate could potentially increase the 
pool of riskier customers. Moral hazard refers to situations in which banks are unable to 
ascertain whether the proceeds of loans are applied to the very projects for which they 
were acquired. Armendáriz and Jonathan (2005) notes that these two problems resulting 
from imperfect information are often aggravated in situations where the judicial systems 
are weak due to difficulties in enforcing contracts. Imperfection in the formal financial 
sector causes gender discrimination, skewing credit access in favor of men relative to 
women.  
The high transaction costs involved in working in poor communities due to 
handling several small transactions cause formal banks to shy away from providing 
financial services for the poor. In addition, the lack of marketable assets that the poor can 
use for collateral makes lending to the poor risky (Armendáriz and Jonathan, 2005).      
5.3.3 Supply-side and Demand-side Problems in Credit Markets 
Perfect information is the key prerequisite for markets to be characterized as 
perfectly competitive. The assumption of perfect information implies that all players in the 
market have perfect knowledge regarding the actions of each player. In practice, however, 
borrowers may have valuable information that lenders do not have on the riskiness of their 
projects and their true ability to repay the loan. This information asymmetry results in 
adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets, yielding sub-optimal supply of credit 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981b). In ‘equilibrium’ there will be potential borrowers who are 
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willing to take loans at the going interest rate, and even higher, who are turned down by 
lenders weary of the high risk of default that may be associated with higher interest rates. 
In other words, information asymmetry may generate ‘credit rationing’, shutting off some 
potential borrowers from the credit market. Information asymmetry in financial markets 
thus prevents the efficient allocation of resources (Stiglitz, 1993b). In particular, 
asymmetric information and the high fixed cost of small-scale lending limit the access of 
the poor to the formal financial institutions thus pushing them to the informal financial 
sector or to the extreme case of financial exclusion (Stiglitz, 1993b). This partly explains 
the difference between rural and urban access to credit from the formal financial system. 
After examining the rationale for the continuing existence and growth of the 
informal financial sector, Aryeetey and Gockel (1991) identified the different factors 
which constrain rural and urban access to credit. The authors argued that despite major 
investment and policies aimed at bolstering the performance of the formal financial sector, 
transaction costs involved with dealing with the formal financial sector is a major 
constraint to small-scale business owners, especially for urban people. Travel cost and 
time is also particularly important for those in the rural areas. In addition, political cost 
involved with saving with the formal financial sector is also a major factor for both rural 
and urban people. These political costs resulted from the implementation of policies by 
different governments in Ghana, between 1979 to 1982, which negatively affected public 
confidence in the banking system (Aryeetey and Gockel, 1991, pp. 9-10).    
Also contributing to the inability of formal financial institutions to provide credit 
to the poor is the pernicious effect of orthodox financial liberalization in African countries 
(Mkandawire, 1999b).  Financial liberalization was expected to result in improved 
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efficiency. However, it ‘has reduced policy-making to the establishment of narrow and 
idiosyncratic ‘fundamentals’ confined almost exclusively to issues of stabilization and 
debt management’ (Mkandawire, 1999b, pp. 338-339). In most SSA countries that have 
adopted an inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy and where there is a greater 
emphasis on financial stability, the resource mobilization and allocation objectives of 
banks have given way to the stabilization objective. The strong emphasis on stabilization 
has not only compromised the possibility of financial liberalization to address the 
fundamental issues of development but has also stifled efforts at poverty eradication. This 
development implies that other sources such as informal finance and microfinance are 
increasingly taking up the roles that formal banking institutions were expected to assume 
under financial liberalization.  
5.4 The Methodology and Data 35 
5.4.1 The Data 
The analysis draws on the quantitative and qualitative evidence from a unique 
dataset generated from a survey of 499 households, with and without access to 
microfinance, during my field research work in Ghana from May to July 2013. The 
household survey collected household-level data on access to credit from MFIs, overall 
balance sheet, and demographic characteristics. The survey covered two regions, Central 
and Greater Accra. The strategy was to target communities with access to microfinance 
institutions. Households with microfinance were randomly selected from clientele list of 
                                                          
35 Refer to Chapter 3 for details about the methodology and data used. 
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randomly selected microfinance institutions and households without microcredit were 
randomly sampled within the same communities. This was done in order to reduce 
selection bias. Out of the sample of 499 households used in the analysis, 252 households 
had received MFI loans while 247 had never taken loans from microfinance institutions. 
5.4.2 Definition of Key Variables 
5.4.2.1 Access to Microfinance 
Access to finance can be measured in 3 different ways: by institutions, services or 
products (World Bank, 2006). In the literature, the mostly used measure of households’ 
access to credit is their participation and experiences in the credit market (Bebczuk & 
Haimovich, 2007; Coleman, 2006; Montgomery, 2006). This study uses the ratio of 
volume of credit to household income as one indicator of a household’s access to 
microfinance. Following practice in the literature, the study also uses participation in MFI 
programs as another measure of access to microfinance. 
5.4.2.2 Gender Inequality 
A recent study on gender asset gap in Ghana developed two sets of measures to 
capture gender differences in asset ownership: gender asset gap and gender wealth gap 
(Oduro, Baah-Boateng, & Boakye-Yiadom, 2011). The gender wealth gap can be 
measured in three ways: the first compares the gross value of assets owned by females and 
males; the second measures the share of the gross value of assets owned by women in total 
gross value of household assets; and the third compares the mean gross value of assets 
owned by females and males. This study uses the second measure to examine the impact 
of microcredit on intra-household gender inequality. Intra-household inequality refers to 
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the inequality between men and women within each household. This measure captures the 
distribution of gross wealth by gender. If one asset is owned by multiple people, all 
individuals with a claim to that asset are considered owners. The unit of observation is an 
individual adult man or woman.  
Other measures of gender inequality to be used in the empirical analysis are (1) the 
modified gender wealth gap which captures the distribution of physical wealth by sex and 
relative to the share of female in the total national population and (2) the share of 
educational expenditure on female children in total household educational expenditures at 
the primary and secondary school levels. 
5.4.2.3 Expenditure Per Capita as a Proxy for Per Capita Income  
Given the usual problems with income measures in developing countries, this 
study uses per capita household expenditure as a proxy for per capita income. The data 
was collected on households’ expenditures on food, health, education, rent and utilities. 
Using expenditure per capita as a proxy for income per capita instead of income reported 
seems more appropriate as the former is subject to fewer reporting errors.    
5.4.2.4 Other Variables 
Other variables used in the analysis include the dependency ratio, the years of 
schooling of the household head, the proportion of household members in the labor force 
and the annual non-income support received by each household.  
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5.5 Empirical Analysis 
This section presents the empirical evidence on the impact of microcredit on 
gender inequality in Ghana. 
5.5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of key variables related to female-headed 
households with and without microcredit. While female-headed households with credit 
tend to be better off in terms of the mean value of wealth relative to their counterparts 
without credit, the latter seem to be better off in terms of income, food expenditure and 
annual non-income support. A major factor driving lower food per capita expenditures for 
female-headed households with microcredit is foregoing or reducing food expenditures in 
order to service their loans. Households who reported that they reduce their food 
expenditures to service loans correspond to 14 percent of households with credit (Figure 
5.1).  
In general, female heads of households with micro-credit tend to have more years 
of schooling relative to their counterpart without micro-credit. Relative to female-headed 
households with microcredit, female-headed households without credit have lower 
dependency ratio and a higher proportion of household members in the labor force.   
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics of key characteristics of households with and 
without micro-credit, for which there are at least one female adult and at least one male 
adult. The data show that on average, and for most of the indicators except for annual non-
income support (remittances), dependency and proportion of household members in the 
 
164 
labor force, households with micro-credit are slightly better off compared with their 
counterparts without micro-credit. 
An interesting finding of the study is that female-headed households with MFI 
credit tend to have parity in terms of spending on education for female and male children 
compared to female-headed households without credit (Table 5.3). On average, 50.4 
percent of education expenditures are allocated to female children in female-headed 
households with micro-credit compared to 47 percent for female-headed households 
without credit. The share of female children’s education expenditure for households with 
and without micro-credit and for which there are at least one adult female and at least one 
adult male differed marginally, 48.8 percent and 50.2 percent respectively. This suggests 
that while micro-credit may be important for women it may not necessarily lead to their 
empowerment within the household unless it improves their ability to contribute to the 
decision-making process within the household which may occur through improved 
income.  
The data also show that the mean value of years of schooling for both male and 
female children is higher for female-headed households with micro-credit compared to 
their counterparts without credit (Table 5.4). Similarly, the mean value of years of 
schooling for both male and female children is higher in households with microcredit and 
where the household head is married (mostly in these cases the household is male-headed) 
compared to their counterparts without microcredit. Notably, the gap36 in terms of the 
                                                          
36 The gap is computed by taking the difference between the mean values for female 
children’s years of education and male children’s years of schooling. 
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mean years of education is relatively higher for female-headed households without micro-
credit.  
The share of health expenditures on women and girls in total household health 
expenditures tend to be above 50 percent for all households with and without micro-credit, 
though on average, households with micro-credit tend to have lower shares compared to 
households without micro-credit (Table 5.5).  
Table 5.6 examines the characteristics of female-headed relative to male-headed 
households. In general, female-headed households are more resource-constrained than 
male-headed households, who have an edge because of higher incomes. Similarly, female-
headed households tend to have fewer years of schooling (7.2 years) compared to male-
headed households (11.3 years). It is therefore expected that access to microfinance would 
lead to a maximized impact on school enrollment for female-headed households relative to 
male-headed households and possibly explaining the estimation results reported on Table 
5.14. 
5.5.2 Intra-household Gender Wealth Gap  
As previously indicated, the study uses three measures of the gender wealth gap. 
The first one measures overall women’s share of the total gross value of household assets 
(Oduro et al, 2011) using weighted average. The second measure compares females’ share 
(including financial assets37) of the total value of wealth within each household where 
                                                          
37 This measure was also computed without financial assets in view of difficulties 
encountered with reporting financial assets and the figures did not differ significantly.  
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there is at least one male and one female. The third measure compares the share of females 
in total value of female assets in households with and without micro-credit.   
Data was collected for 7 main household assets: real estate (including building 
properties and land), livestock, financial assets, consumer durables, businesses, agriculture 
land, and agriculture equipment. Respondents were asked to indicate the year of 
acquisition of each household asset. Households with micro-credit were further asked to 
indicate whether assets were acquired before or after receiving the micro-credit. Using the 
reported market value of each asset, the gross value of total wealth is aggregated by sex 
for each household. For jointly owned assets, the value is distributed evenly across 
owners.  
A major issue encountered was the valuation of real estate and agricultural land. 
Respondents were asked how much a similar property would sell within the vicinity in 
which these properties were located, and these differed significantly even within the same 
vicinity. Every effort was made to arrive at realistic selling prices for property by 
reconciling the valuations of similar properties within the same areas using significant 
numbers of respondents having similar values. Another major problem encountered was 
inadequate reporting of financial assets. Most respondents were reluctant to provide 
detailed information relating to their current financial assets.  
For the entire sample, real estate, businesses and consumer durables constituted 
43.5 percent, 26.2 percent and 15.9 percent of total gross wealth, respectively (Figure 5.2). 
Except for the real estate and businesses categories, the total value of gross wealth for 
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females is lower for all the other categories of assets (Figure 5.3). Overall, women owned 
49 percent of total household wealth. 
The intra-household comparison reveals that females within households with 
micro-credit, on average, tend to have a relatively higher share of household wealth 
compared to females in households without micro-credit (Figure 5.4). The female share in 
the total value of gross wealth for households with micro-credit is 52 percent compared to 
48 percent for females in households without micro-credit (see also Table 5.7). This holds 
even when financial assets are excluded. The share of assets for females in households 
with microcredit was higher for all categories of assets. Overall females in households 
with micro-credit account for 60 percent of the total asset wealth for all females in the 
sample (Figure 5.5).  
Using the modified measure of the gender wealth gap (i.e., subtracting females’ 
share in the population, 52.3 percent, from females’ share in the total gross value of 
wealth) intra-household inequality (where there is at least one male and one female) is 
close to zero for households with micro-credit compared with households without micro-
credit (Table 5.7 and Figure 5.6).  
5.5.3 Econometric Analysis 
This section presents the econometric analysis which uses the cross-sectional data 
from the survey to examine the importance of microfinance for intra-household gender 
wealth inequality. In addition, the section uses the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method 
to examine the gaps in wealth between female-headed and male-headed households. The 
section also examines the impact of access to microcredit on children’s school enrollment.  
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5.5.3.1 Regression Analysis of Intra-household Gender Inequality  
The analysis of the importance of micro-credit for intra-household gender 
inequality is based on an empirical model specified as follows:  
      𝐺𝐼𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝑿𝒊
′𝜸 + 𝛼𝐴𝐶𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖      (1)   
where 𝐺𝐼 is females’ share in total household durable and business assets38; 𝐴𝐶𝑖 is the 
ratio of the total amount micro-credit received relative to household income; and Xi is a 
set of control variables (MFI and household-specific).39 It is expected that receiving 
micro-credit will reduce intra-household gender inequality, given that women are the main 
recipients of microfinance within the household. The null hypothesis tested here is that 𝛼 
= 0 in equation (1), implying that access to micro-credit does not improve equity within 
households.  
 In view of the fact that the dependent variable in this analysis is bounded between 
0 and 1, estimating this model using ordinary least squares (OLS) is inappropriate (see 
Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) and Buis (2010)). This study models the distribution of a 
female’s share in total household durable and business assets with a beta distribution 
(betafit), a zero/one inflated beta distribution (ZOIB), and a fractional logit (generalized 
linear model)40.  
                                                          
38 From the survey most respondents indicated that the funds were used to acquire 
business assets and some durable assets hence its use in the analysis. The variable ranges from 0 to 
1. 
39 See Table A5.1 in the appendix for the definition of the variables used in the analysis.  
40 See Buis (2010) and Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) for detailed review of the 
estimation of rates and proportions. 
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Some points about these different estimation methods are in order. The beta 
distribution estimation method, betafit, is ideal for a continuous variable that is bounded 
between 0 and 1. The beta distribution estimation ignores the 0s (representing households 
with only male adults) and 1s (which represents households with only female adults). The 
zero/one inflated beta distribution method, ZOIB, estimates the model separately for 
households with only male adults (zero-inflate), households with only female adults (one-
inflate), and for households with at least one male and one female adult (proportions 
excluding 0s and 1s) assuming that each of these separate scenarios are governed by a 
different process. The fractional logit estimation method estimates the model by including 
all the values (0s, proportions, and 1s) under the assumption that the 0s and 1s occur 
through the same process as the other proportions (Buis, 2010).  
 The Results from the various estimation methods and the marginal effects are 
reported in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 respectively.41 The results from the three different 
estimation methods show that the coefficient on micro-credit has the expected positive 
sign and is statistically significant. Specifically, there is a positive relationship between 
the share of females’ assets in total household assets and access to micro-credit. It is also 
noted that there is a positive relationship between the share of females’ assets in total 
assets and the level of females’ income. There is, however, a negative relationship 
between the share of females’ assets in total assets and the age of the borrower, and the 
share of health and education expenditures in total essential household expenditures. The 
                                                          
41 The results for the unconstrained model estimation including the OLS results are shown 
on Table A5.6 in the Appendix. 
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dummy variables, the gender of the loan user and financial literacy, both have a positive 
relationship with the share of females’ assets in total assets.  
 The estimation results for the marginal effects for the 3 estimation methods show 
that having micro-credit leads to between 4 and 10 percentage points higher female share 
of total household’s physical assets than the sample average (Table 5.9). When the gender 
of the loan user is female, the share of assets accruing to females is between 24 and 33 
percentage points higher than the sample average. Also, when the loan user has access to 
financial literacy programs over the period of the loan, the share of assets for females is 
between 15 and 17 percentage points higher. A one percentage point of spending on 
education and health above the sample average of 32 percent, however, leads to a lower 
share of total household assets for females from between 2 and 9 percentage points 
suggesting a substitution between physical assets accumulation and investment in human 
capital accumulation.  
5.5.3.2 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Asset Inequality  
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique (Oaxaca, 1973)42 is used to 
investigate the determinants of asset inequality between male-headed households and 
female-headed households. The first step is to examine the determinants of the 
accumulation of household assets. The effect of access to microfinance on accumulation 
of household physical assets is modeled as follows:  
                                                          
42 Another decomposition method, which is regression-based and proposed by Fields (2003) is 
also explored but results are not reported for brevity. 
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 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝑿𝒊𝜸 + 𝛼𝑀𝐹𝐼_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖    (2) 
where  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 is total household physical assets; 𝑀𝐹𝐼_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if a household has access to microcredit and 0 otherwise; and Xi is a set 
of control variables (MFI and household-specific). Household-specific control variables 
included are those relating to the household head - the years of schooling, age, marital 
status and whether the head is self-employed or not. In addition, per capita expenditure for 
the household and the household size are also included. The study also includes ethnicity 
dummies to capture tribal effects on asset accumulation.43 The model is estimated using 
OLS. It is expected that access to microcredit will be associated with an increase in asset 
accumulation of the household. 
 The summary statistics show that the mean difference in the gross value of total 
household physical assets between male-headed and female-headed households is GHS 
6,96444 (Table A5.2, Appendix B). On average, male household heads have more years of 
schooling than female heads of households with 11.25 and 7.25, respectively. Female-
headed households tend to have higher per capita food expenditure relative to male-headed 
households. Female household heads are more likely to be self-employed relative to their 
male counterparts who tend to have wage employment. Male-headed households have 
larger household size relative to female-headed households with 4.9 and 2.9, respectively. 
In addition, male heads of households tend to have a higher age relative to female heads of 
households with 41.6 years and 38.5 years, respectively.    
                                                          
43 This is in view of the fact that ethnicity plays a critical role in inheritance in Ghana. 
44 Equivalent to about $3500. 
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Having examined the mean differences, the next step is to estimate the model 
specified in equation (2) above separately for the total sample, distinguishing between 
male-headed households and female-headed households as follows (3): 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 = {
𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝑿𝒊𝜸
𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛼𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀𝐹𝐼_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑐𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝑿𝒊𝜸
𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛼𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑀𝐹𝐼_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖+ 𝑖
𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
(3) 
The estimation results presented in Table 5.10 show that the estimated coefficient 
on the household head’s gender dummy (dummy=1 for female household head), is -0.494 
and it is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (column 1). This coefficient may be 
interpreted as the log asset differential between female-headed households and male-
headed households. The antilog of this coefficient is 0.610 which indicates that, on 
average, the gross value of total physical assets for female-headed households is 61 
percent of that of male-headed households.   
The effect of access to microfinance differs for male-headed and female-headed 
households. Having access to microfinance has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on total physical assets for female-headed households. The estimated coefficient 
on microcredit variable in the regression on the female-headed households subsample is 
0.571, meaning that female-headed households with access to microfinance have 57 
percent higher physical wealth than their counterparts without. Having access to 
microfinance has no significant impact on total physical assets for male-headed 
households. Apart from the dummy variables for the marital status and ethnicity of the 
house head, most of the other variables have the expected signs with most being 
statistically significant.    
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The results of the decomposition analysis help explain the gap in the means of the 
outcome variable between male-headed and female-headed households. The analysis 
shows that female-headed households have a lower mean value of total household 
physical assets than male-headed households. Following Oaxaca (1973), the OLS 
estimation of equation (3) can be used for inequality decomposition of total household 
physical assets.  
The results of the decomposition exercise presented in Table 5.11 show the mean 
values of log of total physical assets for male-headed households and female-headed 
households, and the difference between them. The results show the contribution 
attributable to the gaps in endowments, the coefficients, and the interaction between the 
endowments and the coefficients (Table 5.11, column 1). The gap in endowments 
accounts for the bulk of the gap in total physical assets between male-headed households 
and female-headed households.  
Columns 2, 3, and 4 in Table 5.11 allow us to see how far gaps in individual 
explanatory variables contribute to endowments, coefficients, and their interactions. 
Focusing on column 2 which reports the contribution of the individual explanatory 
variables to the gap attributable to endowments, one notes that the gaps in household size 
and education actually disfavor female-headed households. The gap in access to 
microfinance favors female-headed households.  
The results in column 3 of Table 5.11, which reports the contributions attributable 
to the coefficients, show that access to microfinance favors female-headed households. To 
test the robustness of these results, the Neumark decomposition method, which deals with 
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selection bias, is also used. The results are reported in Table 5.12, and they also confirm 
the importance of microfinance in reducing the gap in total physical assets, though in the 
case of the Neumark decomposition, microfinance is significantly important in the 
unexplained portion of the gap. While microfinance is important in explaining the gap, the 
analysis shows that other variables are also important, notably the gaps in the years of 
schooling, and household size between male-headed and female-headed households 
(Tables 5.11 and 5.12).      
5.5.3.3 Impact of Microfinance on Children’s Education 
The analysis of the impact of access to microfinance for children’s education will 
be investigated by estimating the following logistic regression model:  
𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = 1) = 𝜑(𝛿 + 𝑿𝑖
′𝛾2 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐹𝐼_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖)   (4) 
where 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is a dummy variable measuring children’s school enrollment (where 
dummy=1 if child is enrolled at school and 0 if otherwise); 𝑀𝐹𝐼_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 is a measure of 
access to microcredit (where dummy=1 if household has access to microfinance credit and 
0 if otherwise); and Xi is a set of control variables (MFI and household-specific). 
Household-specific control variables included are characteristics of the household head: 
years of schooling and gender of the household head. Other household head characteristics 
included but later dropped due to being insignificant include marital status and ethnicity. 
Other control variables included are per capita expenditure for the household, household 
size, the age dependency ratio, assets per person, the share of health and education 
expenditures in total household expenditures, the number of rooms within a household, 
gender of the child and the share of female assets in total household physical assets. It is 
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expected that access to microcredit will be positively associated with children’s school 
enrollment through the alleviation of the liquidity constraints facing poor households.  
Equation (4) is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation method. The 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented on Table A5.7 
(Appendix B). Three different estimation results for equation (4) are presented in Table 
5.13. The first and second columns of the results are for the base model while the 
remainder of the table presents the estimation results for the full model (see Table 5.13).  
In general, the majority of children (95%) in the sample were enrolled in school 
(Table A5.7). About 60 percent of the sample came from households with access to 
microfinance. Roughly, the total sample was split evenly between male and female 
children. About 27 percent of the total sample of children came from households with 
female heads (Table A5.7). The average age for all children in the sample was 12.4 years 
and the average age did not differ by gender of the child.  
The enrollment variable is further examined using selected characteristics of the 
household, household head and the gender of the child (Tables A5.8 and A5.9). The 
descriptive statistics reveal that generally, households with access to microfinance tend to 
have higher school enrollment compared to their counterparts without, 96.5% and 93.6% 
respectively. There is about 8% gap in school enrollment for children in female-headed 
households (90%) relative to male-head households (98%). There is also about 14% 
enrollment gap between children in households where the household-head has post-
primary education (98%) and children in households where the household-head has no 
post-primary education (84%). This clearly points to the critical importance of the 
education of the household head for children’s education. Similarly, there is a 6.5% 
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enrollment gap between households below the upper poverty line of GHS1314 (90.2%) 
and households above the upper poverty line (96.7%), also a clear indication about the 
possible association between a household’s poverty status and children’s school 
enrollment.  
The descriptive statistics also show that the boy-child tends to have relatively 
higher school enrollment compared to the girl-child. This is not surprising because 
households in Ghana usually have a preference to send boys to school rather than girls. 
The preference to send boys rather than girls to school implies that boys usually have an 
advantage in attaining more years of schooling relative to girls. The Ghana Living 
Standards Survey (GLSS V) showed that female school attendance rate declined relative 
to males with increasing age (GSS, 2008).  
The estimation results show that access to microcredit has a positive impact on the 
children’s school enrollment (Table 5.13). Specifically, having access to microfinance 
increases the probability of children’s school enrollment by 3%, and this is statistically 
significant (Table 5.13, columns 2, 4, and 6). Other household-specific characteristics 
which are positively associated with children’s school enrollment and which are also 
statistically significant include urban dwelling, household head has post-primary 
education, the share of health and education expenditures in total household expenditures, 
and the age dependency ratio. Expenditures per capita, household size, and female gender 
of the household head are negatively associated with children’s school enrollment. The 
gender of the child being male is positively associated with enrollment, but it is 
statistically insignificant.  
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Other wealth measures were also included to examine their impact on enrollment. 
While the amount of assets per person is positively associated with the probability of 
enrollment, the coefficient was insignificant. The share of assets owned by females in total 
household assets was used in place of assets per person. It is expected to be negatively 
associated with children’s enrollment because access to microfinance facilitates 
accumulation of assets or education financing. However, though the coefficient on 
female’s share of total household assets has the expected sign, it is statistically 
insignificant.  
This positive impact of access to microfinance on children’s school enrollment is 
significant particularly for female-headed households compared to male-headed 
households for which access to microfinance has a positive but insignificant impact on the 
probability of school enrollment (Table 5.14, columns 1 and 2). Specifically, access to 
microfinance increases the probability of school enrollment by 8 percent, and this effect is 
statistically significant (Table 5.14, columns 1 and 2). This result suggests that when 
female-headed households have access to microcredit this alleviates the resource 
constraints they face and facilitates school enrollment for children. With access to 
microcredit, therefore, households feel less constrained to keep children at school, in 
particular girls. Indeed, the summary statistics presented earlier in Table 5.3 revealed that 
access to microcredit on average helps female-headed households to allocate more funds 
towards educational expenditures particularly for female children (i.e., 50.3%) which is 
expected to translate into higher enrollment rate for female children. Separate estimations 
(not reported) run by the gender of the child showed a positive but insignificant impact on 
children’s school enrollment. It is noteworthy that female years of schooling increases the 
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probability of school enrollment by 13% for female-headed households, and this is 
statistically significant.   
These results suggest that targeting microfinance to financially constrained 
households, and in particular to women, helps to alleviate liquidity constraints that 
households face and translates into a positive impact on children’s school enrollment.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the importance of access to microfinance credit for gender 
inequality within households and across male-headed and female-headed households using 
both comparative and econometric analysis.   
Two main findings emerge from the analysis. First, female-headed households 
receiving micro-credit, on average, tend to spend equally on male and female children at 
the primary and secondary school levels compared to female-headed households without 
micro-credit where education expenditure at the primary level is skewed in favor of male 
children relative to female children. Secondly, for households where there is at least one 
male and one female, the study finds that on average, women have a higher share of 
household assets at about 52 percent compared to 48 percent for women in households 
without micro-credit.  
The econometric analysis using beta distribution regression estimations reveals 
that access to micro-credit contributes positively to increasing females’ share in total 
household durable and business assets. Estimates of the marginal effects from the beta 
distribution estimations show that having microcredit leads to between 4 and 10 
percentage points higher share of total household physical assets for females above the 
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sample average. Decomposition techniques used to examine the contribution of 
microfinance to the gender asset gap between male-headed and female-headed 
households, show that access to microfinance significantly favors female-headed 
households relative to male-headed households. Further logistic regression analysis 
suggests that targeting microfinance to financially constrained households, and in 
particular to women, helps to alleviate liquidity constraints that households face and 
translates into a positive impact on children’s education. The impact of access to 
microcredit on school enrollment is stronger for female-headed households who have 
significantly lower levels of wealth compared to their male counterparts.  
The stylized facts from the survey data showed that on average the loan size for 
female recipients of microcredit was significantly lower than their male counterparts and 
that the cost of microfinance is significantly higher, averaging 5 percent per month or 79.6 
annual percentage rate of interest. These facts combined with the results from the 
econometric analysis suggest that efforts aimed at increasing access to credit, especially 










Households w/o MFI 
Credit 
Obs Mean Mean Obs 
                                                           Means are in Ghana Cedis 
Total household physical assets* 93 13290 6332 87 
Per capita income 93 1851 1985 87 
Per capita food expenditures 93 937 1166 87 
Per capita household expenditures 93 1150 1403 87 
Annual non-income support 93 1042 2118 87 
                                                              Means are in Percent (unless otherwise indicated) 
Household head years of schooling 93 8.1 6.3 87 
Dependency ratio**  93 44.9 30.8 87 
Proportion in labor force 93 49.2 59.8 87 
Total microcredit to household income 93 35.8 - 0 
* Does not include Financial Assets. 
**This considers only children dependents.         
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
 
Table 5.2: Characteristics of Married Household Heads  
Variables 
Households with MFI 
Credit 
Households w/o MFI 
Credit 
Obs Mean Mean Obs 
                                                                               In Ghana Cedis 
Total household physical assets* 176 18089 14042 157 
Per capita income 176 2449 2278 157 
Per capita food expenditures 176 835 824 157 
Per capita household expenditures 176 1008 1011 157 
Annual non-income support 176 663 702 157 
                                                                       In Percent (unless otherwise indicated) 
Household head years of schooling 176 11.1 10.8 157 
Dependency ratio**  176 46.7 42.8 157 
Proportion in labor force 176 46.2 51.0 157 
Total microcredit to household income 176 19.8 - 0 
* Does not include Financial Assets. 
**This considers only children 
dependents.         





Table 5.3: Education Expenditures (Primary to Secondary School) 
 Description 







Children Total  
MFI & Female-headed Households 674 684   1,358  50.4 
Non-MFI & Female-headed Households 567 502   1,068  47.0 
MFI & Household Head is married 858 817   1,675  48.8 
Non-MFI & Household Head is married 671 676   1,347  50.2 
Source: Survey data 
Table 5.4: Years of Schooling 
Description 
Mean Value for 
Male child 





MFI & Female-headed Households 6.1 6.0 -0.1 
Non-MFI & Female-headed Households 6.5 5.5 -1.0 
MFI & Household Head is married 5.6 5.3 -0.3 
Non-MFI & Household Head is married 4.2 4.5  0.3 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data  
 Table 5.5: Health Expenditures 
  
Mean Values (GH¢)  Females' Share 
in Total Male Female  Total 
MFI & Female-Headed Households 63 108 171 63.2 
Non-MFI & Female-Headed Households 59 131 189 69.1 
MFI & Household Head is married 82 97 179 54.2 
Non-MFI & Household Head is married 74 98 172 57.2 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
Table 5.6: Characteristics of Female-headed vs. Male-headed Households 
Variable 
Female-headed 
households   
Male-headed 
Households 
Obs. mean p50  Obs. mean p50 
Adult female years of schooling 180 7.67 10  288 9.20 10 
Number of Children 180 1.38 1  315 2.13 2 
Household Size 180 2.93 3  315 4.42 4 
Years of schooling - household 
head 180 7.21 10  315 11.25 10 
Female share in household assets 179 0.95 1  315 0.41 0.44 
Total Annual Income 180 4357.73 3600  315 10073.41 7800 
Assets per person 180 4190.29 976.9  315 4294.28 1778.8 
Annual Essential household 
expenditures 180 4201.43 3305.6  315 6690.89 5642.9 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data  
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Table 5.7: Gender Wealth Gaps after Credit 
 Description Obs Females' share  Modified GWG 
MFI & Household Head is married 177 0.52 -0.004 
Non-MFI & Household Head is married 157 0.48 -0.04 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
Table 5.8: Impact of Access to MFI Credit on Intra-household Gender Inequality 
Variables  
Betafit Zero/One Inflated Beta (ZOIB) FLogit 
(1)             
Betafit 
ZIOB 







Log of total credit to 
household income 
0.172* 0.172** 1.143*** -0.763 0.523*** 
(0.097) (0.050) (0.000) (0.334) (0.000) 
Log of female annual 
income 0.236* 0.236** 0.362 -1.970** 0.413*** 
(0.052) (0.012) (0.239) (0.032) (0.002) 
Gender of loan user  
0.996*** 0.996*** 2.481* -2.125** 1.667*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.030) (0.000) 
Financial literacy dummy  
0.605*** 0.605*** 0.765* -0.234 0.783*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.081) (0.825) (0.000) 
Age of Borrower in the 
household 
-0.007 -0.007 -0.046** 0.037 -0.019* 
(0.481) (0.439) (0.022) (0.539) (0.060) 
Log of the share of 
Education & health 
expenditures in total 
essential household 
expenditures 
-0.075 -0.075 -0.804*** 1.324 -0.461*** 
(0.478) (0.415) (0.000) (0.223) (0.002) 
Constant -2.299** -2.299** -4.062 11.739* -3.282*** 
(0.025) (0.013) (0.135) (0.065) (0.003) 
/ln_phi 0.847*** 0.847*** -   
  (0.000) (0.000)     
phi 2.33 - - 
Log likelihood  21.80 - - 
Log pseudolikelihood - -94.93 -96.47 
Wald chi2(6) 32.42 37.60 - 
Prob > chi2      0.000 0.000 - 
Number of observations 155 227 227 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pvalue in parantheses. The dependent variable is gender 
inequality measured by female’s share in total household durable and business assets (ranges 













Log of total credit to household 
income 
0.042* 0.105*** 0.104*** 
 [-0.008 - 0.091] [0.051 - 0.159] [0.058 - 0.151] 
 









[-0.000 - 0.115] [0.027 - 0.128] [0.031 - 0.134] 
 
Gender of Loan user ("1" if 
Female & "0" if Otherwise) 
(0.243) (0.313) (0.333) 
[0.125 - 0.360] [0.208 - 0.418] [0.215 - 0.451] 
    
 
Financial Literacy Dummy - (“1” 
IF YES & “0” if Otherwise) 
 
 
0.147*** 0.169*** 0.157*** 
[0.059 - 0.236] [0.080 - 0.258] [0.074 - 0.239] 











[-0.007 - 0.003] [-0.009 - 0.000] [-0.008 - 0.000] 
 
Log of the share of education & 
health expenditures in total 









[-0.068 - 0.032] [-0.120 - -
0.013] 





















0.847 0.847  
N 155 227 227 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 and refers to the significance of the estimated marginal 
effects. Confidence intervals are reported below the marginal effects estimates. The 





Table 5.10: Impact of Microfinance on Household Physical Asset, by Gender of Household 
Head, OLS Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 




Female Household Head -0.494***   
 (0.004)   
Microfinance Dummy 0.114 -0.007 0.571*** 
 (0.301) (0.955) (0.005) 
Log of per capita expenditures 0.924*** 1.026*** 0.833*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age of household head 0.103*** 0.104** 0.072 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.335) 
Age of household head Sqd. -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.033) (0.045) (0.873) 
Education of household head 0.076*** 0.054** 0.074*** 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.001) 
Self-employed Dummy 0.351*** 0.281** 0.356 
 (0.004) (0.030) (0.261) 
Marital Status of household head 







 (0.399)  (0.203) 
     Never married 0.219 0.039 0.475 
 (0.354) (0.899) (0.103) 
     Widow / widower -0.077 -1.306* -0.227 
 (0.773) (0.097) (0.485) 
Ethnicity of household head 







 (0.077) (0.005) (0.493) 
     Ewe -0.153 -0.238 0.225 
 (0.317) (0.185) (0.437) 
     Guan -0.805 -0.539 -1.444 
 (0.126) (0.332) (0.271) 
     Gurma 1.051  1.038 
 (0.375)  (0.415) 
     Mole-Dagbani -0.269 0.055 -1.116* 
 (0.523) (0.922) (0.083) 
     Grusi -1.139* -2.372*** 0.392 
 (0.053) (0.003) (0.661) 
     Others -0.189 -0.578* 1.092** 
 (0.507) (0.088) (0.040) 
Constant -2.355** -2.310** -2.426 
 (0.018) (0.041) (0.219) 
Observations 486 309 177 
R-squared 0.443 0.422 0.404 
Notes: pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is total household 
physical assets. Column (1) reports estimation results for all households in the sample. Column (2) reports 















Male-headed households: Mean 
of Log of total physical assets 
8.871***       
  (0.000)       
Female-headed households: 
Mean of Log of total physical 
assets 
7.860***       
  (0.000)       
Mean difference 1.011***       
  (0.000)       
due to endowments 0.859***       
  (0.000)       
due to coefficients 0.560**       
  (0.022)       
due to interaction -0.408       
  (0.184)       
Microfinance dummy   -0.012 -0.310** 0.012 
    (0.667) (0.014) (0.668) 
Log of per capita expenditures   -0.078 0.478 -0.006 
    (0.237) (0.711) (0.723) 
Log of household size   0.362*** -0.120 -0.064 
    (0.002) (0.642) (0.642) 
Age of household head   0.163 2.542 0.198 
    (0.476) (0.435) (0.449) 
Age of household head Squared   0.014 -1.721 -0.277 
    (0.951) (0.263) (0.293) 
Education of household head   0.218** -0.024 -0.013 
    (0.020) (0.913) (0.913) 
Self-employed dummy   0.001 0.252 -0.103 
    (0.993) (0.408) (0.410) 
Ethnicity of household head   0.005 0.031 -0.052 
    (0.895) (0.788) (0.386) 
Marital Status of household head   0.186 -0.340 -0.102 
    (0.268) (0.103) (0.702) 
Constant     -0.227   
      (0.919)   
Number of observations 487 




Table 5.12: Neumark's Decomposition 
 Variables Overall Explained Unexplained 
Male-headed households: Mean of 
Log of total physical assets 
8.871***   
  (0.000)   
Female-headed households: Mean 
of Log of total physical assets 
7.860***   
  (0.000)   
Mean difference 1.011***   
  (0.000)   
Explained 0.812***   
  (0.000)   
Unexplained 0.199**   
  (0.013)   
Microfinance dummy  -0.003 -0.308** 
   (0.684) (0.012) 
Log of per capita expenditures  -0.082 0.477 
   (0.229) (0.702) 
Log of household size  0.368*** -0.190 
   (0.000) (0.605) 
Age of household head  0.317** 2.587 
   (0.028) (0.394) 
Age of household head Squared  -0.209* -1.776 
   (0.066) (0.206) 
Education of household head  0.282*** -0.102 
   (0.000) (0.730) 
Self-employed dummy  -0.073 0.223 
   (0.116) (0.491) 
Ethnicity of household head  -0.021 0.005 
   (0.402) (0.961) 
Marital Status of household head  0.233** -0.489 
   (0.039) (0.133) 
Constant   -0.227 
    (0.915) 
Number of observations 487 






















Microfinance dummy 0.829** 0.028** 0.817** 0.027** 0.696* 0.023* 
  (0.028) (0.035) (0.039) (0.048) (0.071) (0.080) 
Urban Location of 
Household 2.307*** 0.078*** 2.348*** 0.077*** 2.428*** 0.079*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Expenditures per capita 
(GHS) -0.686** -0.023** -0.486 -0.016 -0.760* -0.025 
  (0.028) (0.042) (0.188) (0.210) (0.084) (0.108) 
Post-Primary Education 
- Household Head 1.616*** 0.054*** 1.927*** 0.063*** 1.849*** 0.060*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household Size -2.373*** -0.080*** -1.881*** -0.062*** -2.296*** -0.074*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) 
Human Capital 
Expenditure share in 
total expenditures 0.817*** 0.028*** 0.675** 0.022** 0.623* 0.020* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.021) (0.067) (0.062) 
Age Dependency ratio 
(%) 1.607*** 0.054*** 1.756*** 0.057*** 1.721*** 0.056*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female-Headed 
Household -1.097*** -0.037*** -0.479 -0.016 -0.756* -0.025* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.397) (0.400) (0.062) (0.059) 
Number of rooms in 
household     -0.268* -0.009* -0.316** -0.010** 
      (0.080) (0.072) (0.038) (0.035) 
Male Child     0.537 0.018 0.551 0.018 
      (0.209) (0.233) (0.204) (0.226) 
Female Share in 
household assets     -0.580 -0.019     
      (0.572) (0.569)     
Log of assets per 
person         0.252 0.008 
          (0.118) (0.138) 
Constant 10.798***   8.917***   9.425***   
  (0.000)   (0.002)   (0.001)   
Log pseudolikelihood -95.39 -90.22 -89.52 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.29 0.31 0.32 
Observations 728 719 719 
Notes: Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is children’s 
school enrollment which takes the value “1” if child is enrolled in school and “0” otherwise.  
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Table 5.14: Impact of Access to Microcredit on Children’s School Enrollment - Female-












Microfinance dummy 1.625* 0.080** 0.465 0.011 
  (0.051) (0.044) (0.475) (0.479) 
Urban Location of Household 2.310** 0.114** 1.702* 0.041* 
  (0.039) (0.030) (0.066) (0.081) 
Expenditures per capita (GHS) 0.567 0.028 -0.859* -0.021 
  (0.566) (0.566) (0.091) (0.105) 
Adult female years of 
schooling 0.255*** 0.013*** 0.086 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.304) (0.315) 
Household Size -2.588** -0.127** -2.467* -0.059* 
  (0.018) (0.013) (0.064) (0.081) 
Human Capital Expenditure 
share in total expenditures 0.143 0.007 1.035** 0.025** 
  (0.852) (0.851) (0.012) (0.023) 
Age Dependency ratio (%) 1.895* 0.093* 1.916*** 0.046** 
  (0.086) (0.081) (0.004) (0.011) 
Male Child 0.765 0.038 1.059 0.025 
  (0.305) (0.302) (0.101) (0.116) 
Female Share in household 
assets -4.141 -0.204 -0.318 -0.008 
  (0.366) (0.364) (0.764) (0.765) 
Constant 4.372   13.559***   
  (0.524)   (0.000)   
Log likelihood -32.95 -53.27 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.45 0.17 
Observations 197 521 
Note: pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is children’s 















Figure 5.1: Effects of Loan Repayments on Households 
Source: Survey data 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Composition of Household Wealth (% of total) 
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Figure 5.3: Females' Share in Total Wealth by Asset Type – Full Sample  
Source: Survey data 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Females' Share in Total Wealth by Asset Type – Intra-household 
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Figure 5.5: Share in Females’ Total Wealth by Asset Type   




Figure 5.6: Gender Shares of Total Physical Wealth 





64 62 66 67 64 60
46
19
















Business Agric Land Agric
Equipment
All






















MFI & if HHH is
married









The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the impact of access to 
microfinance on household welfare and gender equity in Ghana. The motivation for the 
dissertation derives from evidence suggesting that access to finance is an important tool 
for fighting poverty and reducing inequality. However, for most developing countries 
access to finance for the poor is mainly through the informal or the semi-formal sector, 
including microfinance institutions (MFIs). Microfinance is taking the center stage in 
most developing countries as a major source of finance for the poor. The question is 
whether there is a risk that the conditions of the poor could be worsened through 
increased debt burden from access to credit from MFIs. This question is legitimate for 
two main reasons. First, the interest rates charged by MFIs on credit tend to be relatively 
higher than those charged by banks. Second, higher interest rates imply higher debt 
obligations for low income households with low returns on investment, which weakens 
their balance sheet. This is a cause of concern, especially given the lack of institutional 
mechanisms for households in developing countries to deal with debt distress. This 
situation may make it harder for households to obtain additional external financing and to 
sustain expenditures, thereby leading to worsening household welfare. 
Following the G8 Summit resolution of 2004 that sanctioned the eleven principles 
of microfinance, the government of Ghana enacted national policies aimed at 
mainstreaming microfinance into poverty reduction strategies to create a conducive 
environment for the development of microfinance services with very little to no direct 
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government intervention in the microfinance market. The lack of direct policy 
intervention in the provision of credit to the poor has led the latter to rely on informal 
financial market sources, leading to the explosive growth of the microfinance market in 
Ghana. The question is, to what extent has this expansion in the microfinance market 
contributed to improving general household welfare? How has access to microfinance 
affected the gender asset gap within and across households?  
This dissertation, therefore, pursued the following research objectives; (1) to 
examine the impact of access to credit from MFIs on poor households’ balance sheet, 
specifically, the effect on household indebtedness; (2) to identify the factors which 
influence households’ financial distress; (3) to understand households’ coping 
mechanisms for dealing with financial distress; (4) to assess the impact of access to 
microcredit on the gender asset gaps within and across households; and (5) to examine 
whether access to microcredit has any impact on children’s school enrollment.  
The dissertation utilized a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods based on an 
extensive field survey undertaken in Ghana in 2013, to address the following research 
questions:  
1. What are the implications of access to credit from MFIs on household welfare? 
2. Does access to microfinance increase financial distress through high debt burden 
on households? 
3. How do households cope with financial distress? This question will be addressed 




4. Does access to microfinance reduce the gender asset gaps within and across 
households? In other words, to what extent does access to microcredit help to 
reduce gender inequalities?  
5. How does access to credit from MFIs affect children’s school enrollment? 
6.1 Key Results 
The chapter on the Implications of Microfinance for Household Indebtedness and 
Welfare (Chapter 4) examined the factors which explain a household’s level of 
indebtedness and the impact of indebtedness on financial distress, being credit-
constrained and households’ consumption expenditures. Specifically, the study applied 
ordinary least squares regression in conjunction with two-stage least squares and 
maximum likelihood estimation methods to test the following hypotheses: (1) 
microfinance market characteristics are important determinants of a household’s debt 
service burden; and (2) high debt burden compromises household welfare.  
All two hypotheses are confirmed and all the results hold even when we control 
for outliers. Five key findings emerge from the empirical analysis;  
1. There is a feminization of debt confirmed by the high debt service burden for 
women relative to men;  
2. External factors (i.e., microfinance market characteristics) working mainly 
through the interest rate, and on a lesser level, through the type of microfinance 
(i.e., formal MFI relative to informal MFI), positively influence household 
indebtedness. Internal factors (i.e., household and borrower-specific 
characteristics) working through the number of loans held by the household 
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negatively influence household indebtedness and financial distress, while the 
application of a greater percentage of the loan to business enterprise (i.e. above 50 
percent) positively influences household indebtedness and financial distress. 
Contrary to expectations, neither the financial literacy offered by MFIs nor the 
household head having post-primary education had any significant effect on 
household indebtedness;  
3. Debt service to income and essential expenditures ratios above 45.6% and 47.1% 
respectively result in a household being more financially distressed and credit-
constrained;  
4. While access to microfinance is generally good for household welfare, debt 
beyond certain thresholds for different groups compromises household welfare. 
This conclusion is established in conjunction with the results from the financial 
distress analysis, which clearly indicate that debt distress is a real problem for 
households. 
5. In the absence of institutional mechanisms for dealing with financial distress, 
households have very limited coping mechanisms in the event that they go 
delinquent on their loans. Except receiving financial assistance from family 
members, they mostly resort to reducing expenditures on basic necessities in order 
to service their loans.  
The chapter on Implications of Microfinance for Gender Inequality in Ghana 
(Chapter 5), examined the impact of access to credit from MFIs on the gender asset gaps 
within and across households as well as on children’s school enrollment in Ghana. The 
chapter pursued two objectives. First, it examined the impact of access to microfinance 
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on women’s ownership of physical assets relative to men within a household and on the 
gender asset gap between male-headed and female-headed households. Second, the paper 
investigated the impact of microcredit on children’s school enrollment. The following 
hypotheses were tested: (1) access to microcredit reduces intra-household inequalities; (2) 
access to microcredit reduces the gender asset gap between male-headed households and 
female-headed households; and (3) access to microcredit improves children’s school 
enrollment, especially for female-headed households.  
In addition to comparative analysis between households with and without 
microfinance, the chapter used the beta distribution to model the impact of access to 
microfinance on intra-household gender inequality. In addition, the chapter used the 
Oaxaca decomposition methods to explore the determinants of gender asset gap between 
male-headed and female-headed households as well as maximum likelihood estimation 
methods to assess the impact of access to microfinance on children’s school enrollment. 
Two main findings emerge from the descriptive analysis: 
1. Female-headed households receiving micro-credit, on average, tend to spend 
equally on male and female children at the primary and secondary school levels 
compared to female-headed households without micro-credit where education 
expenditure at the primary level is skewed in favor of male children relative to 
female children.  
2. For households where there is at least one male and one female, the study finds 
that on average, women in households with access to micro-credit have a higher 
share of household assets at about 52 percent compared with 48 percent for 
women in households without micro-credit.  
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Three findings give credence to the evidence from the descriptive analysis: 
1. The econometric analysis using beta distribution regression estimations shows 
that access to micro-credit contributes positively to increasing females’ share in 
total household durable and business assets. Estimates of the marginal effects 
from the beta distribution estimations show that having microcredit leads to 
between 4 and 10 percentage points higher share of total household physical 
assets for females above the sample average.  
2. Using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method to examine the implications of 
access to microfinance on the gender asset gap between male-headed and female-
headed households, the study finds that access to microfinance significantly 
favors female-headed households relative to male-headed households.  
3. The results from the logistic regression analysis suggests that targeting 
microfinance to financially constrained households, and in particular to women, 
helps to alleviate liquidity constraints that households face and translates into a 
positive impact on children’s education. The impact of access to microcredit on 
school enrollment is stronger for female-headed households who have 
significantly lower levels of wealth compared to their male counterparts.   
6.2 Policy Implications 
The following are some of the policy implications from the research study.  
First, the evidence from this study suggests that financial inclusion is very 
important for any poverty reduction strategy, and that targeting credit to women who are 
mostly excluded from the formal financial institutions is important for reducing gender 
 
198 
gaps in wealth and education. However, the cost of credit from microfinance institutions 
is too high and more often the poor are subject to significant exploitation by for-profit 
MFIs. This suggests that greater efforts at the national level through targeted policies to 
foster a reduction in the cost of borrowing are warranted. These policies include direct 
intervention in the microfinance market through the provision of subsidized credit and the 
promotion of the microfinance lending model with the mission to improve the lives of the 
marginalized in societies, such as Hopeline Microfinance.  Though some of these policies 
may sound radical in nature, they are necessary to stimulate rapid development and the 
reduction in poverty and gender inequality at all levels.   
Second, the findings from the study also suggest that financial literacy programs 
by MFIs and the level of education of the household head have limited impact on 
households’ indebtedness. This implies that there is a need to introduce financial 
education in the general educational curriculum of their countries. This will enhance the 
greater positive impact in any poverty reduction framework employing credit as a tool. 
As Jonhson (2014) pointed out, debt relations involve complex interconnections of the 
material, social, and cultural, which implies that any poverty reduction framework 
employing debt as a tool must adopt strategies that effectively integrate these 
complexities into the repayment mechanisms which is only possible with a well-educated 
population. That way, the maximum impact of access to credit will be achieved. 
Third, there is a greater need to maintain regular statistics on households’ balance 
sheets, as such data are important for monitoring the effects of macroeconomic 
developments on household welfare. Indeed, general macroeconomic instability has 
important effects on household welfare.  
 
199 
Finally, it is important to establish institutional mechanisms for dealing with debt 
distress. These include, but are not limited to, the implementation of welfare programs 
which cater to basic needs in the event that households go delinquent on their loan. This 
should serve as a temporary cushion to alleviate severe adverse effects on the welfare of 
the family during periods of debt distress.  
6.3 Directions for Future Research  
Further research is needed to understand the effects of the composition of a 
household and the occupational status of adult members of a household on both access to 
credit and the risk of financial distress from debt, which will be possible only with a large 
household sample. In addition, more research is needed to examine the specific ways 
through which the different microfinance lending models affect borrowers. Future 
research should also examine the extent to which social cohesion, in particular, family 
ties, interact with the financial distress experienced by borrowers who are over-indebted 
from access to credit from MFIs. Aside from credit, MFIs also provide financial services 
which include savings and other insurance products. Future research is therefore needed 
to examine the welfare implications of access to these different types of products offered 











SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
Household Survey-2013 
 
Title – Microfinance, Household Indebtedness and Gender Inequality 
 
Investigator: Theresa Mannah-Blankson, Bank of Ghana, Financial Stability Department, CEDI House, P. O. Box GP 2674, Accra.  Telephone: 
0244522356 
What is this research about? The purpose of the study is to collect and analyze data on households with and without access to credit from 
microfinance institutions. This is to enable Theresa complete a dissertation on the “Microfinance, Household Indebtedness and Gender 
Inequality.” The survey will ask detailed questions about who lives in your household, your education, income, expenditures, healthcare cost and 
livelihood activities. We shall also ask detailed questions about the assets that you own. The interview is expected to take about 1 hour. It may be 
necessary to return if we are unable to complete the interview in one sitting.  
Your participation in this study will not affect you in any negative way because it is solely for research purposes.  
There is a small token to be given to you for the time that you spend participating in this interview. Most importantly policymakers, researchers 
and the general public will learn from the knowledge gained in this study. 
We will protect information about you and your taking part in this research to the best of our ability. You will not be named in any reports. The 










Metadata (Complete this Section before the Interview) 
Date of Interview  (DD/MM/YY) |__|__|/|__|__|/|__|__|   Time start interview (24 hr clock)  |__|__| : |__|__| 
Interviewer Name     __________________________________ 
Community Details: 
Name of Region: _________________________________ Zone (Coastal=1; Forest=2; Savannah=3)    |__| 
Community/Village Name_________________________________   Urban/Rural (Urban=1 and Rural=2):  |__|__| 
Compound Details: 
Compound Name__________________________________  Number of Separate Households within Compound |__|__| 
Household Name: 
Household Name __________________________________ Household ID Number     |__|__|__| 
Dominant Ethnicity of Household __________________________________    Ethnicity Code  |__| 
Head of Household Name__________________________________ Gender of Head of Household (Male = 1; Female = 2)  |__| 
Dominant religion of this Household:     |__| (Christianity=1; Islam=2 Other=3 (specify: …………)     
Ethnicity Codes   Zones 
Akan  1  Coastal = Greater Accra Region; Central Region; Western Region  
Ga  2  Forest = Brong Ahafo Region; Ashanti Region; Eastern Region; Volta Region 
Ewe  3  Savannah= Northern Region; Upper East Region; Upper West Region 
Guan  4 
Gurma  5 
Mole-Dagbani 6 
Grusi  7 
Mande  8 








Module 1: List of Household Members  Household ID:  |__|__|__| 
















NAME (First names only) 
Make a complete list of everyone, 
present or absent, in this 
household before going to Q4 
 
Household head 
1st wife and all children 
2nd wife and all children etc 
Other relatives of household 
head/wife 
Their spouses and children 
Unrelated persons who live and eat 
with head 
People not present who normally 




























What is his/her 
relationship to 















































M = 1 







Yes = 1  




Yes = 1 




01            
02            
03            
04            
05            
06            
Relationship Codes (Q4)         Marital Status Codes (Q6)     Education Codes (Q8 and Q10) 
Head            1   Sister/Brother                   7  Brother-in-law/Sister-in-law  13 Married    1     None 1     A-Level            7 
Husband/wife   2   Father/Mother                   8  Mother-in-law/Father-in-law 14 Divorced/Separated 2     Primary 2     Training College     8  
Co-wife            3   Stepmother/Stepfather         9  Son-in-law/Daughter-in-law  15 Widow/Widower  3     Middle/JSS   3     Technical College   9 
Child            4   Grandfather/Grandmother 10  Other (describe)   Never married  4     Vocational  4     Polytechnic            10 
Grandchild       5   Aunt/Uncle    11               O’Level 5     University          11 










Module 2: Information About Household Members (contd): Education and Health Expenses  










Ask Q11 – Q15 only for 
household members who 
are currently enrolled in 
school OR who were 
enrolled in school at 




I want to ask you about educational expenses for [name] 
during the past school year (ie. Sep 2011 to July 2012).  How 
much did you spend on: 
Health expenses for each 
household member over the 
past 12 months. How much 
did you spend on: 
Use this space for 
calculations 
Enter the total 
amount spent in 
the past 12 
months for each 
category in the 

























































       
 
GHS 
01          
02          
03          
04          
05          
06          
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Module 3 & 4: Information About Household Members (contd): 
Household ID:  |__|__|__| 











Instruction: If the 
occupation code for 
any member of the 
household is 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 then also 
respond to Module 
B. 
 
(Ask these questions 
to household 
members who are 
15+ years). 
18.  
What livelihood activities does he/she do in 
order to earn food and income? 
Enter livelihood activity codes from below, 
with descriptions where necessary.   
19. 
Approximate













































What is the 























































code is 3, 
4, 5, 6, 11) 
1            
2            
3            
4            
5            
6            
7            
8            
Occupation Codes (Q18)     
Farming   1    Housework/child care 7   
Livestock rearing  2    Student   8 
Agro-processing   3 (Describe)   Apprentice  9  
Self-employed    4 (Describe)   Unemployed  10   
Government   5 (Describe)   Other (specify)  11 









C1: Information about Household Members with Credit  
















questions in this 
section to all adult 
members (18+ 






























If Not, why? 
1= Does not need 
credit   
2= Did not believe 
it would be 
approved 
3= procedure too 
cumbersome 
4. Applied and 
was rejected 
(>>Q4-5 then 
skip to Module D 
Welfare 
questions then 
move to Mod A) 






in the last 




























What is the 
maximum 
amount you 
think you can 
be allowed to 
borrow from 



























answer only 2-8 
move to Q4-5 and 
move to Module D 
Welfare Questions 







    
01          
02          
03          
04          
05          


























































































































































































































      Yes=1 
No=2 
      
1   Loan 1            
   Loan 2            
   Loan 3            
2   Loan 1            
   Loan 2            
   Loan 3            
3   Loan 1            








Module 6  






















with or without 
MFI loans) 


















(Fill with Q.2 
codes below) 
3. 
What are some of 
the events that make 
it difficult for you 
to service your 
loans each month? 
 
1=health issues 
2=cost of education, 
3=agricultural 
shocks,  




number of children 















































































On a scale 
of 1-10, 
where scale 
1 refers to 
“poorest” 










1           
           
           
2           
           
           
Q.2 Codes   Q.5 Codes     Q.6-8 Codes    Q.9 Codes 
1= Never  1= Take Children Out of school  1= Fully Satisfied   1(poorest) 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10(richest) 
2= Not frequently 2= Reduce meals    2= Somewhat Satisfied 
3= Often  3= Close down home enterprise  3= Neutral 





















(Insert names from 
household roster below; 
ask the questions in this 
section only from 
household members 
with MFI loans as in 
C1) 
Please let the 
respondents know that 
this is strictly 
confidential and will 





Activities to which Microfinance Credit is applied (Fill in amount in Ghana Cedis) 
 
1.  
To which activities are the loans 
applied?  (MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS ALLOWED) 
 
1= Home enterprise >> Q2 
2= Consumption Expenditures  
>> Q3 
3= Health expenditures >> Q4 





6= Other Household 
Expenditures>> Q7  










































































1          
          
          
2          
          
          
3          
          
















(Insert names from 
household roster 
below; ask the 
questions in this 
section only from 
household members 





What is the name of 
MFI from which 











What types of 
Services did 






























































Was your loan 
granted under 
on an individual 


















01  1.       
  2.       
  3.       
02  1.       
  2.       
  3.       
03  1.       
  2.       








Module 7: A. Assets – Dwelling. NB: Household Assets (Obtain this information from the household head or whoever is most knowledgeable about 
household assets) Household ID:|__|__|__| 
1. What type of dwelling does this household currently occupy? 
Several huts/buildings (same compound)……………1 
Several huts/buildings (different compounds)……….2 
Room(s) [Compound House]………...........................3 
Room(s) [Other Type]………………………………. 4 
Single Family House…………………………………5 
Apartment/Flat……….................................................6 
Other (specify ________________________)………7 
 
2. How many sleeping rooms does this household occupy?  |__|__| 
3. What is the occupancy status of the property? 
1=Owned    
2=Rented    
3=Family house   
4= Rent-free  
 
4. What is the source of drinking water for your household?  
Indoor plumbing………………1   Well…………..…………….    8 
Standpipe in compound ………2   Pond/dugout/dam…………..    9 
Public standpipe ………………3      River, lake, spring……..…   10 
Water tanker/vendor …….. …..4   Rainwater………………...   11 
Neighboring household………..5   Sachet Water………………..12 
Private outside standpipe/tap….6   Bottled water……………….13 
Borehole   ………………         7        Other (specify_________)  14 
 
5. What is the main source of lighting for your dwelling? 
   
Candle ……………..1             Electricity (mains)………………5 
Lantern …………….2             Generator………………………..6  
Bobo ……………….3             Other (specify ______________) 7  
Torches (flashlights)……….4  
 
6. What is the main source of cooking fuel for your household? 
Firewood ………………… 1             Cow dung ………………………   5 
Charcoal………………….  2             Gas/Electricity ………………….   6 
Kerosene ………………… 3             Other (specify _______________ ) 7 
Stalks/Crop Residue …….. 4 
 
7. What type of toilet is used by your household? 
Flush toilet………………. 1          Household KVIP …………………. 5 
Pit latrine………………... 2          No toilet ……………………………6 
Pan/bucket………………. 3          Other (specify ________________ ) 7 
Public KVIP…………….. 4 
 









10. I How much could a dwelling like this in this neighborhood be rented per 
month? 
 
Amount: ...................................................................................... .......... 
 
11. Who owns this dwelling or pays for the rent? (If non-household member use 
code 98 and indicate sex). 
 









































How long ago was 
[ITEM] acquired? 
Allow for 3 of each 
item.  Enter number 
of years since the item 
was acquired.  If less 
than a year, enter 90. 
5.  
What was the purchase 
price when it was 
acquired? 




6.   
For how much could you 
sell the item now? 
 
Probe: How much would 
you pay for a used item 
similar to yours? 
GHS 
ID Code Sex 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Clock/Watch 201              
Sewing machine 202              
Kerosene stove 203              
Gas/Electric Stove 204              
Kerosene Lantern 205              
Radio /Cassette Player 206              
TV 207              
Bicycle 208              
Motor cycle/scooter 209              
Furniture (Bed, Living 
room set etc) 210              
Electric Fan  211              
Electric Iron  212              
Fridge/Freezer  213              
Car/Truck  214              
Mobile Phone 215              

























(>> If “No” 
















How long ago was [item] 
acquired? 
 
Allow for 3 of each item.  
Enter number of years since 
item was acquired. If less 
than a year, enter 90. 
4.  
What was the purchase 
price when it was 
acquired? 




5.   
For how much could you sell 
the item now? 
 
Probe: How much would you 




Sex 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Plough 301              
Hand Cart or 
Trailer 
302              
Axe 303              
Wheelbarrow 304              
Hoe 305              
Machete/Cutlass 306              
Tractor 307              
Mechanical 
Plough 
308              
Fishing net 309              
Canoe 310              
Fishing boat 311              
Water tank 312              
Water pump 313              
Irrigation pipe 314              










































































During the past 12 
months, have any 



















Draught animals eg. 
bullock/oxen 
401          
Donkeys 402          
Cattle  403          
Sheep 404          
Goats 405          
Pigs 406          
Chickens 407          
Guinea fowl 408          
Ducks 409          














 Module 7: Household Assets (contd) Household ID: |__|__|__| E. Assets – Agricultural Land and Other Real Estate 
A. AGRICULTURAL LAND B. OTHER REAL ESTATE 
1. Does your household 
have agricultural land? 
 
Yes = 1  
No = 2(>> go to section 
B) 
Don’t know=99 (>> go to 
section B) 
2. In what year was the 
plot acquired? 
 
PLOT 1   ……….. 
PLOT 2   ……….. 
PLOT 3   ……….. 
PLOT 4   ……….. 
 
3. Is there an outstanding 
financial obligation on this 
land? 
 





1. Does any member of the 
household own any other 
building, dwelling, or plot 
of non-agricultural land? 
    
    Yes = 1      
    No = 2   
    Don’t know=99 
2. Which of the following 
does your household 
own? 
 
1= Residential building 
2=Commercial building 
3=Plot of land 
4=Other (specify) 




OR 01 ……….. 
OR 02 ……….. 
OR 03 ……….. 




ot      
N
o. 







How was this 
plot acquired? 
8. 






















5. Who owns this 
real estate? 
6.  








































   Inherited    = 1 
Borrowed  = 2 
Rented       = 3 
From chief = 4 

















  Inherited    = 1 















    






   Inherited    = 1 
Borrowed  = 2 
Rented       = 3 
From chief = 4  

















  Inherited    = 1 















    
    



















individually to all 





Please use roster 
to fill in names 
here and also Use 

































Whose names are on the 
account? (Just indicate ID 























How was the 
money in the 
account 
acquired? List 














































expect to be 















1            
2            
3            
4            
5            
6            
7            
8            
9            
Financial Asset Code 
F1=Bank Account    F6= Deposit with another individual   F11= Treasury Bills  
F2=Cooperative or NGO Saving Institution F7= Cash Savings     F12= Bonds  
F3=Microfinance Institution   F8= Other Savings Program    F13= Life Insurance  
F4=Susu     F9= Provident Funds/Pensions e.g. SSNIT   F14= Other Financial Assets  










Module 7: Household Assets (contd)  Business Enterprise    Household ID:  |__|__|__| 
1.  
Does anyone in 
this house 















Instructions: If no 
one in the 
household owns 
or operates a 
business, skip to 
















Please list each 
type of business 
that someone 







Who owns this business?  
 
Use Member ID CODE 
from Module H and 





























What is the 
total value 
of the assets 
owned by 
the business 




































































Asset Ownership Codes 
1=Land    4=Machinery     7=Equipment     10=Container 
2=Building   5=Furniture     8=Inventory of the final good  








Module 8: Household Expenditure.  Household ID: |__|__|__| Food Consumption Expenditures: In the following questions I want to ask about 
all food purchased by your household, regardless of who purchased them.  Please exclude from your answer any food purchased for processing or 
resale in a household enterprise.   
UNIT CODES 
Pounds             = 1 
Kilogram         = 2 
Minibag           = 3 
Maxibag          = 4 
Fertilizer bag   = 5 
25 kg bag         = 6 
Basket (small) = 7, Basket (med)   = 
8, Basket (large)  = 9, Basin (small)   
= 10, Basin (med)    = 11, Basin 
(large)   = 12, Bowl                = 13 
American tin    =14          
Margarine tin   = 15           
Milk Tin           = 16 
Bunch               = 17 
Number            = 18 
ML                   = 19 


















did you pay 
in total for 
[ITEM] in 
the last 2 
weeks? 
2.  












1 Millet/Sorghum    16 Guinea fowl & poultry     
2 Maize    17 Eggs (guinea fowl / hen)    
3 Rice    18 Fish (dried or fresh)    
4 Yam    19 Pepper    
5 Cassava    20 Salt    
6 Beans    21 Seasoning eg. Maggi, Royco    
7 Soybeans    22 Milk, cheese    
8 Groundnuts    23 Sugar    
9 Greens    24 Bread    
10 Okro    25 Orange    
11 Onions    26 Banana     
12 Tomatoes    27 Watermelon    
13 Oil and Shea butter    28 Mango    
14 Beef    29 Cigarettes or Tobacco    




































is the general 
economic 
conditions in 




















What do you 




Ghana in the 













































do you think 
now is the right 








machine  etc? 
 
 
1=It is the Right 
Time now 





How do you 
expect the 
financial 
position of your 
household to 
change over the 
next 12 months?   
 
 




















s in the next 





































What is your 
expectation on 
developments in 
prices of goods 
and services in the 






2=Increase at the 
Same Rate 





1          
2          
3          
4          
5          
6          






Table A4.1: MFI targeting using poverty lines  
 MFI Households   Non-MFI Households 
 Sample below 4 Poverty lines 
Mean 
(US $) Obs. 
% of 





Absolute Poverty $1 perday 0.69 33 13.1%   0.58 37 15.1% 
$1.25 Per Day 0.83 48 19.0%   0.79 60 24.5% 
$2 Per Day 1.27 106 42.1%   1.15 109 44.5% 
$2.5 Per Day 1.48 134 53.2%   1.40 138 56.3% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data  
 
Table A4.2: MFI targeting using ownership of assets 
Type of Assets MFI Households Non-MFI Households 
1. Agricultural Land  17 19 
2. Livestock 52 39 
3. Business Enterprise* 230 207 
* Ownership of Business Enterprise is a determining factor in accessing 
MFI Loans/ 







Table A4.3: Characteristics of Microfinance Institutions - Survey Results
 
 






Group Lending Services offered
Loan Repayment 
Structure Collateral? Collateral if "YES"
Adehyeman 6 2.21 Dome Individual Training and Advisory Services Weekly and Monthly Yes Guarantor or 6mths Savings
Beige Capital 3 1.11 Madina Individual Training Biweekly and Monthly Yes Guarantor
Express Savings & Loan 2 0.74 Kasoa Individual Training Monthly Yes Between 1-6mths savings 
First National Savings & Loans 2 0.74 Kasoa/Madina Individual Training Monthly Yes Between 1-3mths savings 
Opportunity Int. 22 8.12 Kasoa/Madina Both Training and Workshops/Seminars
Daily, Weekly, 
Biweekly and Monthly Yes
Guarantor, and/or 1-6mths 
savings
Procredit 3 1.11 Kokomlemle Individual No services Weekly and Monthly Yes and No 2mths Savings
Shai Rural Bank Microfinance 10 3.69 Dodowa Both
Training, Book-keeping, 
Workshops/Seminars 
Weekly, Biweekly and 
Monthly Yes and No Between 1-3mths savings 
Advance Ghana Microfinance 8 2.95 Madina Both Training and Book-keeping 
Daily, Weekly, 
Biweekly and Monthly Yes Between 3-6mths savings 
Adwadifoo Adanfo 3 1.11 Madina Both Training Daily and Monthly Yes Between 1-3mths savings 
Catamount Microfinance 14 5.17 Dome/Madina Individual Training and Workshops/Seminars
Daily, Weekly, 
Biweekly and Monthly Yes
Guarantor, Business and/or 1-
6mths Savings
Dream Finance Ltd 2 0.74 Madina Individual Training and Workshops/Seminars Daily
Duapa Trust Microfinance 65 23.99 Kasoa Both
Training, Book-keeping, 
Workshops/Seminars 
Daily, Weekly and 
Monthly Yes Between 1-6mths savings 
E-Top Microfinance 2 0.74 Nungua Group Training and Book-keeping Weekly and Monthly Yes 3mths savings
G-Life 2 0.74 Bawjiase/Madina Individual Book-keeping Daily Yes Between 2-6mths savings
Hopeline Microfinance 23 8.49 Madina Both
Training, Book-keeping, 
Workshops/              Seminars and 
Advisory services
Weekly, Monthly and 
One-off payment Yes
Guarantor, and/or 1-6mths 
savings
J.H Financial Services 5 1.85 Kasoa Both Training
Daily, Weekly and 
Monthly Yes and No 3mths savings
Legacy Capital Microfinance 17 6.27 Osu Individual No services
Daily, Weekly and 
Monthly Yes and No Between 1-6mths savings 
Liberty Microfinance 7 2.58 Kasoa Individual Training
Daily, Weekly and 
Monthly Yes
Guarantor, and/or 1-6mths 
savings
Medic Microfinance 5 1.85 Haatso Both Training and Workshops/Seminars Monthly Yes and No Guarantor
Multi Credit Microfinance 2 0.74 Cantoment/Kasoa Individual Training and Workshops/Seminars Daily Yes Between 2-6mths savings
Olive Branch Microfinance 5 1.85 Madina Both Training Weekly and Monthly Yes and No
Guarantor, Business and/or 
1mth Savings
Women's World Banking 3 1.11 Madina Individual Training Biweekly and Monthly Yes Between 1-6mths savings 
Tier 2 - 4
Others* 20 7.38 See note* below Both
Training, Workshops and Book-
keeping
Daily, Weekly, 
Biweekly and Monthly Yes and No
Guarantor, Insurance and/or 1-
6mths savings
Tier 3
Asa Gh Ltd 26 9.59 Madina Both Training and Book-keeping 
Daily, Weekly and 
Monthly Yes
Guarantor and/or 1-6mths 
Savings
Agt 2 0.74 Nungua Both Training and Book-keeping Weekly and Monthly Yes Between 3-6mths savings 
Don't Know** 12 4.43 See note** below Both No services
Daily, Weekly, 
Biweekly and Monthly Yes and No
Guarantor and/or Between 1-
6mths savings 
Total 271 100
*These are scattered across Achimota, Dome, Kasoa, Kokomlemle, Madina, Nungua, Odumasi, Osu, Spintex and Takoradi and are MFIs categorized under Tier 2-4







Table A4.4: Descriptive Statistics - Determinants of Debt Service Burden: Pooled 
Regression 
Variable Name Variable Definition Obs. Mean Med.  
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Debt service ratio1 
Monthly debt service to 
income ratio (%) 248 64.6 40.0 99.7 1.5 866.7 
Log Debt service ratio 1 
Log Monthly debt service 
to income ratio 248 -0.94 -0.92 0.95 -4.2 2.2 
Debt service ratio2 
Monthly debt service to 
total essential household 
expenditures (%) 248 50.9 49.1 26.8 3.9 233.2 
Log Debt service ratio 2 
Log Monthly debt service 
to total essential household 
expenditures 248 -0.80 -0.71 0.52 -3.2 0.8 
Individual Loan 
"1" if it is an individual 
loan and "0" if otherwise 248 0.63 1 0.48 0 1 
Number of loans  
Number of loans held in 
household  248 1.08 1 0.29 1 3 
Share of Investment 
Credit in Total MFI 
Credit 
Share of Investment Credit 
in Total MFI Credit 248 87.2 100.0 22.9 9.1 100.0 
Log of Share of 
Investment Credit in 
Total MFI Credit (%) 
Log of Share of Investment 
Credit in Total MFI Credit 248 -0.20 0 0.41 
-
2.39 0 
Age of household head Age of household head 248 42.10 42 9.87 22 83 
Household Size Total Household Size Total 248 4.20 4 1.90 1 11 
Log Household Size 
Total Log Household Size Total 248 1.31 1.39 0.54 0 2.4 
Self Employed 
Household Head 
Self Employed Household 
Head 248 0.68 1 0.47 0 1 
Above the upper poverty 
line 
"1" if household is above 
the upper poverty line and 
0 otherwise 248 0.25 0 0.44 0 1 
Formal MFI 
"1" IF it is MFI is a formal 
institution and "0" if 
otherwise 248 0.19 0 0.40 0 1 
Financial Literacy 
"1" if borrower received 
financial literacy and 0 
otherwise 248 0.70 1 0.46 0 1 
Monthly Interest rate (%) 
Monthly interest rate 
charged 248 4.9 5.0 2.1 0.5 19.3 
Log of Monthly Interest 
rate 
Log of Monthly Interest 
rate 248 -3.09 -3.0 0.4 -5.3 -1.64 
Length of Repayment 
"1" if repayment is above 6 
months and 0 if less than 6 
months 248 0.12 1 0.32 0 1 
Years of Schooling 
Household Head 
Years of Schooling 
Household Head 248 10.17 10 3.80 0 16 







Table A4.5: Descriptive Statistics: Debt Service Burden Thresholds – Expenditure measure 








burden Obs.  
= 88 
Mean Mean Mean 
Debt service ratio 
Monthly debt service to total essential household expenditures 
(%) 16.71 32.56 55.30 
Number of loans greater than 1  
"1" if number of loans held in household is greater than 1, "0" 
otherwise 0.05 0.05 0.15 
Share of Investment Credit in Total 
MFI Credit (%) Share of Investment Credit in Total MFI Credit 91.2 90.2 80.9 
Monthly Interest rate (%) Monthly Interest Rate (%) 4.6 5.1 5.0 
Log of monthly interest rate  Log of monthly interest rate  -3.18 -3.05 -3.05 
Loan user is female "1" if loan user is female and "0" otherwise 0.86 0.92 0.73 
Financial literacy received 
"1" if household received financial literacy from MFI and "0" 
otherwise 0.69 0.69 0.72 
Formal MFI "1" if formal MFI institution and "0" informal 0.20 0.15 0.16 
Loan maturity >=6 months "1" if repayment is >= 6 months and 0 otherwise 0.74 0.53 0.48 
Individual loan "1" if it is an individual loan and "0" if group loan 0.57 0.58 0.74 
Urban "1" if household is located in urban area and "0" otherwise 0.94 0.90 0.74 
Below Upper Poverty Line "1" if below upper poverty line  and "0" otherwise 0.06 0.23 0.48 
Owner occupied house "1" if household owns dwelling and "0" otherwise 0.31 0.40 0.41 
Household size>4 "1" if household size is greater than 4 and "0" otherwise 0.42 0.26 0.08 
Number of rooms=>household size 
"1" if number of rooms is equivalent or greater than household 
size and "0" otherwise 0.06 0.12 0.23 
Age of household head Age of household head 43.08 42.31 40.70 
Household head has Post Primary 
Education  
"1" if Household head has Post Primary Education and "0" 
otherwise 0.85 0.81 0.78 
Self-Employed Household Head 
"1" if Household head is self-employed and "0" if salaried 
worker 0.64 0.64 0.75 








Table A4.6: Descriptive Statistics: Debt Service Burden Thresholds – Income measure 










Mean Mean Mean 
Debt service ratio1 Monthly debt service to total income (%) 15.1 30.7 106.1 
Number of loans greater than 1  
"1" if number of loans held in household is greater than 1, 
"0" otherwise 0.04 0.04 0.12 
Share of Investment Credit in Total 
MFI Credit (%) Share of Investment Credit in Total MFI Credit 91.9 91.7 82.8 
Monthly Interest rate (%) Monthly Interest Rate (%) 4.7 5.0 4.9 
Log of monthly interest rate  Log of monthly interest rate  -3.13 -3.08 -3.08 
Loan user is female "1" if loan user is female and "0" otherwise 0.85 0.79 0.84 
Financial literacy received 
"1" if household received financial literacy from MFI and 
"0" otherwise 0.74 0.69 0.68 
Formal MFI "1" if formal MFI institution and "0" informal 0.16 0.13 0.19 
Loan maturity >=6 months "1" if repayment is >= 6 months and 0 otherwise 0.61 0.54 0.58 
Individual loan "1" if it is an individual loan and "0" if group loan 0.50 0.65 0.70 
Urban 
"1" if household is located in urban area and "0" 
otherwise 0.93 0.81 0.83 
Below Upper Poverty Line "1" if Below upper poverty line  and "0" otherwise 0.13 0.25 0.34 
Owner occupied house "1" if household owns dwelling and "0" otherwise 0.43 0.37 0.34 
Household size>4 "1" if household size is greater than 4 and "0" otherwise 0.41 0.29 0.14 
Number of rooms=>household size 
"1" if number of rooms is equivalent or greater than 
household size and "0" otherwise 0.08 0.08 0.19 
Age of household head Age of household head 44.68 43.94 39.67 
Household head has Post Primary 
Education  
"1" if Household head has Post Primary Education and 
"0" otherwise 0.88 0.85 0.76 
Self-Employed Household Head 
"1" if Household head is self-employed and "0" if salaried 
worker 0.56 0.62 0.78 
Source: Author’s calculation based on survey data 
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- Overall Model 
Marginal 
Effect - Low  
Marginal 
Effect - High 
Number of loans  1.106* 3.021* -0.179* -0.193* 0.276* 
  (0.070) (0.070) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) 
Share of Investment Credit 
in Total MFI Credit (%) -1.777** 0.169** 0.287** 0.311** -0.444** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
Log of monthly interest rate  0.366 1.442 -0.059 -0.064 0.091 
  (0.342) (0.342) (0.340) (0.342) (0.342) 
Loan user is female 0.270 1.310 -0.044 -0.047 0.067 
  (0.454) (0.454) (0.452) (0.454) (0.454) 
Financial literacy received -0.191 0.826 0.031 0.033 -0.048 
  (0.539) (0.539) (0.539) (0.539) (0.539) 
Formal MFI 0.660* 1.934* -0.107* -0.115* 0.165* 
  (0.098) (0.098) (0.095) (0.099) (0.098) 
Loan maturity >=6 months 0.182 1.200 -0.029 -0.032 0.045 
  (0.610) (0.610) (0.610) (0.610) (0.610) 
Individual loan 0.747** 2.110** -0.121** -0.131** 0.186** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) 
Urban 0.333 1.395 -0.054 -0.058 0.083 
  (0.523) (0.523) (0.522) (0.522) (0.523) 
Below Upper Poverty Line 0.890* 2.436* -0.144* -0.156* 0.222* 
  (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 
Owner occupied house -0.066 0.936 0.011 0.012 -0.016 
  (0.820) (0.820) (0.820) (0.820) (0.820) 
Household size>4 -0.799** 0.450** 0.129** 0.140** -0.199** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) 
Number of 
rooms=>household size 1.133** 3.105** -0.183** -0.198** 0.283** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Age of household head -0.054*** 0.947*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.014*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household head has Post 
Primary Education  -0.287 0.750 0.046 0.050 -0.072 
  (0.437) (0.437) (0.436) (0.436) (0.437) 
Self-Employed Household 
Head 0.510* 1.665* -0.082* -0.089* 0.127* 
  (0.089) (0.089) (0.084) (0.090) (0.089) 
cut1 -4.763*** 0.009***      
  (0.009) (0.009)      
cut2 -3.614** 0.027**      
  (0.047) (0.047)      
Log likelihood -218.24       
Prob > chi2 0.000     
LR chi2(16) 73.73 Observation: 248    
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.145     
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pval in parentheses. Dependent variable is defined at 3 levels; 
Low burden = "1" if debt service to income ratio<25%; Moderate burden ="2" if 25% >=debt service 







Table A4.8: Descriptive Statistics: Welfare implications of Access to Microfinance 
Variables Variable Definition Obs. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev Min Max 
Food Expenditure per capita - Adults 
(GH¢) Log of Annual Food Expenditure per adult 493 7.143 7.174 0.760 3.766 9.537 
Household Perceived Welfare 
"1" if HH welfare>=average and "0" if below 
average. 495 0.558 1 0.497 0 1 
Microfinance Dummy 
"1" if Household has access to microfinance 
and "0" if otherwise 495 0.505 1 0.500 0 1 
Number of rooms in household Number of rooms in household 493 1.550 1 1.071 1 10 
Income per capita (GH¢) Log of Annual Household Income per person 495 7.423 7.438 0.841 4.787 9.674 
Age dependency ratio (In percent) Dependency ratio 495 0.406 0.500 0.257 0 0.857 
Assets per person (GH¢) Log of Total Assets per person 494 7.284 7.198 1.476 2.730 11.95 
Share of human capital expenditures in 
total household expenditures (In percent) 
Share of human capital expenditures in total 
household expenditures (In percent) 488 
-





Household size Log of number of household members 495 1.218 1.386 0.567 0 2.398 
Household head Years of Schooling Log of years of schooling for household head 433 2.390 2.303 0.220 1.946 2.773 
Self-employed 
"1" if Household head is Self-employed and 
"0" if otherwise 495 0.651 1 0.477 0 1 
Household Head is Married 
"1" if household head is married and "0" if 
single 495 0.673 1 0.470 0 1 
Female 
"1" if is household head is female and "0" if 
otherwise 495 0.364 0 0.482 0 1 
Household Owns Land 
"1" if Household own land and "0" if 
otherwise 497 0.274 0 0.446 0 1 
Owner Occupier Accommodation "1" if dwelling is owned and "0" if otherwise 497 0.326 0 0.469 0 1 
Household has access to Tap Water 
"1" if household has access to clean water 
and "0" if otherwise  497 0.626 1 0.484 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
 
227 
Table A4.9: Welfare Implication of Access to Credit – All Sampled Households  
VARIABLES 













Microfinance Dummy 0.565*** 1.759*** 0.551** 1.735** 0.572*** 1.772*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
Household head Years of 
Schooling 1.716*** 5.561*** 1.433*** 4.191*** 1.494*** 4.455*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Number of rooms in 
household 0.179* 1.196* 0.133 1.143 0.106 1.112 
  (0.086) (0.086) (0.251) (0.251) (0.355) (0.355) 
Self-employed Household 
Head -0.380* 0.684* -0.356 0.700 -0.469* 0.626* 
  (0.087) (0.087) (0.132) (0.132) (0.050) (0.050) 
Income per person 0.438*** 1.550*** 0.466*** 1.594***     
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)     
Household Size     -0.324 0.723 -0.342 0.710 
      (0.380) (0.380) (0.349) (0.349) 
Dwelling is owned     0.273 1.315 0.280 1.323 
      (0.278) (0.278) (0.265) (0.265) 
Log of share of health and 
education expenditures in 
total household 
expenditures     0.401*** 1.493*** 0.361** 1.435** 
      (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
Access to water     0.232 1.262 0.175 1.191 
      (0.314) (0.314) (0.458) (0.458) 
Age Dependency ratio     -0.446 0.640 -0.587 0.556 
      (0.490) (0.490) (0.357) (0.357) 
Household Head is 
Married     0.084 1.088 0.115 1.122 
      (0.786) (0.786) (0.709) (0.709) 
Household owns land     0.193 1.212     
      (0.443) (0.443)     
Assets per person         0.219** 1.245** 








  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) 
Log Likelihood -268.6 -259.5 -261.6 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.082 0.099 0.091 
Observations 432 425 425 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pval in parentheses. The dependent variable is 




Table A4.10: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Distress Analysis 
Variable Name Variable Definition  Obs. Mean Med. SD Min Max 
Financial distress 
"1" if household is frequently 
having difficulty servicing loans 
and foregoing basic needs to 
service loans and "0" otherwise 249 0.23 0 0.42 0 1 
Debt service ratio1 
Monthly debt service to total 
essential household 
expenditures (%) 250 0.35 0.33 0.20 0.03 1.53 
Debt service ratio1 
squared 
Monthly debt service to total 
essential household 
expenditures (%) squared 249 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.00 2.35 
Debt service ratio2 
Monthly debt service to total 
household income (%) 249 0.64 0.40 0.99 0.02 8.66 
Household head 
years of schooling 
Years of schooling for 
household head 250 10.20 10 3.80 0 16 
Household head 
years of schooling 
squared 
Years of schooling for 
household head squared 250 118.37 100 66.43 0 256 
Greater Accra 
Region 
"1" if household dwells in the 
Greater Accra Region and "0" 
otherwise 250 0.59 1 0.49 0 1 
Urban 
"1" if dwelling is located in an 
urban area and "0" otherwise 252 0.86 1 0.35 0 1 
Total annual 
income Log of annual total income 250 8.76 8.79 0.83 6.61 11.04 
Household Size Log of household size 250 1.30 1.39 0.55 0 2.4 
Household head is 
self-employed 
"1" if household head is self-
employed and "0" otherwise 250 0.68 1 0.47 0 1 
Female-headed 
household  
"1" if household head is female 




"1" if number of rooms is 
equivalent or greater than 
household size and "0" 
otherwise 249 0.14 0 0.34 0 1 
Health problems 
"1" if significant health 
problems reported and "0" 
otherwise 249 0.78 1 0.42 0 1 
More than 50% of 
Credit Used for 
home enterprise 
"1" if greater than 50% of credit 
applied to home enterprise and 
"0" otherwise 250 0.83 1 0.37 0 1 
Financial literacy 
received 
"1" if household received 
financial literacy from MFI and 
"0" otherwise 250 0.70 1 0.46 0 1 
Loan user is female 
"1" if loan user is female and 
"0" otherwise 250 0.83 1 0.37 0 1 
Formal MFI 
"1" if formal MFI institution 
and "0" informal 250 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
Formal 
MFI*Interest rate 
Interaction between the dummy 
variable for Formal MFI and the 
monthly interest rate 249 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.16 
Author’s calculations based on survey data 
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Table A4.11: Impact of Debt Burden on Household Financial Distress – Income measure 
VARIABLES 









Debt service to income ratio 0.748** 0.100*** 0.756** 0.100** 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) 
More than 50% of Credit Used for home 
enterprise 
1.214** 0.163** 1.214** 0.160** 
  (0.032) (0.024) (0.034) (0.026) 
Financial literacy received -0.181 -0.024 -0.137 -0.018 
  (0.653) (0.655) (0.738) (0.739) 
Loan user is female -0.863* -0.116* -1.005* -0.133** 
  (0.096) (0.086) (0.057) (0.047) 
Formal MFI 0.431 0.058 0.889 0.118 
  (0.308) (0.301) (0.127) (0.116) 
Household head years of schooling -0.428*** -0.057*** -0.412*** -0.054*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Household head years of schooling squared 0.024*** 0.003*** 0.023*** 0.003*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Greater Accra Region 2.127*** 0.285*** 2.100*** 0.278*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban -1.546** -0.207** -1.514** -0.200** 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.024) (0.022) 
Household head is female 0.459 0.061 0.475 0.063 
  (0.378) (0.377) (0.366) (0.365) 
Total annual income -0.272 -0.036 -0.300 -0.040 
  (0.341) (0.340) (0.288) (0.286) 
Household Size 0.579 0.078 0.606 0.080 
  (0.184) (0.186) (0.171) (0.173) 
Household head is self-employed -0.895** -0.120** -0.874** -0.116** 
  (0.028) (0.025) (0.035) (0.033) 
Number of rooms=>household size 1.055* 0.141* 1.050* 0.139* 
  (0.067) (0.064) (0.072) (0.069) 
Health problems 0.673 0.090 0.622 0.082 
  (0.180) (0.183) (0.220) (0.223) 
Formal MFI*Monthly Interest Rate     -12.327 -1.629 
      (0.321) (0.315) 
Constant 0.607   0.869   
  (0.813)   (0.733)   
Log pseudolikelihood -104.13 -102.72 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Wald chi2 40.6 41.8 
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.22 0.22 
Observations 249 248 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust pvalue in parentheses. Dependent variable= 





Table A4.12: Descriptive Statistics-Impact of Debt Service Burden on being Credit 
Constrained 
Variable Name Variable Definition  Obs. Mean Med. SD Min Max 
Credit Constrained 
"1" if household is 
credit constrained 
and "0" otherwise 496 0.210 0 0.407 0 1 
Debt Service Burden               
Low 
if debt service to 
essential 
expenditures<25% 499 0.667 1 0.472 0 1 
Moderate 
if 25% >=essential 
expenditures ratio< 
40% 499 0.156 0 0.364 0 1 
High 
if debt service to 
essential 
expenditures>40% 499 0.176 0 0.382 0 1 
Household head 
years of schooling 
Household head 
years of schooling 495 9.782 10 4.373 0 16 
Household head 
years of schooling 
squared 
Household head 
years of schooling 
squared 495 114.77 100 70.646 0 256 
Greater Accra 
Region 
"1" if household 
dwells in the Greater 
Accra Region and 
"0" otherwise 497 0.571 1 0.495 0 1 
Urban 
"1" if dwelling is 
located in an urban 
area and "0" 
otherwise 499 0.848 1 0.360 0 1 
Below the upper 
poverty line 
 "1" if Below upper 
poverty line  and "0" 
otherwise 495 0.265 0 0.442 0 1 
Total physical assets 
Log of total physical 
assets 492 8.357 8.26 1.549 3.83 12.42 
Household size>4 
"1" if household size 
is greater than 4 and 
"0" otherwise 496 0.192 0 0.394 0 1 
Household head is 
self-employed 
"1" if household head 
is self-employed and 




"1" if number of 
rooms is equivalent 
or greater than 
household size and 
"0" otherwise 496 0.167 0 0.374 0 1 
Health problems 
"1" if significant 
health problems 
reported and "0" 
otherwise 496 0.800 1 0.400 0 1 




Table A4.13: Descriptive Statistics-Impact of Debt Service Burden on being Credit 
Constrained  
Variable Name Variable Definition  Obs. Mean Med. SD Min Max 
Credit Constrained 
"1" if household is 
credit constrained 
and "0" otherwise 496 0.210 0 0.407 0 1 
Debt Service Burden               
Low 
if debt service to 
income<25% 499 0.643 1 0.480 0 1 
Moderate 
if 25% >=debt 
service ratio< 40% 499 0.104 0 0.306 0 1 
High 
if debt service to 
income>40% 499 0.253 0 0.435 0 1 
Household head 
years of schooling 
Household head 
years of schooling 495 9.782 10 4.373 0 16 
Household head 
years of schooling 
squared 
Household head 
years of schooling 
squared 495 114.772 100 70.646 0 256 
Greater Accra 
Region 
"1" if household 
dwells in the Greater 
Accra Region and 
"0" otherwise 497 0.571 1 0.495 0 1 
Urban 
"1" if dwelling is 
located in an urban 
area and "0" 
otherwise 499 0.848 1 0.360 0 1 
Below the upper 
poverty line 
"1" if Below upper 
poverty line  and "0" 
otherwise 495 0.265 0 0.442 0 1 
Total physical assets 
Log of total physical 
assets 492 8.357 8.26 1.549 3.83 12.42 
Household size>4 
"1" if household size 
is greater than 4 and 
"0" otherwise 496 0.192 0 0.394 0 1 
Household head is 
self-employed 
"1" if household head 
is self-employed and 




"1" if number of 
rooms is equivalent 
or greater than 
household size and 
"0" otherwise 496 0.167 0 0.374 0 1 
Health problems 
"1" if significant 
health problems 
reported and "0" 
otherwise 496 0.800 1 0.400 0 1 
 Author’s calculations based on survey data  
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Table A4.14: Impact of Debt Burden on Being Credit Constrained – Income Measure 
VARIABLES Logit Coefficient Marginal Effects 
Debt service burden      
Moderate 2.180*** 0.310*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
High 2.378*** 0.347*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Household head years of schooling 0.262** 0.031** 
  (0.016) (0.016) 
Household head years of schooling squared -0.014** -0.002** 
  (0.036) (0.036) 
Greater Accra Region 0.366 0.043 
  (0.288) (0.286) 
Urban 1.947** 0.227** 
  (0.020) (0.014) 
Above the upper poverty line -0.546 -0.064 
  (0.137) (0.141) 
Total physical assets -0.030 -0.004 
  (0.747) (0.747) 
Household size>4 1.109*** 0.129*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) 
Household head is self-employed 0.209 0.024 
  (0.516) (0.513) 
Number of rooms=>household size 0.547* 0.064* 
  (0.081) (0.075) 
Health problems 1.582*** 0.184*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -7.005***   
  (0.000)   
Log pseudolikelihood -182.20 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Wald chi2(15) 104.87 
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.281 
Observations 491 
Notes:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust pval in parentheses. Dependent variable: Credit 







Table A4.15: Descriptive Statistics of Welfare implications of Microfinance – Only Households with Access to Credit 
Variable Name Variable Definitions Obs. mean median SD min max 
Food Expenditures Log of Annual Food Expenditures 243 7.77 7.80 0.72 5.78 9.35 
Total Essential Expenditures Log of Annual Essential Expenditures 244 8.45 8.40 0.74 6.13 10.13 
MFI Debt to Asset Ratio MFI Debt to Asset (Per Person) 244 0.32 0.22 0.34 0.00 2.73 
MFI Debt to Asset Ratio Squared MFI Debt to Asset (Per Person) Squared 244 0.22 0.05 0.63 0.00 7.44 
Total MFI Debt to Total Assets Ratio Total MFI Debt to Total Assets  244 0.41 0.24 0.61 0.00 6.27 
Total MFI Debt to Total Assets Squared Total MFI Debt to Total Assets Squared 244 0.54 0.06 2.78 0.00 39.35 
Debt Service to Income Ratio Debt Service to Income Ratio (Monthly) 243 0.64 0.40 1.00 0.02 8.67 
Debt Service to Income Ratio Squared Debt Service to Income Ratio Squared 243 1.41 0.16 7.36 0.00 75.11 
Total MFI Debt to Annual Income Total MFI Debt to Annual Income 244 0.31 0.16 0.49 0.02 4.33 
Total MFI Debt to Annual Income 
Squared Total MFI Debt to Annual Income Squared 244 0.33 0.03 1.64 0.00 18.78 
Investment Credit Share of Total MFI 
Credit 
Log of Investment Credit Share of Total 
MFI Credit 244 -0.20 0.00 0.41 -2.39 0.00 
Annual Household Income  Log of Annual Household Income 244 8.75 8.79 0.82 6.61 11.04 
Wealth Per Person Log of Physical Wealth Per Person 244 7.38 7.29 1.36 4.34 11.11 
Female years of schooling  Female years of schooling (Adults) 232 9.00 10 3.69 0 16 
Age Dependency Ratio Age Dependency Ratio 244 0.45 0.5 0.24 0 0.86 
Age of Household Head Age of Household Head 244 41.8 42 9.78 22 83 
Age of Household Head Squared Age of Household Head Squared 244 1839.9 1764.0 874.5 484.0 6889.0 
Water Access to clean water 244 0.60 1 0.49 0 1 
Urban Household has urban Location 244 0.85 1 0.36 0 1 
Self-Employed Household head is Self-employed 244 0.68 1 0.47 0 1 




Table A4.16: Welfare Impact of MFI Debt – Households with Access to Microfinance 
  
Dep Var1: Annual 
Food Expenditures 
Dep Var2: Annual 
Essential Household 
Expenditures 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Total MFI Debt to Annual Income -0.496*** -0.425** -0.512** -0.325* 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.071) 
Total MFI Debt to Annual Income 
Squared 0.129*** 0.113** 0.128** 0.083 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.026) (0.105) 
Log of Investment Credit Share of Total 
MFI Credit -0.171* -0.109 -0.188* -0.112 
 (0.055) (0.209) (0.069) (0.219) 
Log of Physical Assets Per Person 0.150*** 0.174*** 0.141*** 0.166*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female years of schooling  0.018* 0.011 0.030** 0.022** 
 (0.086) (0.281) (0.011) (0.040) 
Access to clean water 0.489*** 0.450*** 0.506*** 0.482*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban Dwelling 0.527*** 0.572*** 0.304** 0.376*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.001) 
Age Dependency Ratio  0.538***  1.037*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Age of Household Head  -0.008  0.036 
  (0.748)  (0.152) 
Age of Household Head Squared  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.542)  (0.252) 
Household Head is Self-employed  -0.110  -0.203** 
  (0.155)  (0.013) 
Constant 5.878*** 5.589*** 6.719*** 5.259*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 231 231 232 232 
R-squared 0.490 0.531 0.379 0.514 




Table A4.17: Welfare Impact of MFI Debt – Households with Access to Microfinance 
Variables 
Dep Var1: Annual 
Food Expenditures 
Dep Var2: Annual 
Essential Household 
Expenditures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Total MFI Debt to Total Assets  -0.254** -0.249* -0.643*** -0.679*** 
 (0.046) (0.053) (0.001) (0.000) 
Total MFI Debt to Total Assets Squared 0.029 0.029 0.168** 0.204*** 
 (0.267) (0.272) (0.028) (0.005) 
Log of Investment Credit Share of Total 
MFI Credit -0.159* -0.135 -0.185** -0.130 
 (0.067) (0.127) (0.049) (0.141) 
Log of Annual Household Income 0.228*** 0.209*** 0.270*** 0.210*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female years of schooling 0.019* 0.018* 0.024** 0.024** 
 (0.061) (0.080) (0.025) (0.022) 
Access to clean water 0.521*** 0.521*** 0.497*** 0.530*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban Dwelling 0.521*** 0.546*** 0.262** 0.334*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.003) 
Age Dependency Ratio  0.274*  0.861*** 
  (0.086)  (0.000) 
Age of Household Head  -0.015  0.021 
  (0.535)  (0.407) 
Age of Household Head Squared  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.393)  (0.506) 
Household Head is Self-employed  -0.015  -0.103 
  (0.844)  (0.184) 
Constant 4.933*** 5.191*** 5.540*** 5.138*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 231 231 231 231 
R-squared 0.499 0.506 0.461 0.537 




Table A4.18: Welfare Impact of MFI Debt – Households with Access to Microfinance 
  
Dep Var1: Annual 
Food Expenditures 
Dep Var2: Annual 
Essential Household 
Expenditures 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Debt Service to Income Ratio -0.272*** -0.218** -0.352*** -0.248** 
 (0.003) (0.019) (0.001) (0.010) 
Debt Service to Income Ratio 
Squared 0.034*** 0.028** 0.044*** 0.030** 
 (0.005) (0.022) (0.002) (0.017) 
Log of Investment Credit Share of 
Total MFI Credit -0.151* -0.097 -0.192* -0.121 
 (0.094) (0.279) (0.066) (0.193) 
Log of Physical Assets Per Person 0.144*** 0.165*** 0.141*** 0.157*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female years of schooling 0.018* 0.012 0.030** 0.024** 
 (0.073) (0.250) (0.010) (0.029) 
Access to clean water 0.493*** 0.458*** 0.513*** 0.501*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban Dwelling 0.497*** 0.551*** 0.257** 0.359*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.002) 
Age Dependency Ratio  0.503***  1.041*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Age of Household Head  -0.006  0.033 
  (0.787)  (0.181) 
Access to clean water  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.579)  (0.293) 
Household Head is Self-employed  -0.103  -0.181** 
  (0.190)  (0.027) 
Constant 5.963*** 5.658*** 6.804*** 5.388*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 230 230 231 231 
R-squared 0.490 0.522 0.392 0.518 











Table A5.1: Summary Statistics – Intra-household Gender Inequality Analysis 




Females’ share in household durable 
and business assets 
Females’ share in total 
household durable and 
business assets (ranges 
from 0 to 1)45.  
0.66 0.35 0 1 
Microfinance credit 
Ratio of microcredit to 
household income 
0.24 0.36 0.02 2.78 
Social expenditures 
The share of education & 
health expenditures in total 
essential household 
expenditures 
0.32 0.20 0 0.84 
Female income Female’s annual income 4152.7 3705.4 0 24000 
Age of borrower 
Average age of borrowers 
in the household  
39.82 9.26 22 83 
Dummy variables       
Gender of user of credit 
"1" if female and "0" if 
otherwise 
0.83 0.38 0 1 
Financial literacy dummy 
Variable measures whether 
a client received some 
form of training in the use 
of the credit received from 
the MFI. "1" if YES and 
"0" if otherwise: 
0.70 0.46 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data
                                                          
45 The choice of this variable is due to the fact that from the survey most respondents 
indicated that the loan funds were used to acquire business assets and sometimes durable assets 







Table A5.2: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables: Oaxaca Decomposition 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 Table A5.3: Sample Means and Size of Dummy Variables 




Share of Females' Education and 






physical assets  
(GHS) 
MFI Households 250 0.50 64.4% 8.71 16940.25 
Non-MFI Households 245 0.49 67.5% 8.29 11795.48 
Male-Headed Households 315 0.64 56.8% 8.87 16946.42 
Female-Headed Households 179 0.36 81.6% 7.86 9982.31 
Self-Employed 321 0.65 72.8% 8.45 13525.51 









Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Male HHH-
Female_HHH 
Log of household total physical assets 8.50 0.07 8.87 0.08 7.86 0.11 1.01 
Household total physical assets 14422.99 1227.36 16946.42 1509.48 9982.31 2065.79 6964.11 
Male-headed households 0.64 0.02 1.00 0.00 - - 1.00 
Children’s years of schooling 5.07 0.24 4.49 0.28 6.33 0.43 -1.84 
Log per capita household 
expenditures 6.77 0.03 6.74 0.04 6.83 0.06 -0.09 
Per capita household expenditures 1145.52 43.76 1072.31 48.41 1274.35 84.95 -202.04 
Log of household size 1.22 0.03 1.39 0.03 0.91 0.04 0.49 
Household size 3.88 0.08 4.42 0.10 2.92 0.12 1.50 
Age of household head 40.47 0.47 41.58 0.60 38.51 0.75 3.07 
Age of household head Squared 1747.22 42.26 1840.98 55.21 1582.22 62.85 258.75 
Education of household head 9.80 0.20 11.25 0.18 7.25 0.37 4.00 
Self-employed Dummy 0.65 0.02 0.52 0.03 0.88 0.02 -0.37 
Microfinance Dummy 0.51 0.02 0.50 0.03 0.52 0.04 -0.02 
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Table A5.4: Marital Status of Household Head 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data 
 
Table A5.5: Ethnic Group of Household Head 
 











 Obs. Percent 
Divorced / separated 53 10.8 
Married 333 67.6 
Never married 73 14.8 
Widow / widower 34 6.9 
Total 493 100.0 
 Obs. Percent 
Akan 298 60.8 
Ga 83 16.9 
Ewe 72 14.7 
Guan 6 1.2 
Gurma 1 0.2 
Mole-Dagbani 8 1.6 
Grusi 4 0.8 
Others 18 3.7 
Total 490 100.0 
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Table A5.6: Impact of Access to MFI Credit on Intra-household Gender Inequality 
Variables 
OLS Betafit Flogit ZOIB 
OLS Betafit GLM proportion oneinflate zeroinflate 
Log of Total Credit to 
Household Income 
0.046** 0.162 0.335*** 0.162* 1.000*** -1.394 
(0.013) (0.116) (0.005) (0.077) (0.006) (0.166) 
Log of Female annual 
income 
0.071*** 0.160 0.355*** 0.160* 0.077 -4.000** 
(0.004) (0.210) (0.009) (0.084) (0.856) (0.030) 
Gender of loan user  
0.376*** 0.988*** 1.429*** 0.988*** 1.551* -2.455* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.075) 
Dummy for Tier 2 Category 
- MFI  
0.076** 0.289 0.336 0.289 1.627*** 18.570*** 
(0.022) (0.116) (0.121) (0.133) (0.006) (0.000) 
Financial literacy dummy 
0.195*** 0.668*** 0.922*** 0.668*** 1.422** -0.136 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.870) 
Average age of borrowers in 
the household 
-0.001 0.021 -0.019 0.021 0.057 0.186 
(0.894) (0.699) (0.704) (0.610) (0.728) (0.663) 
Age squared 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.997) (0.588) (0.884) (0.432) (0.535) (0.835) 
Marital status of borrower 
0.239*** 1.017*** 2.235*** 1.017*** 3.304*** -12.567*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average years of schooling 
for household head 
0.003 0.037 0.031 0.037 -0.048 0.314* 
(0.467) (0.110) (0.280) (0.181) (0.554) (0.088) 
Log of the share of 
education & health 
expenditures in total 
essential household 
expenditures 
-0.017 -0.038 -0.178 -0.038 -0.126 3.060 
(0.435) (0.766) (0.296) (0.738) (0.664) (0.153) 
Log of household size 
-0.027 0.120 -0.090 0.120 -1.032 -2.054 
(0.526) (0.628) (0.782) (0.622) (0.121) (0.392) 
Urban dummy 
-0.070 -0.290 -0.523* -0.290 0.170 0.998 
(0.156) (0.296) (0.061) (0.137) (0.771) (0.352) 
Constant 
-0.252 -2.798* -3.091** -2.798** -3.371 4.079 
(0.383) (0.070) (0.034) (0.027) (0.462) (0.746) 
/ln_phi   0.946***   0.946***     
    (0.000)   (0.000)     
Number of observations 227 155 227 227 
Adjusted R2 0.486    
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pvalue in parantheses. The dependent variable is the 
gender inequality measured by female’s share in total household durable and business assets 




Table A5.7: Descriptive Statistics for Children’s School Enrollment  





"1" if child enrolled in school 
and "0" if otherwise 
728 0.95 0.21 0 1 
Microfinance dummy "1" if household has access to 
Microfinance and "0" if 
otherwise 
728 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Urban Location of 
Household 
"1" if household located in 
urban area and "0" if otherwise 
728 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Expenditures per capita 
(GHS) 
Log of Household 
Expenditures per person 
728 6.57 0.62 4.92 8.46 
Post-Primary Education 
- Household Head 
"1" if HHH has post-primary 
education and "0" if otherwise 
728 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Household Size Log the number of household 
members 
728 1.63 0.33 0.69 2.40 
Human Capital 
Expenditure share in 
total expenditures 
Log of the share of Education 
& health expenditures in total 
essential household 
expenditures (%) 




Age Dependency ratio 
(%) 






"1" if HHH is female and "0" 
if male 
728 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Number of rooms in 
household 
Number of rooms in household 719 1.83 1.24 1 9 
Male Child "1" if male child and "0" if 
female child 
719 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Female Share in 
household assets 
Female Share in household 
assets 
719 0.59 0.32 0 1 
Log of assets per 
person 
Assets per person (GHS) 719 7.17 1.38 3 10 







Table A5.8: Children’s School Enrollment by Household Characteristics 
School Enrollment  Obs. Mean SD 
Gap 
Households with Microfinance 458 96.5% 18.4% 2.9% 
Households without Microfinance 314 93.6% 24.5% 
Female-headed households 217 89.9% 30.3% 7.6% 
Male-headed households 552 97.5% 15.7% 
Male child 368 96.5% 18.5% 2.2% 
Female child 404 94.3% 23.2% 
Household head has post-primary education 620 98.1% 13.8% 14.2% 
Household head has no post-primary education 149 83.9% 36.9% 
Household is below the upper poverty line (GHS1314) 163 90.2% 29.8% 6.5% 
Household is above the upper poverty line (GHS1314) 605 96.7% 17.9% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Survey data 
 
Table A5.9: Descriptive Statistics for Impact of Access to Microcredit on Children’s School 
Enrollment: Female-headed versus Male-headed Households 





household  Obs=521 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
School Enrollment 
Dummy 
"1" if child enrolled in school and 
"0" if otherwise 0.91 0.29 0.97 0.16 
Microfinance 
dummy 
"1" if household has access to 
Microfinance and "0" if otherwise 0.61 0.49 0.60 0.49 
Urban Location of 
Household 
"1" if household located in urban 
area and "0" if otherwise 0.75 0.43 0.87 0.34 
Expenditures per 
capita (GHS) 
Log of Household Expenditures 
per person 6.44 0.61 6.61 0.61 
Adult female years 
of schooling 
Years of schooling of Adult female 
members of a household 7.76 4.39 9.10 3.53 
Household Size 
Log the number of household 
members 1.41 0.39 1.71 0.25 
Human Capital 
Expenditure share in 
total expenditures 
Log of the share of Education & 
health expenditures in total 
essential household expenditures 
(%) -0.99 0.54 -1.02 0.53 
Age Dependency 
ratio (%) Log of Age dependency  -0.59 0.38 -0.64 0.32 
Male Child 
"1" if male child and "0" if female 
child 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Female Share in 
household assets Female Share in household assets 0.94 0.17 0.47 0.27 
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